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This dissertation examines the development of Russian federalism from 1990-
2002, focusing on patterns of intergovernmental conflict and cooperation that have 
persisted across both the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies.  It argues that unexpected 
instances of cooperation between the federal government and the wealthier regions can be 
explained by the political and economic integrating role of Russia’s largest business 
actors, or “national- level” businesses.  As these businesses increase their impact on 
regional political economies, they tend to enhance the central government’s capacity to 
coerce and co-opt regional politicians.  Although the comparative politics literature has 
increasingly emphasized the dangers of political decentralization in democratizing federal 
states, this study demonstrates how certain types of state-business alliances can, instead, 
 viii 
bind the interests of federal and regional politicians, helping to “make federalism work” 
in an environment of intense economic adjustment and weak democratic institutions.   
The dissertation concludes with an assessment of two contrasting scenarios 
focused on the direction of Russia’s federal system during the next several years.  One 
scenario is clearly more positive than the other, envisioning the gradual 
institutionalization of the state-business relationship, coupled with the development of a 
strong national party system, as contributing to a deepening of democratic federalism and 
to a “market-preserving” balance of power in intergovernmental relations that would 
promote economically salutary competition between subnational governments.  The 
other, more negative, scenario foresees national- level businesses as becoming 
instruments of coercive recentralization in Russia’s federal system, with potentially 
deleterious effects for democratic consolidation and fiscal federal performance. 
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What makes federalism work? Renewed interest in the dynamics of federal 
systems and their consequences for political stability, democratic consolidation and 
economic performance has heightened greatly since the third wave of democratization 
crested a decade ago.  For the Russian Federation, which encompasses eleven different 
time zones, 89 sub-national regions and dozens of ethnic groups, finding a democratic 
solution to the numerous, multifaceted problems of federal governance has been a 
pressing issue.  Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s center-periphery relations involved both 
conflict and accommodation between the Kremlin and an array of recalcitrant regional 
governments that championed their own fiscal and political autonomy.  Moscow’s 
inability to control the pace of decentralization produced an unstable and asymmetrical 
federal arrangement, in which the federal government had limited capacity to implement 
coherent policies and establish a uniform market and rule of law.   
Although Russia managed to avoid the ultimate fate of its Soviet successor state 
and ethnofederal neighbors in Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia, lingering regional 
defiance has continued to frustrate President Putin’s attempts to re-establish federal 
preeminence and enforce mandates uniformly. Understanding the factors that both drive 
and constrain aggressive regional behavior in federal systems is essential for the study of 
democratization in large countries generally.  For Russia in particular, it is important to 
understand how the centrifugal forces unleashed by its dual economic and political 
transition can be managed without backsliding toward the Soviet past.   
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 This study developed in response to a puzzle.  In the comparative politics 
literature, natural resource wealth and industrial development have traditionally been 
associated with higher levels of assertive, autonomy-seeking behavior by regions toward 
the federal center, such as demands for state restructuring and expansion of control over 
fiscal and political resources.  The opportunities for such behavior can be even greater in 
periods of political openings, intense economic adjustment and increased exposure to 
global markets, all of which have been evident in the Russian case.  Yet, Russia’s 
wealthiest regions – the “winners” of the market transition – are clearly divided into two 
distinct groups, “assertive” and “loyal.”  Consistent with the conventional wisdom, the 
first of these two sets of regions has pursued assertive strategies, including disruptive acts 
of political and economic separatism under Yeltsin, as well as overt resistance to Putin’s 
attempts to harmonize federal and regional legislation and phase out the special deals 
contained in bilateral power-sharing agreements signed under his predecessor. On the 
other hand, the second set of regions has far more often followed strategies of loyalty and 
cooperation with the federal center, exhibiting both greater restraint in the public political 
arena under Yeltsin, and more readily acquiescing to the recentralization of authority 
under Putin. 
  While political resource mobilization opportunities inherited from the Soviet 
Union’s ethnofederal structure can explain part of this dichotomous pattern, they cannot 
account for the divergence of behavior within subsets of ethnic and non-ethnic regions, 
which are found in both the “assertive” and “loyal” categories.  Neither does the nature of 
Russia's fiscal federal arrangement fully answer this question, for many of the clearly 
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“loyal” regions possess high levels of bargaining power with Moscow as net contributors 
to the federal budget.  Moreover, the relative difference in regional behavior has 
remained consistent over the past decade despite the redesign of federal institutions, the 
strengthening of the executive apparatus, and a sharp change in national leadership.   
 I argue that unexpected instances of cooperation between the federal government 
and the wealthier regions can be explained by the political and economic integrating role 
of Russia’s largest business actors, or “national- level” businesses.  The top echelon of   
businesses in Russia is a natural ally of the federal center, and has enhanced its capacity 
to both coerce and co-opt elites in the wealthier regions where these businesses have a 
strategic interest.  I develop a theoretical framework for viewing national- level businesses 
as both “sticks” and “carrots” that can reduce the economic incentives and political 
opportunities for regional politicians to engage in confrontational behavior vis-à-vis 
Moscow. I then employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to show that higher 
degrees of “penetration” by national- level business actors in regional political economies 
result in lower levels of assertiveness by these regions in the federal bargaining game.  
 Various scholars have emphasized the perverse incentives that federal institutions 
can create for regional politicians in democratizing and emerging-market countries to 
undermine public goods such as national political and fiscal stability in their pursuit of 
particularistic interests.  In the Russian case, alliances between powerful, rent-seeking 
enterprises and their political patrons in regional governments have been customarily 
viewed as exacerbating this potential danger associated with federal systems.  This study 
demonstrates how certain types of state-business alliances have actually contributed to 
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the stability of Russia’s federal system over the last decade.  In particular, I focus on the 
relative size and structure of big businesses. By forging alliances with both federal 
politicians and officials in regions where their production assets are located, Russia’s 
largest, vertically- integrated businesses have served as a tie that binds the post-Soviet 
federal state in the context of weak national party penetration in the periphery.   
  The capacity of national- level businesses to act as mechanisms of political 
integration reflects a different side of state-business relations than that customarily found 
in the literature on “oligarchic capitalism” in Russia.  It is true that the business oligarchy 
that emerged from Russia’s mass privatization program in the early nineties has been 
blamed for capturing the state and resisting further progress in economic reform in order 
to defend its initial gains.  Yet, even though politically powerful business actors have had 
a “horizontally” fragmenting effect on the federal government by dividing the loyalties of 
public officials among competing financial- industrial groups, they have also played a 
“vertically” integrating role in Russia’s federal system. The acquisition of enterprises in 
key sectors of Russia’s economy by national- level businesses has facilitated the 
construction of economic hierarchies that have supplemented political ones.    
 The fact that the Russian Federation began its democratic transition as a weak 
state in the midst of a relatively chaotic process of decentralization, but is now more 
clearly headed toward greater centralization makes it an intriguing case for gauging the 
effect of business actors on center-periphery relations. No matter what road Russia takes 
politically, the need to integrate into the global economy will make a complete retreat 
toward the Sovie t command-administrative model unlikely.  In order to harness the full 
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economic potential of subnational competition in Russia’s federal state, the Kremlin must 
balance centralization with a measure of political and fiscal autonomy for regional 
governments. In addition to a strong formal state hierarchy, this requires various 
integrating mechanisms to structure bargaining and reciprocity among federal and 
regional politicians.  The dissertation establishes a framework for viewing national- level 
businesses, with their considerable political and economic resources, as playing an 
important role in maintaining this balance and “making federalism work.” 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 The first chapter of the dissertation offers a review of the comparative literature 
on the divergent experiences of democratizing states over the past two decades, which 
have shown that federal systems can be a double-edged sword, enhancing or undercutting 
political stability, democratic consolidation and public sector performance. After 
reviewing critiques of Russian federalism, the chapter examines the dynamics of 
intergovernmental bargaining and the variables commonly employed in the literature to 
explain how regions in federal systems behave.  Two sets of variables are highlighted, 
including “demand-side” ones, which include economic incentives and political 
bargaining power, and also political- institutional constraints, which include the durability 
and fairness of the “federal bargain”, the strength of the state bureaucracy and national 
party system, as well as national leadership and changing patterns of federal responses to 
regional assertiveness.  These variables are then examined in the context of both the 
Yeltsin and Putin presidencies.  The chapter concludes with the contention that 
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conventional understandings of federalism do not adequately explain variations in 
regional behavior in Russia.   
 Chapter 2 develops a theoretical perspective for explaining the divergence in the 
behavior of Russia’s wealthier regions.  It makes the case for incorporating a missing 
variable – the relative influence of national- level businesses in the wealthy regions.  The 
various forms of political and financial influence, or “carrots” and “sticks,” that national-
level business can use to influence regional strategies in the federal bargaining game are 
outlined.  The chapter concludes by presenting a triangular view of federal system 
dynamics that captures the interconnectedness between big business actors and regional 
and federal governments in the Russian case. 
Chapter 3 provides a closer look at the dynamics of intergovernmental relations 
throughout the Russian transition toward democracy, dividing Russian federalism from 1990-
2002 into three phases, and highlighting the change and continuity in both regional agendas 
and the formal and informal rules of the federal bargaining game.  While political 
opportunism certainly has been a motivating factor for regional assertion, especially in the 
earlier years of the transition and by Russia’s “ethnic republics,” the strains of economic 
adjustment have been a common denominator impelling aggressive regional strategies in the 
intergovernmental arena.  Moreover, patterns of accommodation and reciprocity during 
federal election cycles have been a thread that has stretched across intergovernmental 
relations during both the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies.   
Chapter 4 provides statistical evidence that national- level businesses have helped to 
structure more cooperative patterns of center-periphery relations.  It begins by identifying the 
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“national- level” subset of Russian businesses, and then overviews the institutional context 
that has amplified their political role in Russia’s federal system.  Several versions of 
multivariate regression analysis are presented to demonstrate the statistical relationship 
between the level of “penetration” of national- level business actors in the wealthy regions’ 
political economies and these regions’ level of assertiveness in the federal bargaining game.  
Dividing the dependent variable, or regional assertiveness index, across time also shows that 
the various waves of national- level business expansion have increasingly structured center-
periphery relations in Russia.   
Chapter 5 suggests a way of categorizing the wealthy regions through the prism of the 
dissertation's political economy framework.  It begins by identifying three typologies of 
regions: consistently loyal, consistently assertive and those regions demonstrating declining 
assertiveness.  It then reviews the two “waves” of national- level business expansion into the 
periphery under Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, respectively.  Regions that were able to limit 
the expansion of national- level business actors into their jurisdictions during both of these 
waves have been the most consistently assertive.  By contrast, in regions where national- level 
businesses have maintained a strategic presence since the early 1990s, pressing jurisdictional 
and distributional issues have generally been resolved via power-sharing settlements between 
these businesses and the regional administrations, in place of more risky strategies of 
assertion toward Moscow.  Finally, the third category of regions initially pursued assertive 
strategies in the federal bargaining game, but then became “quieter” after national- level 
businesses expanded into their territories beginning in 1999.   
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The sixth and concluding chapter examines the empirical and normative 
implications of the study.  In particular, it emphasizes the role of big business as a 
“balancing” mechanism in Russia’s federal system.  It makes the case that the evolving 
nature of the state-business relationship is important for Russia’s prospects of achieving 
democratic federalism, as well as a “market-preserving” balance in intergovernmental 
relations that would promote efficiency-enhancing interregional competition.  The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of two contrasting scenarios about the direction of 
Russia’s federal system during the next several years.   
9 
Chapter 1:  Russian Federalism in the Comparative Perspective 
 
The tumultuous and conflict-ridden 1990s demonstrated the dangers inherent in 
federal systems throughout Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region.  In the Russian 
case, assertive, autonomy-seeking strategies adopted by regional elites undermined the 
central government’s capacity to effectively coordinate decentralization, leading to ethnic 
conflict, macroeconomic instability, and ultimately threatening state breakdown.  
Although the immediate threat of territorial disintegration has since subsided, instances of 
regional defiance, most notably and violently by Chechnya, continue to frustrate the 
Kremlin’s efforts to reestablish a strong central state able to effectively govern.  
Understanding the factors that both drive and limit regional assertiveness in federal 
systems is important, because Russia must still cope with the challenge of managing the 
centrifugal forces unleashed by political decentralization, ethnonationalism and 
integration into the global economy.   
 This chapter presents a framework for analyzing the dynamics of regional 
assertiveness in federal systems.  It begins by reviewing the comparative and Russian 
area literature on federalism, focusing on the effects that federal institutional 
arrangements have on political and economic performance in democratizing countries.  
Concluding that Russian federalism has failed to live up to its full potential thus far, it 
asks an important question for large democratizing states: what makes federalism work?  
 The second part of the chapter addresses this question by offering an overview of 
the dynamics of elite bargaining in federal systems.  After outlining various types of 
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federal outcomes that result from the interaction of federal and regional strategies, it then 
narrows the question to explaining patterns of regional behavior: why were some regions 
consistently assertive, while others demonstrated greater constraint during both the 
Yeltsin and Putin presidencies?  
The third section reviews the traditional variable set used in the literature to 
explain regional behavior in federal systems.  Two sets of factors are highlighted: 
economic and ethnicity-based drivers on one hand, and political and institutional 
constraints on the other.  I conclude by arguing that the conventional wisdom does not 
adequately explain the variation in regional behavior in the Russian case, especially 
within the cohorts of ethnic and non-ethnic regions.  These observations provide the 
foundation for the dissertation’s thesis pursued in Chapter 2.   
 
FEDERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 
The logic of balance  
 
As Watts’s notes, the term "federalism" is applied to a wide range of institutional 
arrangements in the comparative literature.  Included under the umbrella of federalism 
are federal political systems, which are broadly characterized by a combination of 
"shared-rule and self-rule," and the more narrow set of federations, distinguished by the 
constitutional division of rights and responsibilities within a multi-tiered government 
where each level is held responsible by direct elections.1  Riker's definition perhaps best 
addresses the central feature of federalism: “a political organization in which the 
                                                 
1 Watts defines federal systems as “a genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of 
shared-rule and self-rule.” Federations are a subspecies of federal systems: “a compound polity combining 
constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a 
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activities of government are divided between regional and central governments in such a 
way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final 
decisions.”2  Indeed, the importance of guaranteed autonomous spheres of decision-
making authority in certain policy arenas is central to the idea of federalism.3  In this 
sense, it is just as much designed to keep levels of government at an arms- length distance 
from each other as it is to foster intergovernmental cooperation and accommodation. 4  
 It could be argued that this concept of balance is perhaps the distinguishing 
feature of federal systems, since there is no set blueprint for political institutions, nor is 
there a specific threshold for the level of fiscal or policy decentralization. 5  Indeed, Smith 
labels federal systems as "decentered," noting that federalism has been represented as 
both "centralizing and decentralizing ideolog[ies] as well as a doctrine of balance.”6 
Likewise, Elazar refers to federal systems as being "non-centralized.”7  In this context, 
federalism is a point on a spectrum somewhere midway between a confederal system, 
where the constituent units could routinely override any decision of the central 
government (such as happened in the Soviet Union during its final years of existence), 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its 
legislative, administrative, and taxing power, and each directly elected by its citizens”(121).  Ronald Watts, 
“Federalism, Federa l Political Systems, and Federations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1: (1998) 
117-37.   
2 William Riker, “Federalism” in Government Institutions and Processes, Fred Greenstein and Nelson 
Polsby, eds. (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
3 Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).  Usually, the 
“federal guarantee” is a statement in the constitution proclaiming federal power-sharing principles.   
4 Richard Deeg, “Economic Globalization and the Shifting Boundaries of German Federalism,” Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism, 26:1 (Winter 1996), 27-52. 
5 See, for instance, Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1999) on the variety of federal systems and the complexity of cross-national comparison. 
6 Graham Smith, “Introduction,” in Federalism: the Multiethnic Challenge (London, New York: Longman, 
1995). 
7 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987). 
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and a unitary system, where there are no formal safeguards against the central 
government arbitrarily revoking authority that has been devolved, regardless of the de-
facto level of fiscal or policy-making decentralization.  As a decentralized unitary state, 
China would currently be an example of the latter case. 
Federalism: panacea or pitfall? 
 
In larger and geographically diverse countries transitioning from authoritarian 
rule, federal institutional arrangements can be used as a means of constitutionally 
preserving certain spheres of regional and local autonomy against the threat of 
encroachment by the central government.8  A distinguishing feature of federations (as a 
sub-species of federal systems) is the greater level of political decentralization enshrined 
in the constitution and secured by sub-federal elections.9  In particular, local elections can 
increase the quality and legitimacy of democracy by enhancing local government 
responsiveness and increasing citizen participation, which is especially important in 
countries with ethnically heterogeneous populations.10  Security against unilateral 
revisions to a region’s status is particularly important for co-opting minority groups 
which might otherwise resort to secession or conflict.11  Furthermore, in presidential 
                                                 
8 An independent judiciary is important component of maintaining cooperative resolution of 
intergovernmental disputes. 
9 In most federations, jurisdictional rules – which demarcate the division of political authority and 
autonomous spheres of policy discretion among levels of government – are embedded in the constitution, 
while distributional (e.g. fiscal federal) rules are enumerated in federal legislation and various types of 
intergovernmental agreements that are generally subject to continuous negotiation by officials.  See Mark 
Krasnick ed. Fiscal Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), especially the chapter by 
Anthony F.  Sheppard, “Taxation Policy and the Canadian Economic Union.” 
10 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation  (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1999). 
11 See, for instance, Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985).  See also T.  Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, 
13 
systems, federalism serves to mitigate the “winner take all” aspect of national elections: 
by electing governors in key regions, an opposition party can gain access to state 
resources, influence policy outcomes and participate in governance via federalism’s 
interwoven political arenas.12  
 Finally, according to fiscal federal theory, the benefits of federalism are enhanced 
when accompanied by a measure of economic decentralization. 13  The devolution of 
fiscal authority and responsibility to subnational governments can improve local service 
delivery and lead to greater experimentation and innovation.  In developing countries in 
particular, properly functioning federal institutions shield markets from government 
interference while at the same time promoting salutary subnational competition to attract 
capital and labor.14  
 Not all scholars are convinced that federalism is inherently beneficial, however, 
especially for newly democratizing countries.  In comparison with unitary systems, 
subnational elites in federations have greater opportunities to mobilize political and fiscal 
resources in pursuit of their own particularistic agendas.15  The federal government is 
responsible for the public good – policies that benefit the federation as a whole – while 
                                                                                                                                                 
DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), and Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977). 
12 Joanne Brzinski, "Changing Forms of Federalism and Party Electoral Strategies: Belgium 
 and the European Union," Publius: The Journal of Federalism,  Winter 1999, v.29, 1, 45. 
13 Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972), 3-20. 
14 Richard Bird and Francois Vaillancourt eds., Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge, New York: Camb ridge University Press, 1999). 
15 See for instance Alfred Stepan, “Russian Federalism in the Comparative Perspective,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs,16(2):2000, 133-176.   
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sub-federal elites are beholden to geographically particular constituencies.16  If left 
unchecked, rent-seeking behavior "from below" may undermine national public goods 
such as policy standardization and market regulation, as well as economic growth and 
political stability. 17  
 In transitional countries, where democratic accountability may be generally 
weaker, elections at the sub-federal level have as much potential to do harm as good.  As 
old channels of vertical accountability are severed and the power bases of regional 
politicians become less dependent on national level decision-makers, the federal center's 
ability to punish potentially destabilizing behavior, such as fiscal irresponsibility, autarky 
and political assertiveness, decreases.  Thus, if the local decision-making process is not 
democratic, decentralization will lead to less manageable and less accountable regional 
government.18 
 Even in developed democratic federations, the overlapping of federal and regional 
jurisdictions inherent in mutli- tiered government generates incentives for jurisdictional 
and distributional conflict, while federalism's multiple veto points can fragment the 
policy process.19  Moreover, the additional venues for electoral politics provided by sub-
federal elections can lead to a more geographically fragmented party system, which is 
                                                 
16 A good overview of the literature on the collective action problem in federal systems can be found in 
Erik Wibbles, “Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance,” American Journal 
of Political Science 44:10 (2000): 687-702.  Regional politicians have an incentive to free-ride on public 
goods such as national macroeconomic stability while trying to carve off the largest piece of the federal pie 
for themselves.  In the absence of strong market discipline and central political coordination, this can lead 
to poor fiscal performance and crises. 
17 Ibid. The Russian-area literature also echoes this view, as demonstrated below. 
18 Remy Prude’homme,“The Dangers of Decentralization,” World Bank Research Observer, 10, no.2, 
(August 1995): 201-20.   
19 One school of critique can be found in the historical-institutionalist literature.  See, for instance, David 
Robertson and Dennis Judd, The Development of American Public Policy: the Structure of Policy 
Constraint (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989).   
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especially true when federalism emerges via decentralization, as in the case of Russia, 
rather than centralization, as in the case of the US and, more recently, the EU. 20 
 As several studies have shown, the regionalization of politics is even starker 
during the initial period of democratization.  Perhaps the greatest failure of federalism is 
reflected in the wave of state disintegration in the nineties.  Based on the experiences of 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, various scholars have warned of the 
dangers of ethnofederal systems during periods of political openings and 
decentralization. 21  In these countries, the legacy of federal institutions provided 
resources (administrative levers, symbolic trappings of statehood) for regional elites to 
create alternative political identities and mobilize the population against the center.  
While federal institutions may be harmless when ethnic identity is latent, they can play a 
"subversive" role at times of political openings when the center attempts to broaden 
political participation. 22 
 While ethnofederal systems may be more prone to political instability than unitary 
countries during transitions, research has also shown that emerging market federations 
are more susceptible to macro-economic crises.  In general, emerging market countries 
lack a sophisticated market infrastructure to enforce responsible fiscal behavior at the 
                                                 
20 Joanne Brzinski, "Changing Forms of Federalism and Party Electoral Strategies: Belgium and the 
European Union," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Winter 1999, v.29, 1, 45; Mark Jones, “Federalism 
and the Number of Parties in Argentine Congressional Elections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol 59, No.2, 
May 1997, 538-49; Herman Bakvis and William Chandler, Federalism and the Role of the State (Toronto, 
Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
21 Carol Leff, “Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States,” World Politics, 51:2, 1999, 
205-235; Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: the Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Mark Beissenger, Nationalist 
Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).   
22 Bunce, 1999. 
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regional level.  Instead of reaping the salutary economic benefits of fiscal federal (e.g. 
interregional) competition, many emerging market federations have suffered from what 
Wibbles has labeled “political federalism,” or rent-seeking by regional politicians, which 
undermines national fiscal performance.23   
That federal systems account for one factor explaining the divergence in progress 
toward market reform among third-wave countries (especially between Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, which had similar starting points) has prompted scholars to 
focus on the sequencing of reforms in democratizing federations, and to suggest that 
economic reform proceed political decentralization. 24  This in turn is tied into the larger 
question of central state capacity during transitions.  For instance, various comparisons 
between China and Russia have highlighted the importance of the balance between 
regional autonomy and the capacity of the central state; the latter must be strong enough 
to deter rent-seeking behavior, while properly regulating fiscal federal competition, 
which entails maintaining a unified national market space.25  Inheriting a weak central 
state unable to hold regional leaders politically accountable is therefore another condition 
that can exacerbate the “subversive” effects of federal systems. 
                                                 
23 See Wibbles, “Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance,” 2000.  Federal 
systems provide regional leaders with an incentive to maximize resources within their jurisdictions, and 
free ride in regard to public goods such as a stable currency, which is solely the responsibility of the federal 
government.   
24 Treisman, Daniel.  “Political Decentralization and Economic Reform: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” 
American Journal of Political Science, 43, 2 (April 1999): 448-517. 
25 Oliver Blanchard and Andrey Schleifer, Federalism With and Without Political Centralization:  China 
versus Russia.  NBER Working Paper Series, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2000; and Darrell Slider “Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 
38 (October, 1997): 445-460. 
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By all accounts, in the early nineties the Russian Federation fitted the profile of a 
"risk case" for political decentralization according to the comparative literature: an 
ethnofederal system inherited from the Soviet Union, undeveloped democratic and 
market institutions (emerging-market federation), and a massive economic reform agenda 
accompanied by a crisis in the real economy that exacerbated distributive conflict.  The 
central state at the time of transition in 1991 was also on the verge of a constitutional 
crisis, and severe executive- legislative tensions reduced its capacity to attend to problems 
in the periphery.  Not only was the transition legacy stacked against the Russian 
government, but as Barany and Moser note, the choices made by key policy makers in the 
early transition period also restricted the government’s ability to build effective political 
and market institutions throughout the first decade of the transition. 26  
 
Russian Federalism: a failed experiment?  
 
Given this array of challenges, it is not surprising that throughout the 1990s the 
contours of center-periphery relations in Russia were shaped by waves of conflict and 
accommodation between the Kremlin and recalcitrant regional governments championing 
fiscal and political autonomy.  Moscow’s inability to impose uniform rules on the regions 
and control the pace of political decentralization resulted in an unstable and asymmetrical 
federal arrangement, undermining the federal government’s capacity to implement 
coherent national policy objectives and establish a uniform market space and rule of 
                                                 
26 “Introduction” in Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser, eds. Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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law.27  Indeed, under Yeltsin the Russian federal system increasingly lurched toward the 
confederal end of the spectrum in terms of regional assertiveness and central state 
weakness, which prompted some observers to view the situation as nearing state 
breakdown as local autarky intensified in the latter part of the nineties.28  
 Even though the larger threat of instability and conflict had subsided by the time 
President Putin began his first term in 2000 – with the exception of the breakaway 
republic of Chechnya – various cases of regional defiance have continued to frustrate the 
Kremlin's attempt to re-establish federal preeminence and enforce mandates to dismantle 
the asymmetrical federal system forged during the nineties.  Indeed, despite a much more 
impressive arsenal of formal- legal “sticks,” during Putin's first term the Kremlin was 
forced in large measure to continue a Yeltsin-era pattern of individual bargaining with 
recalcitrant executives.29  
While there is certainly no question that some degree of recentralization was 
necessary after the “fuederalism” that had emerged in the late nineties, the danger is that 
eventually the pendulum might swing too far in the opposite direction during Putin's 
second term, and that a more or less de-facto unitary system might emerge.  In addition to 
backtracking in democratic consolidation, strictly “top-down“ governance – in the 
context of Putin's so-called managed democracy – could also stifle the economic benefits 
of fiscal federalism.30   
                                                 
27 Stoner-Weis s, 1999 and Slider, 1997. 
28 Gail Lapidus, “Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia,” Post Soviet Affairs, 15 
(January), 1999: 74-82. 
29 Daniel Treisman, “How Different is Putin’s Russia?” Foreign Affairs 81:6 (2002). 
30 One of the conditions for “market-preserving” federalism in transitional states is that one level of 
government cannot unilaterally change the rules without the consent of the other. Barry Weingast, “The 
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 Based on this brief overview, it is clear that federal relations have been, and 
continue to be, problematic in terms of overall political stability, democratic 
consolidation and economic performance.  Inasmuch as federalism represents an ideology 
of balance, or a middle road between a loosely knit, confederal-type system, which is 
where Russia seemed to be headed under Yeltsin, and de-facto unitary relations, which 
seems to be a potential direction now under Putin , the major question that arises is “what 
makes federalism work?”  In other words, how can Russia avoid the dangers of 
decentralization without trading off the benefits of democratic federal governance?  
Answering this question leads us to a review of the dynamics of bargaining in federal 
systems.   
 
THE FEDERAL BARGAINING GAME 
 
The bulk of the studies on Russian federalism have viewed center-periphery 
relations through the lens of an iterative bargaining game, which is a framework often 
used in the wider comparative literature to examine the dynamics of competition and 
cooperation among federal and regional politicians.31  As Ordeshook and Shevstova note, 
federalism structures an “N+1” pattern of political interaction: “N federal subjects and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth,” Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 11:1, 1-31.   
31 Steven Solnick, “The Political Economy of Russian Federalism: A Framework for Analysis,” Problems 
of Post Communism (November/December, 1996): 13-19; L. Polishchuk, “The Russian Model of 
Negotiated Federalism: a Political and Economic Analysis” in Klimanov, V., and Zubarevich, N., eds., The 
Regional Dimension of Politics and Economics (Moscow, St.  Petersburg: Studia Politica, 2000). Kathryn 
Stoner Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997); Daniel Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in 
Russia,” British Journal of Political Science 26:3 (1996): 299-336; R.  Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in 
Spain,” International Political Science Review 17: 4 (1996): 385-401; William Riker, The Development of 
American Federalism (Boston: Kluwer, 1987).  Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental 
Relations, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988). 
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national government are adversaries who must compete for power and resources through 
bargaining, strategic maneuvering, coalition formation and deception.”32  Except in cases 
of outright secession, central and regional politicians are bound by a common aversion to 
the disintegration of the federal state, but they hold divergent interests.  Regional 
governments have an incentive to maximize resources in their respective constituencies, 
and securing control over them ultimately involves bargaining with the center.33  
 
Strategies  
 Regional bargaining strategies can range from “assertion” on one end of the 
spectrum to “loyalty” towards the federal center on the other.  Assertive strategies can be 
viewed as a method of expanding disputes over regionally particular issues to the national 
political arena via ultimatums, threats, “tax revolts” or other acts of economic and 
political separatism designed to coerce the center.34  Various forms of political 
mobilization, such as holding referenda on a region’s legal status, mass demonstrations, 
and the creation of political parties with overtly regional agendas, serve the purpose of 
demonstrating a region’s resolve and enhancing the credibility of future threats.  As 
                                                 
32 Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shevtsova, “Federalism and Constitutional Design,” Journal of Democracy      
8: 1 (1997): 27-42.   
33 Generally, the objects of bargaining in federal systems are the rules governing the division of political 
authority (jurisdictional) and fiscal resources (distributive rules). Intergovernmental fiscal federal rules can 
be conceptualized in the same manner as a system of property rights: ‘income rights’ – tax sharing norms 
and the division of natural resource rents; ‘use rights’ – management of state-owned enterprises and 
regulation of natural resource licensing; and ‘transfer rights’ – control over the privatization of state 
property.  As such, fiscal rules require recognition by both the region and center to provide a degree of 
certainty and guarantee of autonomy.  Autonomy that is simply “grabbed” unilaterally by a region can be 
usurped just as readily by the federal center. See Charles, McClure Jr., Fiscal Federalism and the Taxation 
of Natural Resources (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983). 
34  Intergovernmental relations have been framed as an elite bargaining game; instances of assertion are 
considered to be motivated by regional elites as part of a bargaining strategy to pressure the center into 
making certain concessions on the federal rules.  See, for instance, Hudson Meadwell, “A Rational Choice 
Approach to Political Regionalism,” Comparative Politics, 23: 401-420; Wright, 1988. 
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opposed to partisan protests, regional assertiveness is characterized by demands for 
changes in the distribution of political authority (i.e.  jurisdictional rules) and fiscal 
resources (i.e.  distributional rules) between the federal center and a particular region or 
coalition thereof. 35  
 As well as an “offensive” variant, where the region is the initiator, regional 
assertiveness can also take a defensive form, reflected in public defiance of attempts by 
the central government to encroach upon or rescind autonomy that it had previously 
granted.  Overt resistance to Putin’s campaign to take back much of the formal autonomy 
devolved under Yeltsin – in particular power-sharing agreements signed with many 
regions – is a prime example of this.  Whatever the form, assertive strategies raise the 
stakes of the bargaining game for both sides.  By contrast, strategies of loyalty are 
evidenced by political constraint and the avoidance of defiant or provocative actions in 
the public arena.36   
 Federal strategies range from coercive to accommodative.  Coercive strategies 
indicate that the center is not willing to bargain further than it already has, and usually 
involve “sticks” to punish regional elites in an effort to deter future acts of offensive 
regionalism or compel compliance with federal mandates (e.g. counter defensive 
                                                 
35 The literature distinguishes between instances of partisanship and regionalism per se.  There is a large 
literature on the effect of partisanship on federal-regional relations.  Acts of regional defiance motivated by 
partisanship are targeted against the policies of the national party in power, and not necessarily motivated 
by a desire to change the distributional or jurisdictional rules pertaining to a specific region.  For an 
overview of partisanship and federalism, see Alfred Montero, “After Decentralization: Patterns of 
Intergovernmental Conflict in Argentina, Brazil, Spain and Mexico,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
31:4 (Fall 2001), 43.   
36 It is important to note that the extent of a region’s “loyalty” is relative to the actions of its assertive 
neighbors and the existing norms of center-periphery interaction (e.g. “rules of the game”), and may not 
necessarily indicate satisfaction with the existing federal arrangement.  
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regionalism).  Accommodative strategies involve various forms of “carrots,” or 
concessions, to co-opt regional elites into loyalty.  As the central player in the bargaining 
game, the center’s response to individual instances of regional assertiveness 
simultaneously structures all regional leaders’ choice sets in terms of the costs of certain 
types of assertive behavior and rational expectations for accommodation. 37 
 
Federal Outcomes: IGR Typologies 
 The interaction of dominant regional and federal strategies corresponds with 
distinct typologies of intergovernmental relations, or federal outcomes.  In reality, federal 
systems are often hybrids in various policy arenas.  The typologies in Table 1.1 are “ideal 
types,” reflecting the dominant trend characterizing intergovernmental relations in the 
national political arena at a given phase.38  
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37 Ordeshook and Shevtsova, 1997. 
38 The terms describing IGR typologies are borrowed from the comparative intergovernmental literature, 
though there are many contextual variables in the Russian case that need to be taken into account.  For 
instance, “assertive regionalism” is equivalent to “competitive regionalism” in the literature on developed 
federations, though the type of competition inferred by competitive regionalism is much mo re constrained.  
Competitive regionalism also refers to rivalry among the regions themselves, while the dissertation uses the 
term assertive regionalism only to refer to the intergovernmental (e.g.  federal-regional) dimension of 
conflict.  For an overview of competitive regionalism in the European perspective, See Tanja A.  Börzel , 
“From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of 
the Autonomies,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30:2 (2000): 127-142. 
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The first typology, “cooperative federalism”, represents accommodative strategies 
on the part of both the center and regions.  In this case, federalism is “working” according 
to its intended purpose as a cooperative mechanism for dispute resolution.  Competition 
between the federal and regional governments is restrained as both sides refrain from 
attempts to unilaterally change the jurisdictional or distributional rules and pursue 
reciprocity.  A key aspect of cooperative federalism is the inclusive nature of decision-
making and joint, non-coerced behavior.39  
Assertive strategies can become dominant if regional elites anticipate that such 
behavior will lead to some degree of accommodation by the federal center, which may 
especially be the case if the central government has demonstrated either a lack of political 
will to punish defiant regions or a credible commitment to enforce uniform rules.  
Assertive regionalism among wealthier regions is almost always associated with 
pressures for greater fiscal and political decentralization. 40 
Coercive federalism can be considered the “inverse” of assertive regionalism in 
that the center takes the offensive, with regional elite generally exhibiting loyalty 
(acquiescence).41  The center can use various forms of punishment and compellence, 
ranging from fiscal pressure tactics and administrative sanctions to criminal 
                                                 
39 A key condition of cooperative federalism is that “one plane of government does not coerce the other” 
and that cooperation is negotiated, which involves some degree of accommodation from both sides.  See 
Joseph Zimmerman, “National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 31:2 (Spring 2001): 15-35. 
40 See Milica Z.  Bookman, The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development (New York: Praeger, 
1991.) 
41 Ibid, 24. In mature federations, coercive measures by the federal government usually include various 
forms of federal preemption, as well as fiscal sanctions.  While “coercive federalism” has been used to 
describe regional assertiveness as well in the comparative literature, here it is used solely in regard to the 
typology of IGR characterized by federal government encroachment and regional acquiescence.   
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investigations and the threat of brute force.  When coercive federalism is the outcome, the 
costs of resistance (e.g. “defensive” assertion) outweigh the benefits for regional leaders.   
In cases where the stakes are high enough that neither side is willing to 
accommodate the other, intergovernmental conflict may persist, as in the case of the 
ongoing conflict in Chechnya, which quickly evolved outside the parameters of the 
federal bargaining game.42  However, thus far instances of sustained conflict have been 
the exception rather than the rule, as federal and regional politicians in Russia have 
shown a propensity for bargaining.   
Sustained periods of regional assertiveness can seriously undermine state capacity 
and engender ethnic conflict, as happened during the Yeltsin years, while coercive 
strategies by the federal government in direct reaction to regional assertiveness may push 
Russia closer to the unitary end of the spectrum during Putin's second term.  Indeed, for 
Russia, cooperative federalism – based on norms of accommodation and compromise on 
both levels of government – could be seen as the most desirable in the interests of 
deepening democratization. 43  
This brings us to the next logical question: what accounts for the strategic 
behavior of regional and federal governments?  In the Russian case, there has been 
variation in federal strategies across time – from more accommodative to more coercive, 
as partisan conflicts that weakened the federal center in the nineties have subsided under 
                                                 
42 The proliferation of actors claiming authority on the Chechen side made negotiating difficult if not 
impossible, while one of the key conditions structuring the federal bargaining game – mutual aversion to 
state breakdown – was absent on the Chechen side.  In the majority of the other internal “ethnic” republics, 
the Soviet-era leadership remained intact and kept a tight grip on power within the region, adhering to the 
rules of the game (e.g. limits of permissible behavior) set by Moscow.   
43 See Stepan, 2000 on the importance of the decision-making process for the performance of federal 
systems in democratizing countries.   
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Putin.  At the same time, there has been considerable continuity in patterns of regional 
strategic behavior across both the Yeltsin and Putin periods, with some regions 
consistently pursuing assertive strategies and others remaining loyal.  Before examining 
this variance more closely in the succeeding chapters, however, it is necessary to review 
the conventional wisdom about determinants of regional strategic behavior in federal 
systems in general, and in the Russian case in particular.   
 
ASSERTIVE REGIONALISM AND RUSSIAN FEDERALISM  
 
Generally, the literature highlights two main groups of factors as determinants of 
regional behavior in federal systems.  One group of variables, which could be labeled 
“demand side” factors, gauges the intensity of instrumental incentives for assertion, based 
on both the potential economic benefits of accommodation by the center as well as a 
region’s political resources, or bargaining power, in the intergovernmental arena.  In the 
Russian case, these have included regionally-specific factors such as resource 
endowments, industrial assets and socio-economic structure; the localized impact of 
global market integration; and status as an ethnic homeland.   
Another set of factors includes institutional constraints, which affect the direct 
costs (e.g. threat of punishment) and opportunity costs (e.g. benefits of an alternative 
strategy of loyalty) of assertive strategies.  Unlike demand-side variables, these factors 
are not specific to a particular region, but involve some degree of coordination by the 
central government and are shaped by overall state capacity.  Formal institutions include 
the durability and fairness of the jurisdictional or distributive rules enshrined in the 
constitution or related legislation, as well as the strength of “vertically- integrating” 
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mechanisms such as the state bureaucracy and national political party system.  Informal 
institutions include the “rules of the game” of the federal bargaining process  – the extent 
to which federal politicians employ “carrots” or “sticks” that shape regional leaders’ 
rational expectations of accommodation or punishment.  The informal rules governing 
Russia's federal system have largely been a function of the fluctuating unity of federal 
elites and the persona and power base of the chief executive, which is particularly linked 
to the federal election cycle.   
Figure 1.1 presents a model of regional strategic decision-making, charting factors 
that affect the cost-benefit calculations of regional elites, and thus either drive or 
constrain a strategy of assertion.  The individual variables are then examined in more 
detail below. 
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44 The table reflects an instrumentalist, rather than primordialist view, of ethnic assertion, which is 
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“Demand-side” Drivers: Economic Incentives 
Two main categories of economic incentives for assertive regionalism are 
discussed in the literature: the costs of federation and the relative value of economic 
assets, including natural resource endowments, industrial wealth and export capacity 
within a region’s territory.   
The costs of federation measure the relative burden placed upon a particular 
region by the current fiscal federal arrangement, which is primarily a function of its 
wealth (e.g. tax base).45  Regions that are net contributors to the federal budget bear the 
highest costs of sustaining the federation, and thus will benefit most from gaining greater 
autonomy (fiscal decentralization), rather than transferring their resources to the federal 
center to subsidize less self-sufficient regions.  The level of interregional socioeconomic 
asymmetry is an important factor that determines the costs of federation placed upon the 
wealthier regions.  As the income gap among regions increases, so does the burden of 
equalization.   
Likewise, the presence of endowments such as natural resources, competitive 
industries and export commodities motivate attempts to increase a region’s autonomy, 
especially in the sphere of intergovernmental property rights.  The rela tive fiscal value of 
these assets is linked to their performance on both national and global markets.  In the 
Russian case, integration with global markets has resulted in a fiscal windfall for 
exporting regions, whose economies have benefited the most from the change in relative 
                                                 
45 Of course political considerations can play a large role in how efficiently the costs of federation are 
distributed among regions.  This is largely a function of a region’s political resources (bargaining power), 
which is dealt with below. 
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prices.46  Indeed, economic globalization has been a major driver of assertive regionalism 
in mature federal systems as well.47   
While the relative difference in wealth among regions usually remains constant in 
the short- to medium-term, asymmetrical economic shocks, such as market reform and 
major movements on global markets, can increase this gap.  Due to the high degree of 
economic concentration in Russia, market reform initially created a narrow set of 
“winners” – regions with competitive industrial assets and natural resources – and a much 
larger field of “losers.”  Heightened interregional socioeconomic disparities have forced 
the center to place higher costs of federation on the winners to reduce the income gap 
among the two groups and create a more even playing field.  Thus, an increasing 
equalization burden at home and the opportunity to reap the benefits of global market 
integration provide a constant incentive for the “winners” of Russia’s market transition to 
strengthen control over rents on their territory via autonomy-seeking strategies.   
 
                                                 
46 The same dynamics affect IGR in mature federations as well.  In Canada, for instance, ris ing oil prices in 
the seventies prompted oil-producing regions to seek control over a greater share of the windfall.  This put 
them in direct competition with the federal government, which also laid claim to the expanded tax base in 
order to smooth over the increased income gap between the oil regions and the agricultural, industrial 
regions.  See Charles Mclure Jr., Fiscal Federalism and the Taxation of Natural Resources (Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1983).   
47 See, for instance, Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring 
and Political Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 1998).  In addition, Benz notes that in the German 
case integration with the European Union has caused the more competitive Lander in the West to clamor 
for greater fiscal and economic autonomy while the more disadvantaged Lander in the East have been 
seeking greater engagement by the national government (redistribution).  See Arthur Benz, “From Unitary 
to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock after 50 Years,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
29: 4 (Fall 1999): 55.   
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“Demand-side” Drivers: Political Bargaining Power 
 
Variations in bargaining power variables can be used to measure the relative 
political value of a region’s resources and the regional administration’s capacity to use 
them to pressure the central government.  The ability of a region to credibly threaten 
central objectives such as political stability, re-election of a president or parliament, and 
smooth tax collection gives it added leverage vis-à-vis the federal center.48  Regions with 
higher degrees of bargaining power are predicted to more often “flex their muscles” by 
pursuing assertive strategies vis-à-vis Moscow. 49 
In Russia, the most potent bargaining chip has been status as an ethnic homeland.  
Many socialist countries that were divided territorially into titular ethnic homelands have 
spawned ambitious regional leaders with a political and institutional base for mobilizing 
resources to assert political and economic autonomy. 50  Russia inherited the Soviet 
Union’s ethnofederal legacy, whereby regions designated as the historical homelands of 
titular ethnic groups were distinguished, at least de jure, from the other subjects of the 
federation.  During the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of these regions 
declared sovereignty as internal republics in Russia, and regional leaders’ ability to 
                                                 
48 Daniel Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Russia,” British Journal of Political 
Science 26:3 (1996): 299-336.   
49 This is essentially a “Realpolitik” argument: increased capabilities lead to greater assertion.   
50 See Philip Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Resource Mobilization,” World Politics 43 (January, 
1991), 196-232; Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: the Design and Destruction of Socialism and the 
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  Bunce asserts that the dense institutional network 
built by socialist regimes to penetrate society – in essence a de-jure federal institutional structure – played a 
subversive role during polit ical transitions, leading to state breakdown in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia.   
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mobilize ethnic constituencies around regionalist agendas increased the credibility of 
threats.51 
Other variables used in bargaining power models include the size of a region’s 
electorate and relative size of a region’s tax base.  The former reflects a region’s potential 
ability to “blackmail” the center during federal election cycles, and the latter reflects a 
region’s potential ability to threaten federal revenue collection.  Relative size matters in 
terms of bargaining-power: larger regions will, ceteris paribus, have more leverage over 
the center than smaller ones.  At the same time, the political value of particular resources 
in the national arena – and the capacity of the regional regime to mobilize them in a 
confrontation with the center – will vary across time.   
 
Cross-regional studies of assertive regionalism   
Large-n, quantitative studies of regional behavior in the post-Soviet literature 
have been few.  In a study of the entire set of 89 regions through 1995,  Dowley finds that 
instrumental incentives such as net contributor status to the federal budget and the 
presence of natural resource endowments, as well as the level of bargaining power (ethnic 
republic status), are positively correlated with regional elite preference intensities for 
greater decentralization. 52  Likewise, Soderlund finds that structural power resources such 
as natural resource endowments, industrial wealth, an important geographic location and 
                                                 
51  On the various privileges enjoyed by the ethnic republics in Russia’s federal system, see Alfred Stepan, 
“Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” Post-Soviet Affairs 16: 2 (2000): 133-176.   
52 K. Dowley, “Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional Government Strategies, ” 
Communist and Post Communist Studies 31:4 (1998): 359-380.  Dowley performs a content analysis of 
public speeches, declarations and communications by regional elites.   
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cultural distinctiveness were bargaining chips that regional elites could use to gain earlier 
accommodations from Moscow during the bilateral treaty process from 1994-1998.53     
Treisman’s seminal analysis of separatist activism among the subset of Russia’s 
20 ethnic republics reveals that instrumental incentives such as natural resources, 
industrial strength and export capacity explain variation in behavior when bargaining 
power is held constant. 54  Wealthier ethnic homelands (republics) have been much more 
assertive than poorer ones.  Thus, the potential for economic gains is cited as the primary 
driver of assertive regionalism in the post-Soviet literature on Russia.  Bargaining power 
variables, such as ethnic republic status, explain the timing of a region’s actions, and, as 
will be evidenced below, the strategic response of the center.   
 
FEDERALISM UNDER YELTSIN 
 
In general, demand-side drivers have remained more or less constant throughout 
the Russian transition. 55 Political- institutional constraints, on the other hand, have varied 
considerably, due both to changes in the macro-political environment and the strategy of 
the federal center.  This section examines these factors and federal strategy in the Yeltsin 
and Putin periods in turn. 
                                                 
53 Soderlund, Peter J.  “The Significance of Structural Power Resources in the Russian Bilateral Treaty 
Process, 1994-1998,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26 (2003): 311-324. 
54 While there is a debate on whether the centrifugal forces that tore apart the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia were primarily a function of a primordial drive “from below” for self-determination by various 
nationalities, or the result of mobilization “from above” by self-interested republican elites, there is a 
stronger consensus among scholars that separatism and regional defiance in the post-Soviet period have 
been primarily elite-driven – both among the “ethnic” republics and Russian oblasts alike.  Most literature 
on Russian ethnic separatism gives priority to instrumental motives based on economic calculations.  See 
especially Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a 
Post-Communist Order,” World Politics 49:2 (1997): 212-249. 
55 While the income gap between the richer and poorer regions increased in Russia throughout the nineties, 




Most scholars concur that there is no particular institutional blueprint for “making 
federalism work.”56  At the same time, it is generally recognized that the sine qua non of 
stable federal systems is an effective and durable “federal bargain” – a viable guarantee 
against arbitrary interference by the federal government in clearly prescribed spheres of 
sub-national discretion.57  To the extent that regional elites have a stake in the federal 
system, they will eschew assertive strategies that could intensify its instability and result 
in a new status-quo arrangement that might or might not better serve their particular 
interests.  Concise, fair and well-enforced rules can more effectively co-opt regional 
elites into the existing federal system and increase the benefits flowing from a strategy of 
loyalty. 58   
 When formal jurisdictional and distributional rules are either ambiguous or not 
properly enforced by the center, regional elites face a strong incentive to protect 
themselves from the more immediate threat of federal arbitrariness by pushing for special 
deals or unilaterally usurping authority and resources (e.g. undertaking “preemptory” 
assertive strategies in face of uncertainty).  For example, in the Yeltsin period the dearth 
                                                 
56 See, for instance, Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1999).  Comprehensive cross-comparison of federations – in terms of the division of 
jurisdictional powers, distribution of fiscal resources and the corresponding level of centralization or 
decentralization – is an extremely complex task in itself. 
57 Riker, 1964. 
58 According to Riker, political elites who negotiate a federal bargain do so out of a belief that their 
interests are better served by the federal arrangement rather than a unitary or confederal one.  Thus 
autonomy -seeking regional elites may prefer to make concessions at some point if the federal rules are 
stable and fair, rather than taking the risk of  pursuing assertive strategies that could eventually spark an 
economic crisis or political instability, leading to either to a clamp -down by the federal government (move 
toward unitary system) or state breakdown (confederal system).   
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of federal legislation clarifying the divisions of power among levels of government, 
together with the weakness of the Constitutional Court, set the stage for an ad-hoc 
process of state-building whereby regional elites repeatedly attempted to “grab” power 
from below in the context of a virtual legal vacuum. 59  
   The legitimacy of the federal decision-making process itself is also an important 
variable affecting the strength of a federal bargain.  The division of powers at federal and 
regional levels, including a bicameral legislature, is designed to create consensus among 
the regions and balance the federal decision-making process.  In the Russian case, the 
large powers afforded to the president by the Russian Constitution, coupled with the even 
stronger position of most regional executives vis-à-vis legislative bodies, heavily favors 
executive bargaining and bilateral deals.60  The lack of transparency in the process of 
negotiating power-sharing agreements between federal and regional executives led to 
widespread perceptions of unfairness by regions that felt they had been slighted, while 
enforcement of the agreements was problematic as many of them contradicted the federal 
Constitution. 61  In addition, special fiscal deals with the central government that allowed 
certain wealthy regions (mainly the “ethnic republics”) to free-ride further raised the 
costs of federation for the remaining net contributor regions, in turn fueling assertion. 62  
                                                 
59  Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution 
Process in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15:1 (1999): 87-106. 
60 Ordeshook and Shevtsova, 1997. 
61 Stoner-Weiss, 1999. 
62 Even if distributional rules are asymmetrical (e.g., favoring one region over others), the decision-making 
process is paramount to ensuring consensus.  Federal legislative venues such as parliament are the only 
ones which collectively include representatives from all regions in the decision-making process.  For 
example, Stepan, notes that the decision to grant Spain’s autonomous regions special status was made 
collectively at the national level (parliament) rather than as a special deal between executives.  The result 
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Thus, the role of the federal institutional arrangement during the 1990s – in 
particular the dearth of clear and durable rules and a lack of transparency in the federal 
decision-making process – encouraged regional assertion.  Regional elites had small 
stakes in the federal system, and fewer incentives to adopt a strategy of loyalty.  Federal 
legislation, rather than executive orders and bilateral agreements, would have provided 
greater legitimacy to the federal decision-making process and produced a more durable 
“federal bargain” for regional elites.  Yet, Yeltsin’s narrow base of support in the Duma, 
coupled with the regional governors’ ex-officio status as senators in the upper chamber, 
made coordination between the executive and legislative branches extremely 
problematic.63   
 
Vertically Integrating Mechanisms  
Irrespective of federal constitutional design, political coordination between levels 
of government depends on the effectiveness of vertical- integrating mechanisms that 
project the central government’s influence into the periphery.  These mechanisms include 
the state executive hierarchy (e.g. formal links between federal and regional 
bureaucracies), which enforces compliance with rules and oversees the implementation 
federal policies, as well as political parties, which serve to align the interests of regional 
and national politicians.   
                                                                                                                                                 
was greater intergovernmental stability and consensus during the transition, as opposed to the Russian case. 
Stepan, 2000. 
63 Indeed, many observers point to the volatility in executive-legislative relations on the federal level as 
Yeltsin’s Achilles heel in center-periphery relations.  See Stoner-Weiss, 1999 and 2001. 
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State Executive Hierarchy: Mechanisms by which the executive branch can 
monitor regional elites and enforce the rules are an integral element of political 
coordination in decentralized systems.  When the state executive hierarchy is strong and 
responsive, the federal center will have access to both fiscal and political resources in a 
region that can be used to increase the center’s leverage over regional officials.64  
Under Yeltsin the administrative capacity of the central state to check regional behavior, 
coordinate federal functions and implement policy in the periphery was severely limited.  
The key links between the Kremlin and regional administrations, the presidential 
representatives, were rendered ineffective because they depended on regional budgets for 
housing and other expenditures, were understaffed, and in many cases had pre-
established close ties with regional elite groupings, all of which made them prone to 
“capture” by sub-federal governments.65  Furthermore, various regions gained control 
over appointments to branches of the Federal Prosecutor’s office and security agencies as 
part of their deals with the federal center.66 
Political Parties: The state administrative hierarchy is primarily a “top-down,” or 
coercive mechanism.  Regional elites are inclined to either capture agencies and their 
                                                 
64 For instance, in the Chinese case, Li and Lian identify “checking” and “enforcement” agencies as crucial 
to the center’s capacity to gather information and discipline officials in the periphery.  Checking 
mechanisms include the prosecutor’s office as well as various intergovernmental commissions to root out 
corruption, while “enforcement” mechanisms, such as arbitration courts, monitor adherence to legal norms 
in doing business (bankruptcy, contracts, etc.). The authors argue that decentralization and autonomy are 
necessary, but not sufficient, elements for ensuring effective market reform in China: autonomy must be 
balanced by control.  See Shuhe Li and Peng Lian, “Decentralization and Coordination: China’s Credible 
Commitment to Preserve the Market under Authoritarianism,” China Economic Review 10 (1999): 161-
190.   
65 Interview with Vladimir Reshetnikov, government official in Kirov Oblast, June 2000.  The presidential 
representative and his staff were regularly unable to perform many of their assigned functions, and 
members of the governor’s staff had to fill the void.   
66 Stoner-Weiss, 1999. 
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representatives or otherwise curtail their influence.67  National political parties, on the 
other hand, also have the capacity to co-opt regional elites by linking their political 
ambitions with those of national politicians (re-election) and enhancing the representation 
of regional interests at the national level.68  In terms of the intergovernmental bargaining 
game, national parties can structure cooperative, or “win-win,” outcomes in federal 
systems.69  
  When regional political actors are not bound by loyalty to a national party for the 
advancement of their political career, the central government must employ other 
bargaining methods (e.g. fiscal carrots or political sticks), which can eventually exhaust 
central resources.70  Political parties can also supplement the functions of state 
bureaucratic mechanisms by themselves as coercive instruments.  For instance, one of the 
key factors behind China’s success in coordinating political decentralization is the role of 
the Chinese Communist Party; the central government uses regional leaders’ desire for 
advancement in the party to compel them to obey central objectives.71  
Thus, when national party systems are strong, the costs of defiance of the center will be 
higher, to the extent that the party leadership is able to discipline recalcitrant regional 
                                                 
67 Li and Lan, 1999.  
68 On the importance of party systems, see Herman Bakvis and William Chandler, Federalism and the Role 
of the State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
69 Indeed Ordeshook and Shevtsova note that “No [intergovernmental] agreement is likely to withstand 
demands for renegotiation… sustaining a federal arrangement that leaves federal subjects in possession of 
certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power requires institutional arrangements that 
make it in the self-interest of regional political elites to cooperate and coordinate with one another and with 
the national government, and makes it in the self-interest of national elites, including those not specifically 
thought to represent regional governments, to be protective of the autonomy of all federal subjects.” They 
make the case that a strong national party system can fulfill this role.  (32) See Ordeshook and Shevtsova, 
1997.  
70 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Limited Reach of Russia’s Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual 
Transitions,” Politics and Society 29:3 (September 2001): 385-414. 
71 Blanchard and Schleifer, 2000.  
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politicians by threatening their careers and power bases.  Conversely, the benefits of 
loyalty will be higher, because federal politicians have a mechanism with which to 
advance or retard regional politicians’ careers.   
The weakness of the Russian national party system in the 1990s significantly 
diluted its vertically integrating function – e.g., its capacity to act as a systematic tool of 
either co-optation or coercion – in intergovernmental relations.  Partisan identifications 
among executives in Russia, especially at the regional level, were weak due to the nature 
of the electoral rules, the sequencing of federal and regional elections, the lack of 
strategic voting in the population, and the reluctance of the chief executive to associate 
himself directly with a party. 72 
 
 Rules of the Game under Yeltsin  
Finally, the informal rules of the bargaining game -- the center’s reputation and 
strategy in the intergovernmental political arena – shape regional behavior in federal 
systems.73  Consistent federal strategies shape rational expectations of what the 
immediate response to assertiveness will be.  While there are many factors that determine 
the response of a federal government to regional assertiveness, the relative unity/disunity 
of federal elites and the leadership style of the chief executive play a particularly 
important role in the Russian case.   
                                                 
72 On the underinstitutionalization of Russia’s party system, see especially Robert Moser, “Electoral 
Systems and the Number of Parties in Post-Communist States,” World Politics 51 (April 1999): 359-384; 
and Stoner-Weiss, “The Limited Reach of Russia’s Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual 
Transitions,” 2001.   
73 Steven Solnick, “The Political Economy of Russian Federalism: A Framework for Analysis,” Problems 
of Post Communism (November/December, 1996): 13-19. 
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As Higley and Burton have noted, the balance of power among elite groups 
competing for power influences the nature of the rules of the game, and the probability 
that formal rules will be adhered to by all sides.74  The configuration of federal elites 
reflects the central government’s ability to act as a unified front and maintain a credible 
threat (e.g. commitment to coercive strategies) in order to deter or coerce regional elites.  
When federal elites are divided, and locked in an unrestrained or “winner-take all” 
conflict, vying factions are more likely to use selective concessions to enlist the support 
of regional elite groups to boost their position in the struggle with rival groups in the 
central political arena.  Repeated strategies of accommodation by opposed factions 
deprive the federal center of a reputation for enforcing fair, symmetrical rules, which in 
turn fuels further instances of assertive behavior from below.   
During most of the Yeltsin period, a high level of partisan (ideological) 
polarization among federal political elites, coupled with internecine privatization 
struggles among various informal political “clans”, undermined the center’s cohesiveness 
as a united front and sapped its political will to coerce regional elites systematically.  In 
particular, the high level of political uncertainty at the federal level stemming from the 
threat of a Communist revanche put the Kremlin in a very weak bargaining position – and 
an overly generous mood -- during federal election cycles.75  Moreover, Yeltsin’s 
personal leadership style, which was based on informal ties, face-to-face haggling, and 
                                                 
74 Typologies of elite configurations can be found in John Higley and Michael Burton, “Elite 
Transformations in Democratization’s Three Waves,” Paper presented to IPSA World Congress, Quebec, 
2000.  When elites are disunited, there is a lack of consensus on the rules of the game, and competition 
takes place in the context of a “winner take all” environment.  A “consensually united” elite adheres to set 
rules and codes of political competition.   
75 Solnick, 1996. 
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backroom deals, further undermined the center’s credibility and perceptions of its 
fairness.76  
 Both formal and informal constraints on regional behavior were severely limited, 
in short.  A recalcitrant parliament, a state administrative hierarchy “captured” from 
below, disunity among federal elites – in addition to Yeltsin’s own lack of popular 
support – all deprived the central government of the capability and political will to 
systematically pursue coercive strategies in the formal arena and raise the costs of 
regional assertion.  At the same time, the weakness of the “federal guarantee,” lack of 
transparency in the executive bargaining process, and under- institutionalization of the 
national party system prevented the cooptation regional elites.  Federal leadership 
encouraged, rather than discouraged, assertive regional strategies.   
In response to the rising tide of assertive regionalism, the Kremlin adopted a 
dominant strategy of selective accommodation, although there were isolated cases of 
successful coercive strategies (e.g. punishment).77  The Kremlin strategically appeased 
assertiveness and rewarded loyalty by manipulating distributive and jurisdictional rules.  
For instance, according to Treisman, the Kremlin used budgetary transfers to appease 
regions that demonstrated the most credible threats to the regime.78  Likewise, Solnick 
                                                 
76 On the importance of such informal relationships see James Hughes, “Moscow’s Bilateral Treaties Add 
to the Confusion,” Transition 2, 19 (1996):39-43. 
77 For instance, after the first wave of regional assertiveness in 1993, several governors were dismissed by 
Yeltsin.  The Kremlin’s ability to punish regional executives was greatly reduced after gubernatorial 
elections were introduced around the country in 1995-6, as evidenced by Yeltsin’s unsuccessful campaign 
to unseat Primorie governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko in the latter part of the nineties.  Nazdratenko, one of 
the more assertive (and corrupt) regional executives, was finally persuaded by Putin to leave office after 
receiving a position on a federal commission. 
78 Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999).   
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notes that the Kremlin manipulated other selective incentives – such as the signing of 
power-sharing treaties – in order to co-opt regions and break up regional coalitions.79  
Additionally, the Kremlin rewarded loyal regions that supported the “party of power” in 
federal elections.80  But the resulting system of federal rules was highly asymmetrical and 
ad-hoc, and the ethnic republics as a group were able to gain more jurisdictional and 
distributional privileges than the non-ethnic regions.81   
While the center’s strategy of selective accommodation was ultimately successful 
in staving off the threat of territorial disintegration and preserving the regime, the 
Kremlin’s “generosity” in the intergovernmental arena eroded its ability to coerce 
regional elites while at the same time exhausting its capacity for further accommodation.  
In turn, weak political coordination of economic decentralization resulted in a crisis-
prone fiscal federal system and a fragmented national market.82 
                                                 
79 Solnick, 1996. 
80 Vladimir Popov, “Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules Versus Electoral Politics,” Working Paper, 
http://www.nes.ru/public-presnetations/Papers/Popov.htm, accessed on December 13, 2002.   
81 M.  Guboglo, Federal Power and the Power of Federalism (Moscow: State Duma, Committee on 
Federal and Regional Policy and the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997).  Differences in formal 
accommodation within each set of regions were mainly reflected in the timing of treaty-signing, in addition 
to the specific needs of individual regions. 
82 Russia’s fiscal federal system in the nineties has been described as “market-d istorting,” in that the state’s 
inability to enforce a common market and legal space, discipline regional leaders and efficiently distribute 
resources resulted in poor economic performance.  See Darrell Slider, “Russia’s Market-Distorting 
Federalism,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38 (October, 1997): 445-460.  On the dangers of 
economic decentralization without adequate central political coordination, see also Wibbles, 2000.  
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FEDERALISM UNDER PUTIN 
 
Putin’s ascendancy to power ushered in a new phase of intergovernmental 
relations marked by a turn toward political and fiscal centralization. 83   Putin’s initial 
political assets included his popular appeal stemming from his image as a strong 
statesman, as well as his amenability to both the Communist opposition and competing 
federal political- financial clans.84  Indeed, the federal elite’s loose rallying around the 
political persona of Putin has helped pave the way for some degree of change in virtually 
all of the supply-side factors during his first term in office. 
Formal Rules and Federal Institutions  
 
 First and foremost, the Kremlin’s ability to broker a settlement with the 
Communist opposition in parliament and form a centrist majority ended the hostile 
executive- legislative relations that plagued his predecessor.  This in turn allowed the 
Kremlin to spearhead legislation overhauling Russia’s federal institutional arrangement.  
The main thrust of Putin’s reform project has been reducing the political influence of 
regional executives over the national legislative process and over federal bureaucracies in 
the periphery, while also establishing clear, symmetrical federal rules.  By moving the 
main venue of decision making on intergovernmental issues from the executive (e.g.  
bilateral deals) to parliament, Putin has sought to increase the transparency and 
legitimacy of federal rules. 
                                                 
83 As Dogan and Higley argue, periods of crisis have a profound effect on the configuration of national 
elites, and consequently, the future political trajectory of transitions.  Mattei Dogan and John Higley, Elites, 
Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).   
84 Peter Reddeway, “Will Putin be able to Consolidate Power?”  Post-Soviet Affairs 17:1 (2001): 23-44. 
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One of his first moves was to rescind the governors’ ex-officio status in the upper 
house of parliament, replacing them with representatives that resemble senators in other 
federations.  While they are still appointed by regional governments, the fact that they are 
once-removed from the governors has increased the loyalty (pliability) of the upper house 
vis-à-vis Kremlin.  Furthermore, Putin has instituted formal procedures for the removal of 
governors from office by federal courts in cases of criminal activities or administrative 
incompetence. 
In the fiscal federal arena, Putin has overhauled the tax system, resulting in the 
further recentralization of fiscal resources, a trend that began following the 1998 fiscal 
crisis.  In addition, the federal government has curtailed many of the distributional 
privileges afforded to individual regions, including the ethnic republics, by his 
predecessor.  In order to clarify jurisdictional rules, Putin established a presidential 
commission to formulate legislation demarcating intergovernmental competencies.  One 
of the key priorities in this sphere is strengthening the fiscal sufficiency of municipal 
governments.85 
Concomitant with the legislative process, the Kremlin has pressured regional 
leaders to voluntarily abrogate the power-sharing treaties signed with the central 
government in the mid- to late nineties, which are the principal legacy of the Yeltsin 
period.  In general, the redesign of the federal institutional arrangement – from a high 
degree of asymmetry and opaqueness to more concise, durable and fair rules – is aimed at 
                                                 
85 In late 2002, Dimitry Kozak, head of the Commission, stated that he would recommend over 200 
separate pieces of legislation that would demarcate federal and regional competencies.  More self-sufficient 
municipal government would also serve a political purpose by empowering mayors, who have traditionally 
been highly dependent on regional administrations for funding, to counterbalance the near-authoritarian 
power of some regional executives within their jurisdictions.   
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reducing the grounds for contention and increasing the stake that a greater number of 
regions have in the “federal bargain.” 
Vertically-Integrating Mechanisms  
 
State Administrative Hierarchy: Putin has made restoration of the “vertical” 
dimension of state authority, or the executive hierarchy, a top priority.  His major 
innovation in this regard has been dividing the country into seven macro-regions (federal 
districts) and appointing commissars attached to the presidential administration to 
oversee the implementation of federal directives.  Most of the new commissars have a 
background in the security forces or military. 86  The main task assigned to the federal 
districts has been to bring regional legislation into line with the Russian Constitution, and 
stimulate outside investment in the regions.  In addition, Putin has used other state 
agencies, such as the Prosecutor General’s Office and Federal Security Agency, to 
influence the political situation in assertive regions.87   
Political Parties: Although Putin has not formally joined a national political party, 
his popularity has the potential to boost the status of the “party of power,” which enjoyed 
very limited support under Yeltsin.  The largest pro-Kremlin party, United Russia, has had 
more success than previous parties of power in garnering nationwide support, and, has 
developed into a popular centrist party. 88  A more popular “party of power” would in turn 
                                                 
86 Reddeway, 2001.   
87 Under Putin, both the Prosecutor General’s office and the Federal Security Agency have been used in 
attempts to influence the outcomes of regional elections, at times successfully, as evidenced by the 
unseating of Yeltsin-era incumbents in the republics of Yakutia and Ingushetia. 
88 Reddeway, 2001. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Unity gathered almost three times as much votes 
as the previous party of power (Our Home is Russia) in 1995.   
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raise the benefits of loyalty for governors, increasing the center’s ability to co-opt regional 
elites.89  
Rules of the Game under Putin 
 
The center of the political spectrum – virtually non-existent at the beginning of the 
transition– has widened significantly as Russia’s political space has become less 
ideologically polarized.  As a result of a convergence toward the political center, patterns 
of elite interaction in the federal political arena have become more cooperative and the 
threat of a Communist revanche has faded.90  As the federal center has started to coalesce 
into a united front (at least in public), the pivotal role of the regions as powerbrokers in the 
federal arena has been reduced and, correspondingly, the political will of the federal center 
to rein in regional leaders has increased.  Furthermore, Putin’s own background in the KGB 
and his personal connections with the nation’s “security elite” (e.g.  siloviki) have given 
him more authority among regional leaders than his predecessor had.91   
 On one hand, the Kremlin under Putin has been successful in deterring offensive 
forms of assertive regionalism, due to its increased credibility and the strengthened political 
will of a united federal center.  On the other hand, the Kremlin has enjoyed only limited 
success in battling defensive forms of assertive regionalism.  Several regions have overtly 
resisted Putin’s directive that regional leaders abrogate their power-sharing agreements, 
                                                 
89 Recent legislation requires that a certain portion of regional deputies must be elected on national party 
tickets.   
90 In addition to brokering a tactical alliance with the opposition in parliament, Putin has done a better job 
of regulating the inter-elite s truggles for property that seriously divided the Yeltsin administration; some of 
the Yeltsin-era “oligarchs” (e.g. V.  Gusinsky and B.  Berezovsky) were driven from the country.   
91 Reddeway, 2001. 
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with some still holding out to this day. 92  In addition, the newly instituted federal district 
apparatus has also made limited progress in forcing regions to conform to federal policy. 93   
Putin has thus far acted with caution toward defiant regional elites, and has yet to employ 
the legislation that permits the removal of governors from office.  On the contrary, many 
assertive regional leaders have secured the formal right to run for re-election for third and 
fourth terms.  Indeed, Putin’s avoidance of confrontation and his apparent willingness to 
pursue accommodative strategies has prompted some observers to claim that he is 
reverting to “Yeltsinism,” and that his formal authority has not translated into the actual 




Given the weakness of political and institutional constraints on regional behavior, 
the wave of “offensive” assertive regionalism that characterized the first decade of 
Russia’s federal transition was not surprising.  Neither is the fact that under Putin a more 
united federal center and strengthened executive hierarchy has placed assertive regions 
on the defensive.  This sharp swing of the federal pendulum approximates a “revolution 
from above”, and is consistent with Russia’s historical pattern of recentralization after 
periods of weakness and crisis.   
                                                 
92 The Kremlin has not unilaterally voided the power-sharing agreements; instead, regional leaders and the 
Kremlin have signed a bilateral document nullifying the previous treaty.  The presidential envoys in 
particular have been given the task of pressuring regional leaders to “voluntarily” give up the agreements.   
93 Peter Reddeway, “Is Putin’s Power More Formal than Real?” Post-Soviet Affairs18:1 (2002): 31-40.   
94 Daniel Treisman, “How Different is Putin’s Russia?” Foreign Affairs 81:6 (2002).  Treisman asserts that 
Russia’s federal system is still akin to the Yeltsin-era model of “Feuderalism.” Specifically, Putin has relied 
on special deals with regional elites rather than asserting his formal authority in intergovernmental 
relations, while the presidential envoys have been hampered by overlapping jurisdictional boundaries and 
unclear mandates.   
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At the same time, scholars point increasingly to patterns of continuity between the 
two presidencies.  Despite the expanded arsenal of political and formal state resources at 
his command, Putin has had mixed success in compelling regions to break their practices 
during Yeltsin period.  The next chapter examines a relatively uniform pattern of 
assertive regionalism under both Yeltsin and Putin that is not adequately explained by 
either the demand-side factors or institutional approaches to regional strategic behavior 
that are outlined in the literature.  It is argued that there is an additional variable 
structuring center-periphery relations and accounting for sub-national variation. 
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Chapter 2: Big Business in the Intergovernmental Arena 
 
An examination of regional strategic behavior across both the Yeltsin and Putin 
periods reveals a dichotomous pattern that defies conventional wisdom.  Russia’s 
wealthiest regions can be divided into two groups – “assertive” and “loyal” – despite the 
fact that they have equally high levels of instrumental motives for pursuing assertive, 
autonomy-seeking strategies.  While the ethnofederal system inherited from the Soviet 
Union explains part of this dichotomy, it cannot account for the divergence of behavior 
within subsets of ethnic and non-ethnic regions, which are found in both the “assertive” 
and “loyal” categories.  Moreover, the dichotomous pattern has remained consistent 
across time despite the redesign of federal institutions, strengthening of the executive 
apparatus, and changes in national leadership.   
 In this chapter, I develop a theoretical perspective for explaining the divergence in 
levels of assertive behavior among Russia’s wealthier regions.  I make the case for 
incorporating a missing variable – the role of national- level businesses – into customary 
explanations of assertive regionalism.  I argue that the top echelon of large businesses in 
Russia has a greater propensity to ally with the federal center, enhancing its capacity to 
both coerce and co-opt elites in the wealthier regions.  I then develop a theoretical 
framework for viewing national- level businesses as both “sticks” and “carrots” on the 
regional level that can reduce the economic incentives and political opportunities for 
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assertive behavior.  In the chapter's concluding section, implications for both Russian 
area studies and the wider comparative field are examined. 
 
THE PUZZLE OF RUSSIAN FEDERALISM  
 
The “winners” of Russia’s market and federal transition – wealthier regions that 
enjoy natural resource endowments and competitive industrial bases – have exhibited a 
wide degree of variance in strategic behavior in the intergovernmental arena.  Russia’s 
wealthy regions can be divided into two distinct subsets. The first subset has consistently 
pursued assertive strategies, including provocative acts of political and economic 
separatism under Yeltsin, as well as overt resistance to Putin’s attempts to rescind the 
formal autonomy previously devolved through bilateral power-sharing agreements.  The 
second subset, however, has more often followed strategies of loyalty, exhibiting greater 
restraint in the public political arena under Yeltsin, and more readily acquiescing to 
Putin’s mandates. 
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Table 2.1: Strategic Behavior of the Wealthy Regions 95 




(Yeltsin period)  
Demands for changes in legal 
status, political ultimatums, “tax 
revolts”, etc.   
Restraint; less unilateralism and 
confrontational behavior in the 
public arena  
“Defensive” Regionalism 
(Putin period) 
Overt defiance of Kremlin’s 
mandate to abrogate power-
sharing treaties 
Quicker compliance with, and 
public support for, abrogation 
of power-sharing agreements 
Type of Political Mobilization
(Both Periods) 
Regionalist: Active participation 
by executive in regionalist 
parties; referenda on autonomy; 
early elections  
National: Greater support by 
executive for pro-Kremlin 
“parties of power;” low levels 
of regionalist party building 
 
Likewise, regional executives in the “assertive” group have consistently pursued 
strategies of mobilizing regionalist parties and referenda, while the “loyal” executives 
have generally eschewed regionalist mobilization and more actively supported national, 
pro-government parties during federal election cycles.96  
At first glance, a simple explanation for the consistency in regional strategies 
across both periods is that regions which were the most assertive under Yeltsin – and 
therefore gained the most in terms of special privileges – now have the most to lose under 
Putin.  However, the problem is more complex.  With few exceptions all the wealthy 
                                                 
95 The upper half of Russian regions, ranked by per-capita industrial output, is the main focus of this study 
(wealthiest 44 of the 89 total regions).  A detailed breakdown of the regional assertiveness index, including 
types of actions and weightings, is presented in chapter 4.   
96 It is important to note that the extent of a region’s “loyalty” is relative to the actions of its assertive 
neighbors and the existing norms of center-periphery interaction (e.g. “rules of the game”), and may not 
necessarily indicate satisfaction with the existing federal arrangement.  For regional executives, remaining 
“quiet,” and supporting the national party of power during federal election cycles may be considered a 
strategy of loyalty when other regional leaders are pursuing assertive strategies and building regionalist 
parties.  In times where the center takes the offensive, loyalty is reflected in acquiescence to central 
mandates.  The ends pursued via a strategy of loyalty can be the same as those pursued by strategies of 
assertiveness – accommodation by the center – but the means, and therefore the qualitative nature of 
intergovernmental relations, are profoundly different in this case.  A strategy of loyalty is based on 
expectations of reciprocity, in that the region expects to be rewarded at a later point, while assertive 
strategies are based on unilateral actions and threats to coerce the center into accepting the region’s terms 
and timing. Chapter 5 addresses the importance of timing of regional assertiveness.  
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regions signed bilateral agreements in the 1990s, formally delineating their autonomy 
with the center and expanding their control over resources in their territories.  The 
“quieter” regions that were rewarded for their loyalty under Yeltsin could be expected to 
resist the central government’s recent campaign to revoke their autonomy alongside the 
more assertive ones that pioneered the drive.97 
In fact, this did occur for a certain period of time.  Almost all of the wealthy 
regions – from both the “assertive” and “loyal” camps – banded together to resist the 
mounting trend toward political and fiscal recentralization that occurred in the wake of 
the August 1998 financial crisis.98  Soon after Putin’s electoral victory, however, the 
Kremlin launched a campaign to curtail the regions’ political and fiscal autonomy, and 
the wealthy regions eventually split back into “defiant” and “loyal” camps, suggesting 
that the central government wields an additional source of political leverage over the 
loyal regions. 
“Demand-side” factors, which gauge the level of instrumental motives for 
assertive strategies, are unable to explain the divergence in behavior among the wealthy 
                                                 
97 A high level of assertiveness was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for receiving special 
accommodation from the center in the form of a bilateral agreement (See table 4.7 below).  The difference 
in formal accommodation of the wealthy regions was primarily in the timing of actions, such as the signing 
of bilateral agreements delineating intergovernmental competencies, and the authorization of regional 
elections.  In general, the assertive group pioneered both processes, signing power-sharing agreements and 
holding regional elections earlier than the loyal group.  While some of the features of the power-sharing 
agreements were symbolic and not consistently implemented by the federal center, they held significant 
political value for the governors, both in terms of gaining access to more fiscal resources on their territory 
and increasing their authority in the region as “political heavyweights” able to effectively bargain with the 
center.   
98 This was especially evident during the federal election cycle in 1999-2000, when most of the wealthy 
regions banded together under the banner of the “Fatherland-All Russia” party, which had a clear agenda to 
defend regional autonomy, in particular the power-sharing agreements.  The party’s presidential hopeful, 
Evgeniy Primakov, had renewed the federal government’s bilateral agreement with Tatarstan during his 
tenure as Prime Minister.   
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regions.  All the wealthy regions have high levels of economic incentives for pursuing 
strategies of assertive regionalism, in both its offensive and defensive forms, according to 
traditional measures such as aggregate levels of natural resources, export capacity and 
industrial output.  Likewise, regions in both camps have been net donors to the federal 
budget for extended periods throughout the transition.  Interestingly, observations are 
often counterintuitive in this regard: many of the regions in the “loyal” camp have been 
net contributors to the budget for the longest periods of time, and they enjoy the highest 
levels of per-capita exports and industrial output.99 
Asymmetrical levels of political bargaining power do explain part of the variation.  
Russia’s internal “ethnic” republics have enjoyed greater political leverage vis-à-vis the 
Kremlin due to their privileged political- institutional status as official homelands of non-
Russian ethnic groups, which is a legacy of the Soviet ethnofederal system.  Indeed, the 
wealthiest ethnic republics have been the most assertive throughout the transition period, 
which is consistent with the literature on ethnicity-based resource mobilization in the 
post-Soviet period.100 
However, ethnic homeland status can only explain the divergence in behavior 
between, but not within, the various tiers of regions.  For instance, the “Russian” regions 
that do not have ethnic homeland designation (oblasts and krays), which make up the 
majority of the wealthy cohort, are almost equally divided between loyal and assertive.  
                                                 
99 The list of regions classified as net contributors, or “donors” to the federal budget changes from year to 
year.  Some regions have been consistently on the list, and are classified by the Ministry of Finance as 
having the highest category of fiscal sufficiency.   
100 A dummy variable identifying ethnic homelands is significant when regressed against the index of 
assertiveness.  This is consistent with the literature.  See Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The 
Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Post-Communist Order,” World Politics 49:2 (1997): 212-
249. 
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Here, other bargaining power variables found in the literature, such as population size, 
tax base, etc.  do not adequately explain the difference.101  
The puzzle becomes even more acute when we turn our attention from “demand-
side” factors to the central state’s capacity to consistently enforce political and 
institutional constraints on assertive behavior.102 The relative difference in regional 
behavior has persisted under both Yeltsin and Putin, despite significant variation in 
federal institutional arrangements, the strength of vertically- integrating mechanisms 
including the executive hierarchy and the “party of power”, and national leadership (e.g.  
elite unity and executive leadership styles).  Thus, personal ties or fiscal appeasement 
might explain repeated strategies of loyalty under Yeltsin, but they do not explain why 
these same regions would also be more acquiescent under Putin.  It is certainly true that 
Putin has been much more successful than his predecessor in deterring politically 
disruptive acts of regionalism.  Yet, Putin has had mixed success in compelling various 
regions to dismantle the Yeltsin legacy, and he has been occasionally forced to negotiate 
with recalcitrant regional executives.103    
This pattern suggests that there is a missing variable not accounted for by the 
literature that explains the center’s greater success in coercing or co-opting one subset of 
the wealthier regions but not the other.  Identifying this variable is important to 
understanding factors that affect the political integration of democratizing federal states. 
                                                 
101 See Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 for an overview of economic incentives and bargaining power variables.   
102 These include the durability and legitimacy of the current federal institutional arrangement; the strength 
of “vertically-integrating” mechanisms such as the state bureaucracy and political party system; and 
national leadership – the unity of federal elites and the persona of the chief executive – which shapes 
regional leaders’ rational expectations about the center’s immediate response to a given strategy.   
103 This has been particularly true closer to federal election cycles; see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
discussion.   
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SOLVING THE PUZZLE 
 
Approaches that use aggregate measures of economic or political resources to 
gauge the level of instrumental incentives for regional assertion make certain implicit 
assumptions about collective action by regional elites.  For instance, approaches that 
highlight economic incentives assume that regional politicians aim to increase their 
authority by obtaining greater control over rents in their jurisdictions and then 
distributing these to key constituencies.104 Likewise, bargaining power approaches 
assume that regional administrations have the capability (or can credibly threaten) to 
mobilize resources in confrontations with the center.   
Accordingly, both of these approaches assume demand for – or at least tacit 
support of – an assertive, autonomy-seeking strategy by major constituencies that seek 
special privileges, such as enterprise directors or leaders of titular ethnic nationalist 
groups.  However, when influential actors within a region oppose a confrontation with 
the federal center, the political utility of assertiveness for regional politicians decreases, 
while divisions in the regional elite reduce the regional administration’s ability to act as a 
united front.  This in turn diminishes regional bargaining power vis-à-vis the center.   
Due to the high degree of industrial concentration in Russia, big business actors control a 
significant amount of economic resources and wield a high degree of political influence 
at the regional level, especially in the wealthier regions.   
                                                 
104 Of course personal financial gain (e.g.  corruption) may have played a role as well, but the dissertation 
assumes that a strategy of assertion is supported by a wider group of elites that wish to receive greater fiscal 
privileges or political authority from Moscow. 
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According to the dominant perspective in the literature, big business is part of the 
problem of assertive regionalism.  Customarily, business actors are assumed to be in 
collusion with regional governments in pursuing assertive, rent-seeking strategies.105 
Indeed, the instrumentalist view of ethnicity-based regional assertion assumes that 
regional leaders play the “ethnic card” to expand their influence over the region’s key 
economic assets, either directly by winning greater control over the privatization process, 
or indirectly by redistributing a larger portion of federal income to regional 
constituents.106  
The same logic applies to non-ethnic regions as well.  In particular, Stoner-Weiss’ 
(1997) case study of four oblasts in the early 1990s concludes that business elites in 
regions exhibiting higher degrees of economic concentration more readily overcame the 
collective action dilemma, forming into a cohesive interest group that “captured” the 
regional administration.  In such cases, regional economic and political elites are bound 
by strong informal ties that facilitate an alliance providing steady rent-seeking channels 
to business elites and resource mobilization opportunities (primarily at election time) to 
politicians.   
                                                 
105 See, for instance, Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Andrey Schleifer and Daniel Treisman Without a Map: Political 
Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000), 90, 190-112, 140; Steven 
Solnick, “Russia’s Transition: Democracy Delayed, Democracy Denied?” Social Research 66:3 (1999): 
789-814. 
106 See Treisman, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival” for a description of instrumentalist motives for assertion 
among the ethnic republics.  This assertion is also based on interviews with Vasiliy Fillipov, Center for 
Civilization and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Fall 2001.  A primary 
component of the ethnic republics’ drive for sovereignty in the early 1990s was securing control over major 
industrial assets and natural resources, and many of these regions used these rights to set-up regionally 
based companies.  See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this topic. 
56 
At the crux of this relationship are the large financial and administrative resources 
that are concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of regional political and economic 
elites.  As a result, tight-knit groups, akin to “cartels,” monopolize political and economic 
resources in the region, and are united in their desire to keep the competition – rival 
political and economic elites at both regional and federal levels – marginalized.  
Following from these observations, such patterns of cooperation and unity should also 
strengthen a region’s ability to assert the dominant elite alliance's common interests vis-
à-vis Moscow.  Stoner-Weiss notes that wealthy regions with heavily concentrated 
industrial bases are better able to present a united front in bargaining with the center, 
which should fuel more assertive behavior.107  
It is important, however, to distinguish between the size and structure of business 
actors and the level of government that they are primarily dependent upon for competing 
in Russia’s highly politicized economy.  Theoretically, managerial elites in a region could 
generally divide along “national” and “regional” lines.  The largest enterprises in a region 
that enjoy steady rent-seeking channels to the regional administration may also have 
influence on the national level, and may depend more heavily on the patronage of central 
bureaucrats to defend their business interests in the national market.  Enterprise managers 
with national strategic interests would be less willing to rally around the flag of political 
and economic regionalism if doing so disrupts their relationships with federal patrons. 
                                                 
107 For instance, Stoner-Weiss found that certain regional governors could manipulate the center into better 
power deals by using natural resource wealth and industrial bases as bargaining tools.  Stoner Weiss,1997.  
Large-N analyses have also used aggregate measures of industrial and natural resource wealth as measures 
of bargaining power.  See Treisman, 1997 and Dowley, 1998. 
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I argue that the political role played by Russia’s largest businesses explains the 
dichotomy in regional behavior observed among the wealthy regions.  When they control 
significant political and economic resources at the regional level, national- level 
businesses can enhance the central state’s capacity to coerce and co-opt regional 
executives, acting as a constraint on assertive strategies despite strong instrumental 
incentives “from below.” For regional political elites pursuing assertive strategies, 
regional- level enterprises can be an asset, but national- level businesses, which depend on 
steady channels to federal politicians, are a potential liability in a confrontation with the 
center because they can be a resource for the Kremlin.  Moreover, in some regions 
national- level businesses act consistently as vertically- integrating mechanisms, 
structuring cooperation and reciprocity between federal and regional executives who 
depend on them for resource mobilization.  Hence, my thesis ultimately rests on certain 
assumptions about the role of big business in the intergovernmental political arena, and 
these need to be outlined. 
Big Business as a Natural Ally of the Federal Center 
 
Since the beginning of privatization in the early 1990s, the Russian economy has 
been dominated by an oligarchy of influential business structures, including a handful of 
metallurgical giants, vertically- integrated oil companies, gas and power monopolies, and 
Moscow-based financial- industrial groups (all of which are hereafter referred to as 
“national- level business,” or “big business” for short) .108  Relying on an alliance with 
federal politicians and Moscow-based banks, they have consistently pursued strategies of 
                                                 
108 For a precise definition of national-level businesses based on size and structure, see Chapter 4. 
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vertical integration and consolidation of assets across the country. 109  While they are 
autonomous entities whose preferences clash repeatedly with federal objectives in fiscal 
and economic policy arenas (e.g.  taxation, competition policy, structural reform), their 
strategic interests intersect with those of the Kremlin in two main respects.   
First, national- level businesses rely on an “economy of scale” in the patronage 
they provide to federal officials who are willing to defend their interests in the national 
market.110  For all big businesses, maintaining steady channels to federal decision-makers 
is vital for competition with rivals, especially for those that depend on the national 
transportation (e.g.  oil and gas pipelines) infrastructure or that are primarily export-
oriented.111  
Second, the strategic alliance between big business and the center is based on a 
mutual aversion – the geographic fragmentation of Russia’s political and market space– 
that would inhibit the expansion of national business groups and at the same time 
undermine the Kremlin’s formal governance capacity.  Widespread assertive regionalism 
would erode the state’s ability to coordinate the process of economic decentralization and 
ensure a uniform legal framework and infrastructure for the national market.  In turn, a 
                                                 
109 Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Finansovaya Oligarchiya v Rossii,” Izvestia, Jan 10, 1996; 5.  
Kryshtanovskaya notes that the Kremlin has endeavored to manipulate the privatization process to create an 
“authorized class” of property holders that act as agents for the federal government in return for favorable 
treatment.  By using the privatization process to consolidate Russia’s strategic assets in a narrow group of 
economic actors beholden to their patronage, Kremlin and government officials have ensured themselves 
steady access to financial, fiscal, and consequently political resources, while at the same time denying them 
to potential rivals in national and regional political arenas.  Of course, just as happens on the federal level, 
regional governors have created their own “authorized classes” as bases of political and financial support 
that are independent of federal control. 
110 In particular, national infrastructure has been strictly controlled by the state, which gives the federal 
government a constant source of leverage over oil and gas companies that depend on state pipelines.   
111 See Yakov  Pappe, Oligarkhi, Ekonomicheskaia Khronika (Gos.Un-t Vysshaia Shkola Ekonomiki, 
Moscow: 2000). 
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geographically fragmented market would raise the costs of doing business for national-
level business actors.  Indeed, assertive regionalism in Russia has often been 
accompanied by protectionism, various forms of economic populism and regional calls 
for greater state intervention in the economy to protect local industries.112 Hence, for 
industrial groups expanding into a region, support from federal patrons is often vital for 
overcoming resistance by regional elites.113  
Given their reliance on federal patrons and their aversion to national market 
fragmentation and regional protectionism, national- level businesses have a greater 
propensity to ally with the center.114  In order to ensure a stable and predictable business 
environment, national- level businesses actors have an incentive to mediate 
intergovernmental conflict and deter assertive behavior that would threaten their relations 
with federal patrons.  Moreover, in cases where national- level businesses have 
established a cooperative relationship with regional administrations, they can structure 
patterns of reciprocity between federal and regional politicians.  There are various levers 
of influence national- level businesses have at their disposal to accomplish this, and these 
also must now be outlined. 
                                                 
112 See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of the agendas of various rounds of regional assertiveness.  Many 
strategies were designed to give the regional government greater formal policy levers to intervene in the 
economy and reduce the “shock” of radical market reform, which often involved populist policies and 
redistribution of regional income to less productive industries.  
113 Pappe also notes that strong ties to federal officials are a significant bargaining chip for Moscow-based 
companies negotiating with regional politicians over the “rules of the game” within their jurisdiction.   
114  In the event of a conflict between a region and the federal center, the strategic interests of national-level 
businesses in the national or export markets would be most damaged by disrupting their relationship with 
federal rather than regional patrons.  Regional governments can only offer businesses protection (e.g.  a 
“krysha”) and legal guarantees within the borders of their respective jurisdictions. 
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Big Business as Sticks and Carrots   
 
The informal alliance between big business and federal politicians has meant that 
the “penetration” of national- level businesses in a region is often accompanied by an 
increase in the central government’s political leverage in that region.  Local resources 
controlled by national businesses can be used both as “carrots” and “sticks” to co-opt or 
coerce regional politicians, respectively.  For instance, when national- level businesses 
account for a large part of its tax base, a region is more vulnerable to various forms of 
fiscal manipulation by the central government.  Special deals with key enterprises that 
bypass the regional administration can significantly undercut its tax collection 
capabilities.115  Likewise, control over industrial inputs, such as energy and raw 
materials, gives national- level business much leverage over regionally-based 
industries.116 
In particular, the takeover of strategic enterprises and their subsequent integration 
into national- level corporations and holding companies can undermine the power base of 
regional elites.  The replacement of key managers and board members, coupled with 
corporate downsizing and restructuring, can disrupt corporatist arrangements between 
major enterprises and the regional administration, reducing governors’ control over the 
regional economy and straining social safety nets.  Moreover, by supporting rival 
                                                 
115 Regional governments have also had to rely on the central government to mediate disputes over taxation 
and property rights with Moscow-based businesses, making political confrontation with the center more 
costly.  The tax bases of wealthier regions still tend to be highly concentrated and dependent on a handful 
of major taxpayers.  Interviews with economists at Raifeissen Bank, Moscow, December, 2001. 
116 Besides state-owned monopolies, such as Gazprom and United Energy Systems, financial-industrial 
groups and oil majors have pursued strategies of buying up shares in regional coal and electricity 
companies, and are also moving into gas production and distribution as well.   
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politicians in the region – or even their own agents – in gubernatorial elections, national-
level businesses have the potential to act as political sticks against incumbent governors.  
As will be demonstrated below, this has proven to be an especially effective strategy 
when accompanied with various forms of political pressure from the Kremlin. 
National- level businesses also provide four types of economic “carrots.” First, 
their influence at the national level allows them steady access to federal decision-makers, 
which can bring a region federal investment funds and offer regional enterprises that 
integrate into the business in question fiscal benefits such as tax restructuring relief.  
Second, because of the high degree of concentration of financial resources in Moscow, 
these groups can generally offer substantially greater levels of private financing than are 
available internally in most regions.  Third, they have helped integrate regional 
enterprises into both national and global markets.  For regional enterprises, injections of 
outside financial resources and technical expertise, together with the presence of steady 
informal channels to federal decision-makers provided by national- level businesses, help 
ease the strain of adjustment to a market economy.  Finally, national- level businesses can 
play an important role in financing social programs and development in the periphery. 
Electoral alliances with national- level businesses can also be an important 
political carrot for regional executives.117  Electoral alliances between an incumbent 
governor and big business are often cemented by networks of business and political elites 
that penetrate political and corporate institutions at both federal and regional levels.  
                                                 
117 See Vladimir Gelman, “Sub-national Institutions in Contemporary Russia,” in Neil Robinson, ed., 
Institutions and Political Change in Russia (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000).  Especially in cases 
where the business is located outside of the region’s administrative center, it can effectively monopolize 
resources for political mobilization in its locality.   
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Federal and regional executives often serve on the boards of major corporations and/or 
their regional subsidiaries, which gives them a common interest in the company’s 
performance.  In most regions, national- level businesses have established a considerable 
presence in local legislatures, which can serve as an important political resource for the 
governor.  Finally, national- level businesses have indirectly structured cooperation by 
supporting the expans ion of national parties in the periphery.  Alliances between 
national- level business groups and federal “parties of power” in a region are common, 
because both organizations are often beholden to the same patrons in Moscow. 118 
For regional elites, however, the political and economic carrots offered by 
national- level businesses come at a price.  The greater the penetration of national- level 
businesses in a region’s political economy, the more political and financial resources that 
they must essentially “share” with the owners of those businesses and, by extension, their 
federal patrons.  Limiting the influence of national- level business actors in a region keeps 
political power more concentrated within existing regional- level elites.  This, in turn, 
increases the region’s relative bargaining power with the center, giving regional 
executives greater opportunities for pursuing “winner-take-all strategies” in order to 
maximize control over political and financial resources with their jurisdictions, with 
                                                 
118 The close relationship between business groups and pro-government/Kremlin sponsored parties was 
most vividly evidenced in the mid- to late 1990s by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s “Our Home is Russia,” 
which was closely associated with oil and gas companies and Moscow-based financial-industrial groups.  
Regional governors can take advantage of the resources already invested by national business groups 
simply by claiming affiliation with the “party of power” and contributing their administrative resources.  
Support of the national party of power by regional executives can bring rewards similar to those gained 
through more confrontational strategies.  In the 1990s, regions that supported “Our Home is Russia” were 
invited to sign agreements alongside more assertive ones.  Likewise, under Putin, concessions to Moscow 
mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shamiyev, who were the main lobbyists for the 
repeal of an amendment limiting regional executives’ terms in office, were reportedly linked to their 
support for the “United Russia” Party on the national level. 
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lesser fears of punishment in the next elections.119  Conversely, when national- level 
businesses account for a larger portion of regional politicians’ constituencies, they can 
use the various sticks and carrots at their disposal to raise the costs of assertiveness and 
increase the benefits of loyalty toward Moscow. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING VARIABLE 
 
I argue that models of regional strategic decision-making more fully explain 
patterns of assertive regionalism when the resources controlled by national- level 
businesses are taken into account.  Without doing this, models based on socioeconomic 
structure tend to be overly deterministic.  Based purely on aggregate measures of a 
region’s wealth (e.g. levels of industrial output, export capacity, natural resource 
endowments) all the wealthy regions, whether ethnic or non-ethnic, are predicted to 
pursue assertive strategies.  By distinguishing between the relative influences of national- 
and regional- level business actors, variations in assertiveness among regions with similar 
levels of economic incentives and political bargaining power can be better explained. 
Likewise, state capacity approaches generally focus on the role of state actors and 
political institutions in the intergovernmental arena.  I argue, by contrast, that the role of 
non-state actors must be taken into account as well, both as a political resource that 
enables the federal center to coerce and co-opt regional elites, and as a vertically 
integrating mechanism that structures reciprocities between regional and federal 
politicians over time.  By forging informal strategic alliances with both federal politicians 
                                                 
119 Here I assume that regional executives would ideally prefer a “winner-take-all” outcome: retaining 
maximum control over the strategic enterprises in their regions.   
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and regional officials where their production assets are located, Russia’s largest business 
actors have served as a “tie that binds” the post-Soviet federal state in an environment of 
weak state institutions and limited penetration of federal political parties at the regional 
level.  Figure 2.1 depicts the strategies and mechanisms that have structured the dynamics 
of federalism in post-Soviet Russia.   
 



























Yeltsin: Cooptation in the Fiscal Federal 
Arena (Appeasement, Bilateral Deals) 
 
Putin: Coercion via Executive Hierarchy & 
Security Agencies (Harmonization of 
Rules) 
Federal “Party of Power:” Limited 
regional penetration, though increasing 
under Putin 
 
Alliance with Center:  
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on federal patronage, 
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sub-national 
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political resources in a 
region, they can raise the 
costs of assertion.  They 
also can raise the benefits 
of loyalty, by offering 
steady channels of 
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65 
The Surprising Cohesiveness of the Russian Federal State  
 
The thesis that big business has acted as a centripetal mechanism in the 
intergovernmental arena provides a different perspective on how the Russian Federation 
held together in the context of a weak central state.  For instance, Treisman points to the 
federal center’s ability to use selective incentives and manipulate the fiscal federal system 
in order to appease regions that presented the most credible threats to political stability 
and regime survival. 120  Treisman notes, however, that fiscal appeasement primarily 
benefited a narrow group of regions, primarily the larger “ethnic” republics, while it 
simultaneously drained federal coffers and diminished the state’s capacity to “buy off” 
other regions.121  Furthermore, it sharply raised the costs of federation for the majority of 
the wealthier regions that had to finance the government’s largesse, increasing these 
regions’ incentives for assertiveness.  Fiscal appeasement, therefore, does not account for 
the loyal subset of wealthy regions.  Instead, the influence of national level businesses in 
these regions helps to explain their restraint despite the relative unfairness of the fiscal 
federal arrangement during the 1990s.122  
Big businesses’ role as mechanisms of political integration reveals a view of state-
business relations that is different from the one traditionally found in the Yeltsin-era 
                                                 
120 See Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).  Some scholars disagree that the federal center under Yeltsin 
even had the capacity to act strategically.  See Stoner-Weiss, 1999.  
121 For a formal analysis of fiscal appeasement and how it progressively undermined the fiscal capacity of 
the federal government, see Daniel Treisman, “Political Decentralization and Economic Reform: A Game 
Theoretic Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 43 (April 1999): 549-517.   
122 Compared to fiscal appeasement (e.g. use of the federal budget for co-optation), big business can be 
viewed as a more efficient mechanism of distributing rents and co-opting assertive regions.  It was less 
transparent, and thus did not incite protests, and also brought in outside financial resources for the federal 
government.   
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literature.  While big businesses certainly have had a “horizontally” fragmenting effect on 
government at the federal and regional levels – by dividing the loyalties of government 
officials among competing financial- industrial groups – they also have played a 
“vertically” integrating role, enhancing the center’s capacity to constrain assertive 
regionalism.  In this sense, the creation of Russia’s oligarchic capitalist system – which 
has been characterized by powerful rent-seeking business groups – represented a trade-
off in the 1990s between the state’s formal extractive and regulatory capacity (tax 
collection, structural reform) and the political cohesiveness of the federal state.123 
 
While Putin has demonstratively distanced himself from big business and 
emphasized the role of formal state institutions in regulating intergovernmental relations, 
there still have been major elements of continuity with the Yeltsin period in terms of the 
political role played by national- level businesses in the periphery.  As the following 
chapters will show, fiscal and political centralization under Putin has tipped the scales in 
favor of big business at the regional level, further strengthening its influence in the 
periphery.  As regions lose formal autonomy, they are less able to stave off “asset 
grabbing” by national- level business elites.  Likewise, the regions’ diminished share of 
                                                 
123 This integrating function of national-level businesses reflects the important role that privatization can 
play in federal state building.  “Spontaneous”  privatization (which lacked any measure of political 
coordination from above) during the late 1980s and early 1990s expedited the breakdown of Soviet state 
hierarchies, where as strategic privatization in the mid-1990s (which was heavily influenced by a narrow 
group of federal bankers and bureaucrats)  strengthened the vertical integration of the nascent Russian 
Federation by partially reconstructing an economic hierarchy.  In this sense, the “gathering of the assets” by 
national-level businesses under President Yeltsin was the first phase of reintegration, followed by the 
“gathering of the lands,” or strengthening of the formal state hierarchy, under President Putin.   
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fiscal resources in the consolidated budget has made governors even more dependent on 




Conventional wisdom views Russia’s largest business actors as detractors from 
the central state’s governance capacity and as catalysts for assertive regional behavior.  
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework for viewing the top echelon of 
Russian companies – national- level businesses – as centripetal mechanisms, rather than 
centrifugal forces, inasmuch as they enhance the federal center’s political leverage over 
wealthy regions in an environment of weak formal state institutions and limited national 
party penetration in the periphery.  Success in implementing federal strategy in both 
periods – decentralization via co-optation under Yeltsin and more coercive 
recentralization under Putin – has been greatest in regions where national- level business 
actors have maintained a strategic presence.  The expansion of national- level businesses 
into the periphery and vertical integration of the country’s strategic assets has helped to 
build informal economic hierarchies that have supplemented formal political ones. The 
following chapters provide empirical evidence to support these claims. 
                                                 
124   In particular, the federal district system instituted by Putin has provided another venue for strategic 
alliances between federal officials and national-level businesses in the periphery.  In fact, the relative power 
of major businesses vis -à-vis individual presidential representatives is greater than vis -à-vis the Kremlin, as 
there are less competitors for influence per access point: in many federal districts, only a couple national-
level businesses dominate.  The additional political leverage provided by national-level businesses also 
helps to explain patterns of success demonstrated by presidential envoys in compelling compliance with 
Putin’s mandate to abrogate bilateral agreements, both within and across federal districts. 
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Chapter 3: Center Periphery Conflict and Accommodation, 1990-2002   
 
This chapter provides a closer look at the dynamics of intergovernmental relations 
in general, and assertive regionalism in particular, throughout the Russian transition to 
democracy.  Particular emphasis is placed on the wealthy regions that will be included in 
the regression analysis in Chapter 4.  The chapter identifies a symmetrical pattern in the 
behavior of the wealthier regions across various configurations of formal and informal 
institutional factors, including variance in federal strategies and the strength of vertically-
integrating mechanisms.  In particular, two main themes serve as a common thread 
running through the first dozen years of the Russian transition.   
  First, despite variance in formal institutions and federal strategies, patterns of elite 
bargaining and accommodation primarily centered on the federal election cycle have 
persisted across the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies.  Second, while the window for 
political opportunism stemming from central state weakness has gradually closed, the 
economic basis for assertive regionalism has remained constant throughout the entire 
period.  As demonstrated in this chapter, regional assertiveness has been motivated by 
attempts to cope with the strains of sub-federal economic adjustment, in terms of either 
demanding more financial resources for protecting regional industries, or largely 
demonstrative, political protests to “pass the buck” and place the responsibility for social 
problems on Moscow's shoulders.   
Within this overall pattern of continuity there has been considerable variation in 
the federal center’s strategy toward the regions.  The twelve year period from 1990-2002 
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can be divided up into three phases of intergovernmental relations.  The first phase, from 
1990-1993, encompasses the death knell of the Soviet Union (1990-1991) and the short-
lived First Russian republic (1991-1993).  During this phase, elite conflict at the federal 
level – between the newly-elected President Yeltsin and first Soviet leader M.  
Gorbachev, and then with the ancien regime parliament (Supreme Soviet) in 1993 – 
seriously weakened the center’s ability to enforce a consistent set of rules governing 
center-periphery interaction.  As a result, this period was characterized by arbitrary rules 
and various unilateral actions aimed at widening a region’s political autonomy as well as 
a widespread “revolt” against the government’s fiscal stabilization and economic 
adjustment policies.  In this phase, Russia’s wealthiest “ethnic republics” emerged as the 
pioneers of the regional autonomy movement, though many of the non-ethnic regions 
soon followed their example.   
 Yeltsin’s victory over the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 set the stage for the 
second phase, 1994-1998, which was inaugurated by the approval of a new Russian 
constitution and election of the first post-Soviet parliament in December, 1993.  Although 
intense partisan divisions and ensuing executive- legislative conflict still curtailed the 
center’s ability to act as a united front vis-à-vis the regions, the Kremlin managed to 
contain regional assertiveness within a process of bilateral negotiations between federal 
and regional executives.  Power-sharing treaties between the center and various regions, 
coupled with the institution of subfederal elections, enabled regional elites to formalize 
much of the autonomy that they had unilaterally “grabbed” in the first phase, while at the 
same time providing a framework for settling jurisdictional disputes.  Political interaction 
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between center and periphery began to be “tamed,” while initial attempts were made to 
institutionalize Russia’s fiscal federal system.  At the same time, conflicts over economic 
policy and the government’s persistent fiscal weakness sparked another revolt from 
below in 1996-1998, which peaked after the August, 1998 economic crisis, when the 
Russian Federation found itself on the brink of state breakdown.   
 The third phase, which began in 1999, has been characterized by both fiscal and 
political centralization.  The political aftershock of the 1998 crisis led federal elites to 
coalesce around a strong central state, which was accompanied by the reemergence of 
Russia’s state security elites, or siloviki, who represent a powerful “stick” in 
intergovernmental relations after a decade of mostly “carrots.” As a result, regional 
assertiveness has been aimed at defending the formal autonomy achieved in the previous 
phase in the face of the center’s counter-offensive.  This was first expressed in terms of 
political mobilization, specifically the building of political parties with strong regionalist 
agendas that united several of Russia’s wealthiest regions in opposition to the center’s bid 
to dismantle the asymmetrical federal system built in the 1990s.   
However, after the defeat of the regional elite coalition to the Kremlin in the 1999 
parliamentary elections, and the subsequent election of President Putin, regional 
assertiveness reverted back to its most typical form in the 1990s – with individual regions 
rather than coalitions as the main actors– although now it has taken on a distinctly 
defensive form.  Instead of various types of revolts, ultimatums and declarations that 
characterized the Yeltsin regime, assertive regions have tried to “wait out” the center’s 
siege via a more passive form of defiance of federal objectives.  Indeed, as the 2003-2004 
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election cycle drew nearer, the Kremlin increasingly evidenced the willingness to 
accommodate regional elites, resulting in a “two steps forward, one step back” pattern of 
centralization in Putin’s first term.  The rest of this chapter delves into each of these three 
phases in more detail.   
PHASE 1: FEDERAL FRAGMENTATION AND REGIONAL REBELLION 
1990-1991: The Parade of Sovereignties  
 
  During the final years of the Soviet regime, many of Russia’s internal ethnic 
homelands, in particular the republics, followed the example set by the Union republics 
and issued declarations of sovereignty. 125  The “parade of sovereignties” from 1990-1991 
represented the first strong impulse from below for democratization, decentralization and 
restructuring of the moribund federal system that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union.  
The ethnic homelands in turn set the example for the remaining regions, oblasts and 
krays, which followed suit in the proceeding years, demanding greater autonomy from 
Moscow.  In this manner, the legacy of assertive regionalism that the Russian Federation 
inherited from the crumbling Soviet state was to define center-periphery relations for the 
next decade.   
It is important to note that the drivers of the sovereignty movement within Russia 
itself differed in some ways from those precipitating the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
125 As a republic itself in the Soviet federal system, Russia was further subdivided into administrative units 
(e.g.  oblasts and krays)  and “autonomous” ethnic regions (republics, oblasts or okrugs).  The latter were 
distinguished as officially designated homelands of the titular nationality.  The republics (hereafter referred 
to as “ethnic republics”) enjoyed privileged status in the ethnic region hierarchy as they were subordinate 
directly to Moscow, rather than a non-ethnic administrative unit.  They also were the subject of central 
policies designed to promote an indigenous elite and were afforded some of the formal institutional 
trappings of autonomy.  For further analysis, see Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: 
Hutchinson, 1988). 
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Due to the demographic structure of Russia’s historical ethnic homelands – titular 
nationalities constitute the majority only in a few regions, and in several cases are a 
minority – sub-national autonomy movements were not a mass popular phenomenon at 
the same level as in the most assertive constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, 
such as the Baltic States.126  The presence of large Russian populations, coupled with 
rivalry among non-Russian populations, tempered the sovereignty aspirations of the 
most- independent minded republican leaders, while geographical constraints played a 
major role for non-border regions.127  The influence of nationalist organizations has 
varied over time, and in many regions has waned since the earliest years of the 
transition. 128 
At the elite level, however, events on the national political stage in the early 
1990s offered regional leaders a window of opportunity to assert control over political 
and fiscal resources within their territories.  The threat of ethnic separatism proved to be a 
                                                 
126 For a comparative analysis of autonomy movements by the Soviet republics and the internal Russian 
republics, see, for example, Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of 
Regional Leaders in a Post-Communist Order,” World Politics 49:2 (1997): 212-249; and Philip G.  
Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43 (January 1991), 197; Kisangani N.  
Emizet and Vicki L.  Hesli, "The Disposition to Secede: An Analysis of the Soviet Case," Comparative 
Political Studies 27, no.  4 (1995). 
127 For a demographic and geographical analysis of Russia’s internal republics, see Chauncy D.  Harris, "A 
Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands," Post-Soviet 
Geography 34, no. 9 (1993).  The presence of large non-titular populations constrained separatist 
aspirations by the titular nationality.  For instance, Emizet and Hesli note that the concentration of the 
titular nationality is a significant predictor of the strength of secessionism in the Soviet case (p.530).  Soviet 
policy toward Russia’s internal Muslim republics, for example, encouraged divisions, such as the creation 
of a written Bashkir language (vs.  the shared Tatar language) and the drawing up of borders and promotion 
of migration to include significant Tatar populations in Bashkiria, and vice-versa.  Thus, not only Russians, 
but non-titular ethnic populations also increased the heterogeneity of many republics.   
128 For an account of the relationship between republican governments and indigenous nationalist 
movements in Russia’s republics, see Michael McFual and Nikolai Petrov, Politicheskii Al'manakh Rossii 
(Russian Political Almanac) , Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998, 
especially the sections on Tatarstan and Bashkortostan .   
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salient barga ining chip in future dealings with Moscow. 129  Politically, popular elections 
that accompanied the sovereignty movements as early as June 1991 provided republican 
leaders, most of whom belonged to the Soviet nomenklatura, with an alternate, 
democratically legitimated base of power that put relations between regional executives 
and Moscow on a more even keel than that of their non-Russian neighbors, who could be 
fired on a whim.130  In particular, the pioneers of the institution of regional elections were 
Russia’s ethnic republics, including Chechnya, Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia, in addition 
to the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow.   
In terms of fiscal federalism, control over state property, tax revenues and natural 
resources were central issues in many of the republic sovereignty movements during this 
period, especially in the wealthier republics.131  Following the example of the Union 
republics, some internal Russian republics halted regular tax payments to the federal 
center, instituting single-channel tax systems.132  Other jurisdictional issues, such as 
citizenship, status of the titular language, control over the appointment of state officials in 
                                                 
129 Treisman, 1996 and 1999. 
130 The Chechen case is a notable exception that more closely mirrored developments in the Baltic states, 
where nationalist leaders replaced the Soviet ones in power during the onset of the autonomy movement.  
Otherwise, Soviet regional leaders (e.g.  CPSU secretaries and other high-ranking members of the 
nomenklatura) have retained their positions in the lion’s share of the internal Russian republics, much more 
so than in the non-ethnic regions.  For a general analysis on elite continuity in Post-Soviet Russia, see John 
Higley & J.  Pakalski, “The Persistence of Post Communist Elites,” Journal of Democracy 2:133-147; Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “ From Power to Property: The Nomenklatura in Post-Communist 
Russia, ”in Graeme Gill, ed., Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics (NY: St.  Martin’s Press, 1998). 
131 See for instance, Vera Tolz, “The Role of the Republics and Regions,” RFE/RL, Vol 2, No 15, April, 
1993; and Treisman, “Russia’s Ethnic Revival.” 
132 In its final years, the Soviet Union suffered from fiscal as well as political disintegration.  The Baltic 
republics initiated a “tax revolt” by unilaterally revising rates of taxes remitted to Moscow, and eventually 
withholding all taxes. As other republics followed suit, state coffers were eventually emptied.  Tatarstan 
and Chechnya were the pioneers in the Russian case; both republics unilaterally declared single channel tax 
systems in the early 1990s, ceasing payment into the Russian budget altogether for a period of time.  See I.  
Demchenko, “Rossiyskiy Parlament Reshil Sam Soorudit Byudzhet v Piku MinFinu,” Izvestiya,10 July  
1993, 2. 
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the region, etc. also dominated the ethnic republics’ political agendas.  As the ethnic 
republics also formed their own constitutions, many of which proclaimed the supremacy 
of republican over federal legislation, the stage was increasingly set for a “war of laws” 
that has plagued intergovernmental relations throughout the transition. 
Moscow’s reaction to the “parade of sovereignties” can be best summed up in 
Boris Yeltsin’s oft-quoted exhortation to regional leaders to “take all the sovereignty you 
can swallow.”133 The newly elected president of the Russian Federation needed the 
political support of regional elites in his struggle with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
for control over the Kremlin.  While Yeltsin primarily had the more powerful ethnic 
republic leaders in mind, the leaders of Russia’s non-ethnic regions (oblasts, krays) 
certainly weren’t oblivious to the political window that opened up and the vulnerable 
position of the fragmented federal government.134 In late 1991, the legislatures of various 
oblasts also began discussing the idea of upgrading their legal status in the Federation as 
well.  Except for nationa list issues, their agendas were strikingly similar to those of the 
republics.  During this phase, however, only a few oblast legislatures, such as 
Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, tested the waters by forwarding petitions to the Supreme Soviet 
to upgrade their status.135  Unlike the ethnic regions, however, the oblasts refrained from 
unilateral declarations.136  
                                                 
133 Berite stol’ko suvereniteta, skol’ko smozhete proglotit’! The ethnic republics in particular proved to 
have a large appetite.   
134 For the sake of simplicity, the non-ethnic regions will be referred to as “oblasts.”  There has been no 
legal distinction between the status of oblasts and krays in either the Soviet or Russian system.  The latter 
term tends to denote large border regions.   
135 “Will there be a Yenesei Republic?” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.  43, No.47 (1991), 24; and 
“Inner Soviet Adopts Resolution Asking Supreme Soviet to Recognize Irkutsk Province…” Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press, Vol. 43, No.47 (1991), 24.  The governors of other regions such as Sakhalin also 
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1992-1993: Economic Adjustment and the Struggle for Equal Rights    
 
The lowering of the Soviet flag over the Kremlin on December 25, 1991, heralded 
the short-lived First Russian Republic (1991-1993), which was increasingly plagued by 
rivalry between ancien regime institutions such as the Congress of People’s Deputies and 
the newly institutionalized Russian presidency.  The Soviet-era constitution and court 
system were ill-equipped to deal with the political realties of the transition, and just like 
the rivalry between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the confrontation between Supreme Soviet 
Speaker Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutskoi on one side, and President 
Yeltsin on the other, kept the political window of opportunity open for assertive regional 
elites, who enjoyed a strengthened bargaining position due to their role as power brokers.  
Each side in the political conflict at the federal level was willing to accommodate 
regional demands in exchange for political support.   
Just as significant as the mounting political paralysis on the federal level, in 1992 
the federal government embarked on market reform, including price and trade 
liberalization, fiscal stabilization and a privatization program that was unprecedented in 
terms of its size and speed.137  The federal government’s economic policies had a 
significant impact on the regional autonomy movement during this period.  Budgetary 
resources became scarcer, while natural resource rents became more valuable.  This in 
turn thrust the issue of fiscal federalism – in particular the distribution of tax revenue, 
resource rents and economic policy authority – into the forefront of intergovernmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
supported the idea of creating republics, but no resolutions were forwarded to the national parliament, as in 
the cases above. 
136 Oblast executives were appointed by the Kremlin until the institution of regional elections in 1995-97. 
137 Chapter 5 will take a closer look at the struggles surrounding privatization in center-periphery relations.   
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relations.  At the crux of the issue was the viability of subjects of the Federation as 
autonomous political units based on the disposition of regional revenue and the 
redistribution of national income, as well as an independent sphere of expenditure 
discretion at the subnational level.  The new Russian state had inherited a highly 
centralized fiscal system, where regions were considered administrative appendages of 
the state, and possessed virtually no formal budgetary discretion. 138  
While the republican sovereignty movement in 1990-1991 engendered a “war of 
laws,” the government’s stabilization program sparked a “battle of the budgets.” In the 
second quarter of 1992, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), in an effort to reduce the federal 
deficit and control hyperinflation, began to push expenditures for a wide range of social 
and public investment programs down to the regional level.  Responsibility for 
expenditures for consumer price subsidies, cash subsidies for vulnerable groups, welfare 
programs for pensioners, family allowances, as well as various capital expenditures such 
as schools, hospitals, airports, highways, utilities, housing for military personnel and 
mandatory wage increases for public sector workers were transferred from federal to 
regional budgets.  At the same time, the MOF imposed a hard budget constraint on 
regional leaders, ceasing the practice of adjusting tax-sharing rates to accommodate 
                                                 
138 Under the fiscal system inherited from the Soviet Union, subnational budgets were formulated in an 
administrative fashion by MOF in Moscow, and were always balanced, with the deficit at the federal level.  
Regional budgets had neither the legal right to raise their own taxes nor the ability to determine their own 
rates for shared taxes.  There was no transparent, formula -based system to redistribute national income; 
instead, the new Russian government adjusted VAT tax deduction rates on a regular basis to meet 
individual regions’ budgetary needs (as determined by the MOF).  In general, the process of centralized 
budget formation was plagued by many of the same types of problems as centralized planning: expenditure 
norms were often unreliable, and did not allow for sufficient flexibility or regional cost differentials.  The 
ability of a region to finance desired programs depended mostly on its ability to lobby Moscow via 
informal channels.  See A.  Kalugin, “O Nekotorykh Problemakh Regiona’lnogo Upravleniya v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,” Ekonomist, No 8 (August 1993): 63-67. 
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additional expenditures.  In essence, the government hoped to eliminate many of the 
social programs, and intended to “pass the buck” to regional administrations for the 
cutbacks.139 
The legal vacuum in regard to Russia’s federal system in general, and the 
intergovernmental fiscal system in particular, exacerbated the situation.  The absence of 
legislation authorizing regions to raise additional taxes and other sources of subnational 
revenue meant that they had to primarily rely on informal means such as lobbying to 
comply with the federal government’s mandates.  A law on regional budgets intended to 
give regional officials more budgetary discretion passed by the Supreme Soviet in 
December 1991 was never realized, and as of mid-92 no legislation had yet been passed 
concerning the distribution of federal grants and transfers.  The Federation Treaty, which 
was signed in March 1992, kept major issues, such as control over resources and taxation, 
open to future negotiations and legislation.  Thus, regional leaders were essentially left to 
fend for themselves and compete with their neighbors for scarce resources and favorable 
deals with the federal center.  Assertive regionalism – pressuring the center through 
declarations and threats – proved to be the most potent weapon in the macro-political 
arena.   
The “first among equals” in this competition for resources were those ethnic 
republic leaders that had pioneered the sovereignty movement and had demonstrated the 
ability to mobilize resources to win elections in 1990 and 1991.  Many of the most 
                                                 
139 As Wallich notes, Moscow aimed to absorb regional surpluses and shift the deficit downward from the 
federal to the regional level.  Tax-sharing rates were set to force regional government to either cut back 
expenditures.  At the same time, regions had little formal options for borrowing, so they were caught 
between a rock and a hard place.  See Christine Wallich, Fiscal Decentralization: Intergovernmental 
Relations in Russia (Washington: The World Bank, 1992), 27-28.   
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assertive ethnic regions managed to secure special fiscal privileges in separate addenda to 
the Federation Treaty. 140  In addition, the republic of Tatarstan, which along with 
Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty, held a referendum the same month on 
the question of formulating relations with the center via a bilateral treaty subject to 
international law.  Armed with vox populi, Tatarstan, along with Chechnya, unilaterally 
instituted a single-channel tax system, sidestepping negotiation with Moscow. 141  All in 
all, a handful of Russia’s wealthiest ethnic republics – Tatarstan, Chechnya, 
Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia, Karelia and Komi – were able to assert control over a 
significant portion of the natural resources and fiscal revenue on their territories, either 
presenting the center with a fait accompli or negotiating extremely favorable deals.142  
The growing asymmetry between the formal rights and fiscal privileges enjoyed 
by the ethnic republics and the limited autonomy of  the  oblasts (non-ethnic regions) 
became an increasingly politicized issue in 1992.  Frustrated by their “second-class” 
                                                 
140 For instance, Bashkortostan was promised a fiscal scheme similar to a single-channel tax regime, 
whereby it retained well over ninety percent of its revenue and a large share of export revenue.  Sakha-
Yakutia and Karelia arrived at special deals whereby they could funnel their taxes through the federal 
budget and receive, respectively, 100 and 90 percent back.  Komi managed a similar deal allowing it to 
retain 70-75 percent of its income.  Sakha-Yakutia also received the right to retain a large share of proceeds 
of hard currency receipts and control over 20% of diamonds, 11.5% of gold.  Bashkortostan was awarded 
75% of its hard currency receipts.  While some oblasts (Tyumen, Sverdlovsk), etc. successfully petitioned 
for more control over foreign economic activity and hard currency receipts (e.g.  Siberian regions received 
25%), none were awarded such special fiscal privileges (in terms of % of tax receipts kept in the regions).  
Vera Tolz, “The Role of the Republics and Regions,” and “A United States of Russia?” Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, Vol 44, No.8 (92), 7-8. 
141 Moscow’s refusal to allow Tatarstan to unilaterally implement a single-channel tax system (e.g. keep all 
of the revenue collected within the territory, and then negotiate with Moscow on the amount and timing of 
future tax deliveries) was a key issue motivating the republican leaders to refuse to sign the Federation 
Treaty and schedule the referendum.  The success of the referendum was a strong bargaining chip in 
convincing federal authorities to “tolerate” the republic’s fiscal separatism.  See Ann Sheehy, “Tatarstan 
Asserts its Sovereignty,” RFE/RL, Vol.1 (14), 3 April, 1992, 11-4. 
142 Of these six regions, four were successful in effectively maintaining single-channel tax systems (or 
close equivalents) throughout the 1990s: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia and Chechnya 
(Ingushetia as well after the division).  Karelia and Komi were “cut off” in the mid-1990s.  See Guboglo, 
1997 and Lavrov, “Russian Fiscal Federalism: First Steps, First Results,” Segodnya, June 7, 1994, 5. 
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status and squeezed by the federal government’s stricter fiscal and monetary policies, a 
number of oblasts in the Volga, Urals and Siberian areas of Russia launched a tax revolt 
in the summer of 1992, when their legislatures adopted decisions to revise revenue 
sharing with Moscow and effectively implement single-channel systems.143  Among the 
reasons given by regional authorities for their act of defiance was the growing gap 
between federally-assigned expenditures and the amount of revenue left to the territories.  
Regional authorities were increasingly unwilling to spend their time in Moscow “sitting 
in waiting rooms and begging for allowances for their territories.”144  For instance, 
Chelyabinsk authorities bemoaned the fact that only 42% of the revenue generated in the 
oblast in 1992 remained in its budget, while it had to petition the MOF for loans in order 
to collect the harvest, implement federal conversion programs, finish nearly-completed 
construction projects and build housing for military personnel and migrants, in addition 
to meeting other social and capital needs.  Similarly, Krasnoyarsk authorities decried the 
unfair redistribution of finances between the center and regions, claiming that it kept the 
oblasts on a short political leash.   
Also included among Krasnoyarsk’s grievances was the region’s lack of control 
over the disposal of its resources, and the lack of compensation it received for their use.  
Krasnoyarsk Soviet Chairman Novikov cited the fact that while Buryatia, due to its 
privileged status as a republic, was able to pass a law on forestry, the oblast was not 
legally permitted to regulate the use of its forests or other resources, and thus could not 
                                                 
143 A.Orlov, “Preferentsial’niy Byudzhet Mog by Prekratit’ Byudzhetnye Razdory,” Ekonomika I Zhizn, No 
5 (February 1993), 5. Orlov notes that the unilateral actions taken by the regions were in protest to their 
“fleecing” (obdiralovka) by MOF.   
144 Ibid. 
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define its own economic policy. 145  Likewise in an article published in the summer of 
1992, the head of Tyumen oblast, Yuri Shafrannik, complained that while oil and gas 
from the region accounted for over 60% of the Federation’s hard currency receipts, the 
oblast as a whole occupied sixtieth place in terms of budgetary support for health, 
education and services.  The Federation Treaty, Shafrannik asserted, remained only on 
paper – it was not observed by the MOF and supporting legislation had yet to be passed.  
Indeed, the title of Shafrannik’s article, “A Strong Region Means a Strong Russia” 
summed up the concerns of many regional elites in terms of the discrepancy between 
their formal authority and that needed to effectively manage the tasks of economic 
adjustment and market reform. 146  
  In contrast to its passive acceptance of the ethnic republics’ assertiveness in the 
fiscal sphere, the MOF reacted swiftly to the uprising by the oblasts, employing various 
sanctions to force the regions to rescind their decisions.147  At the same time, the 
Supreme Soviet, competing with the Kremlin for the loyalty of regional leaders, adopted 
legislation allocating regional governments discretion over at least 50 percent of their 
income, and pledged to support legislation to implement the Federal Treaty.  Later, the 
Economic Council of the Supreme Soviet, in a report disseminated during the 7th 
Congress, recommended that the proportion of expenditures allocated solely to the 
regions be raised to 60 percent of the consolidated budget.  However, the 1993 budget 
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
146 Yuri Shafranik, “Silniy Region – Sil’naya Rossiya,” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,’ No 8 (August, 1992), 
30-35. 
147 Orlov, 1993.  Among the sticks employed by the MOF were the freezing of export licenses and 
federally-funded programs, including the financing of “closed cities,” and the denial of reciprocal credits to 
regional enterprises.   
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message delivered by President Yeltsin in January took into account ne ither the increased 
share of regional revenue enshrined in the legislation, nor the Economic Council’s even 
more generous recommendations, instead offering only a marginal increases in revenue 
allocated to the regions.148  The budget message sparked a wave of protest by regional 
officials in national newspapers, and during a meeting with the Supreme Soviet’s 
Economic Council in March, oblast leaders complained that Moscow granted fiscal 
privileges to the republics “according to the measure of their national-separatist 
strivings,” while discriminating against “law-abiding Russian oblasts.”149   
The federal center’s intransigence, coupled with published reports of the fiscal 
privileges enjoyed by the ethnic republics, sparked another round of assertive regionalism 
in the summer of 1993, at an even broader level than the short- lived tax revolt during the 
previous summer.150  In April, Chelyabinsk held an election for governor in defiance of 
Moscow.  The federally appointed head of the administration refused to comply with the 
results, leading to a crisis of legitimacy in the regional government.  Two oblasts – 
Vologda and Sverdlovsk – added a question onto the April 25th national referendum 
asking whether their regions should have the same rights as the ethnic republics, such as 
Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia, to which the majority of voters gave their approval.  Armed 
                                                 
148 Ibid.  The regions’ overall share of the consolidated budget was scheduled to rise from 42.5 to 43.2 
percent, while the share of expenditures was to rise from 30.0 to 32.8 percent, a far cry from the figures 
hoped for by the regions.  The gap in regional financing often had to be made up by loans from the 
Ministry of Finance, which further exacerbated the region’s dependence on Moscow.   
149 Cited in Rossiyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Zhurnal, No.3 (March 1993), 29-30.  The letter of protest from 
regional leaders can be found in A Morozov, “Vlast’ – Tsentru, Otvetsvennost’ – Regionam,” Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 20 January, 1993, 1-3. 
150 Data published in Segodnya newspaper, 25 June, 1993, 3, showed that the distribution of federal funds 
heavily favored the ethnic republics: of the fifteen regions which received more funds from the federal 
budget than they contributed, thirteen were republics.   
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with a public mandate, both regions proclaimed themselves as “republics” in the 
following months and began work on their own constitutions.  Moreover, the governor of 
Sverdlovsk oblast, Eduard Rossel, extended an invitation to neighboring regions to join 
his region in forming a “Urals Republic” in recognition of the need for non-ethnic regions 
to enjoy the same economic and political rights as the ethnic republics.151  In the ensuing 
months, the legislatures of several other regions adopted decisions to begin preparations 
(e.g. schedule referenda, formulate constitutions) for republic status, and officials in 
Tomsk and Irkutsk declared their intent to hold referendums on their respective region’s 
juridical status.  Meanwhile, members of the Siberian Accord seriously debated whether 
or not to follow Sverdlovsk’s example and declare a Siberian Republic, which took place 
on the eve of the clash between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet.152    
The decisions to adopt republic status stemmed from both economic populism and 
political opportunism.  For instance, the decision of the Chelyabinsk legislature to hold a 
referendum on the issue of upgrading the region’s status (which ultimately did not take 
place) was partially motivated by the desire to dampen the effects of shock therapy, 
including price controls and the establishment of a higher minimum wage.153  On the 
other hand, included with the elements of economic populism (which contained largely 
unfeasible policy prescriptions) was shrewd political calculation. 154  For regional 
                                                 
151 Chelikov, Vadim.  “Respublika, Kotoroy ne Nuzhen Gerb,” Moskovskie Novosti, No.  31 (August 
1993), A8. 
152 James Hughes, “Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement,” Europe Asia 
Studies Vol.  46, No.7 (1994), 1133-1161. 
153 “Yet Another Republic,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLV, No.34 (1993), 24. German 
Galkin, “A President and a Tsar are Proclaimed Simultaneously in Chelyabinsk.” Izvestia, Aug 28, 2.   
154 For instance, freezing prices coupled with continuous wage increases.  Even “red” regions such as 
Ulyanovsk were unable to maintain such islands of socialism for more than a couple years.   
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executives, the declarations also were part of assertive bargaining strategies aimed at 
extracting concessions from the center.  In some cases they resulted in an immediate 
payoff to the region.  For example, Maritime province, after an unsuccessful attempt to 
woo neighboring regions into a “Far Eastern Republic,” presented PM Chernomyrdin 
with a copy of a resolution adopted by the local legislature calling for a referendum to 
confirm the region’s status as a republic.  The region then received permission to keep 
most of federal taxes that year.155  In other cases, the payoff came later, in the second 
phase, in the form of the right to hold early elections (Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, etc.) or 
maintain highly preferential fiscal regimes, as in the case of the most assertive republics 
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia, etc.) 
Table 3.1 highlights oblasts that were most assertive of their political autonomy during 
this period, in terms of upgrading their status and holding referendums.   
 
Table 3.1: Assertion of Formal Political Autonomy among the Wealthy Non-ethnic 
Regions, 1992-1993 
 
     Unilateral Upgrade of Status   
 
Executive declares 
“republic status”  
Sverdlovsk, Vologda 
Parliament adopts intent 
to declare, or supports 
interregional republic156  
Altai, Arkhangelsk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, 
Kemerovo, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Maritime, 
Nizhny Novgorod, Sakhalin, Samara, Tomsk, 
Tyumen, Voronezh  
                                                 
155 “Primorie Trebuyet Rasshirieniya Svoikh Prav,” Izvestiya, 2 September 1993, 4.   
156 The “South Urals Republic” was in fact declared in Chelyabinsk, but not by the chief exe cutive who 
was officially the head of the regional administration.  Instead, a contender in the gubernatorial elections in 
April 1993, who finished seventh, decided to take matters into his own hands and make the declaration in 
late July.  The parliament did, however, adopt a decision to hold a referendum on the question, which never 
took place.  It is included in this period as it represented the tail end of the “wave” of referenda begun by 
Tatarstan in March, 1992.  The legislatures of Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk first adopted a decision to petition 
the Supreme Soviet in late 1991; the idea of forming a joint (e.g.  Enisey) republic was brought back to life 
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The most politically assertive oblasts during the summer offensive of 1993 were 
Sverdlovsk and Vologda, both of which officially declared themselves republics after 
holding public referenda.   
While Prime Minister Chernomyrdin publicly denounced the oblasts’ rebellion, 
the government, cautious of losing allies in its struggle with the Supreme Soviet, took no 
formal action at this point.157  In August-September the regional rebellion further 
snowballed as it became increasingly clear that the government was not going to back 
down in terms of fiscal policy.  Over thirty regions unilaterally withheld tax payments 
from the center which, coupled with the mushrooming “republic” projects, raised the 
specter of a Soviet-style state breakdown. 158  The explanations provided by oblast leaders 
for their assertiveness echoed the same concerns as the previous summer: their absolute 




                                                                                                                                                 
in summer, 1993. “Politicheskie Igri Vokrug Byudzheta,” Moskovskie Novosti, No.  28, 11 July 1993; 
Emel’yanenko, “Nastuplenie Provintsii na Kreml,” Moskovskie Novosti, No.  40, 3 Oct 1993, p.3A; and I 
Vetrov, ”Ne Slishkom Dal’niy Vostok,” Kommersant, No.  33, 16-26 August, 1993, 18; “Vologda Province 
is Proclaimed a State within Russia,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press,  Vol 45, No.20 (1993), 24-25; 
“More New Republics Loom; is Shakhrai the Loser?” Current Digest of the Soviet Press,  Vol 45, No.  28 
(1993), 6.   
157 V Chernomyrdin, “Ekonomicheskie Mery Pravitel’stva – Platforma Natsional’nogo Soglasiya,” 
Rossiyskie Vesti, 7 August, 1993, 1-2.  Chernomyrdin mentioned Rossel by name, who was later fired. 
158 Among the regions which threatened to withhold taxes were Krasnoyarsk, Altay Kray, Belgorod, 
Voronezh, Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays, Bashkortostan, Samara, 
Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia, Karelia, Udmurtia and all the “Golden Ring” oblasts.  It was not a coordinated 
effort between all the regions, though most of the decisions occurred in the last week of August and first 
week of September, 1993.  See R Batryshin, “Nalogovaya Voina Tsentra i Regionov: Boris Federov 
Otstupaet, Teryaya Milliardi,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 September 1993, 3.   
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The governor of Yaroslavl oblast, Anatoly Lisitsin, insinuated this danger in his 
explanation for his region’s defiance:  
“So long as one person is allowed to live at the expense of others and so long as 
Tatarstan spends everything only on itself and delays its dealings with other 
Russians, there will be no order.  The epidemic of non-payments to the federal 
budget will end in a common grave.”159   
     
In some individual cases, defiant regions were successful in coercing MOF into 
transferring additional funds to regional budgets.  For instance, Yaroslavl authorities 
petitioned the MOF to keep 50% instead of 20% of VAT collections for a period of three 
months in order to offset the 8 billion ruble debt owed by the federal government to the 
oblast.  The ministry refused, and it was only after the Yaroslavl legislature adopted the 
decision to withhold taxes that it was offered a three-month interest free loan, for the 
exact amount of the VAT deductions. 
However, the rebellion did not have time to play itself out.  Political events on the 
federal stage soon took precedence, as the constitutional crisis culminated in the shelling 
of the White House (which then housed the Supreme Soviet) by tanks friendly to 
President Yeltsin in the first days of October, 1993.  Boris Yeltsin’s victory over the 
Supreme Soviet brought an end to the political uncertainty on the federal level.  By the 
end of the month the Kremlin had consolidated power and was able to turn its attention 
toward regional leaders.  The government’s response to the regional rebellion consisted 
of both “sticks” and “carrots.” In late October, Yeltsin issued an ukase authorizing the 
government to apply sanctions to regions not remitting the proper sum of federal taxes 
                                                 
159 Yu. Vakhrin, “Epidemiya Neplatezhey Zakonchitsya Obshchim Kladbishchem, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 17 
September 1993, 4. 
86 
and authorizing the Central Bank to deduct the amounts from their current accounts.160  
The federal government instituted a federal treasury system to reassert its control over the 
flow of tax payments from individual enterprises.  In addition, Moscow cracked down on 
the most assertive oblast executives.  Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk and Vitaly Mukha of 
Novosibirsk, chief architects of the Urals and Siberian republics, were fired, while the 
results of the unauthorized election held in Chelyabinsk were annulled.   
At the same time, by way of concession, two of the most hard-line liberals, Yegor 
Gaidar and Boris Federov, were removed from their positions in the government.161  The 
government stepped up its rhetoric on the need for equality among the regions, and 
several of the ethnic republics were forced to cough up tax funds that had been withheld 
during the previous quarters.162  Despite intense lobbying by the ethnic republic leaders, 
the special legal status of republics as sovereign states was not formally recognized in the 
new Russian Constitution to the degree that it was in an earlier (July 1993) draft. 
Moscow also undertook efforts to meet regional demands for greater ins titutionalization 
of fiscal federal relations.  President Yeltsin issued an edict establishing uniform VAT 
rates for 1994 and extending the right to regional and municipal governments to raise 
additional taxes and duties.163  The edict also stated that in the future federally mandated 
                                                 
160 “On Measures for the Observance of Russian Federation Legislation and Budgetary Arrangements,” 
signed October 28, 1993.   
161 Many regional leaders saw their removal as a “green light” for the further doling out of subsidies by the 
MOF.  See V Tordes, “Gaidar and Federov kak Zakuska k Dotatsiyam,” Segodnya, 22 January, 1994, 2; A 
Veslo, “S Otstavkoy Federova Pravitel’stvo Tatarii Spit Spokoinee,” Segodnya, 28 January, 1994, 2. 
162 V Shirobokova, “Nalogovaya Voina Regionov s Tsentrom Ugrozhaet Rossii Razvalom,” Finansovye 
Izvestiya ,24-30 December, 1993, 2; D.  Mikhaylin, “Idet Voina Byudzhetnaya,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 
Sept.  93, 3.   
163 “On the Formation of the Russian Federation Republic Budget and Its Relationship with the Budgets of 
the Federation Subjects in 1994,” 6 January, 1994.   
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expenditures not agreed upon with regional governments would not be obligatory.  In 
addition, the edict mandated the institution of a formula-based system for redistributing a 
portion of national income in order to smooth over the growing socioeconomic 
asymmetry among the regions.  Finally, separate legislation allowed regional 
governments to share in federal tax room; for example, regions were allowed to set up a 
surtax on the federal profit tax rate.164   
 
PHASE 2: FORMALIZING ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM 
 
The second phase of intergovernmental relations in Russia was inaugurated in 
December 1993 with the public approval of Yeltsin’s Draft Constitution.  There are three 
main areas of contrast from the previous phase.  First, the adoption of a presidential 
system in the federal constitution formalized the supremacy of the executive branch, 
which solidified a form of intergovernmental relations akin to “executive federalism.”165  
Bargaining amongst executives defined the rules of the game during this phase, and 
bilateral power-sharing treaties were signed with over half of the subjects of the 
Federation.  Second, the institution of the Fund for the Financial Support of the Regions, 
together with tax-sharing principles enshrined in federal legislation, laid the formal 
foundation for a rule-based fiscal federal system better designed to address the needs of 
regional leaders in terms of sub-national economic adjustment.  Third, the institution of 
regional elections nationwide strengthened the hands of regional executives vis-à-vis the 
center, changing the bargaining model from one of “principal-agent” to one of “principal-
                                                 
164  G Cherkasov, “ Nalogovoe Zakonodatel’stvo ne Postupilos’ Printsipam,” Segondya, 12 March, 1994, 2.   
165 For an excellent overview of the rise of presidentialism in Russia, and the problems associated with it, 
see Barany and Moser, 2001.  
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principal.”166  Moscow’s ability to remove recalcitrant regional executives via fiat was 
curtailed, and electoral mandates became a potent bargaining chip in the 
intergovernmental bargaining game.   
While the first phase was mainly characterized by unilateral actions designed to 
coerce the center into accepting regional autonomy projects as a fait accompli, assertive 
regionalism after 1994 was more confined to a process of bilateral negotiation.  Federal 
elites were less disunited during this phase than during the previous one, and although 
sharp ideological divisions hampered executive- legislative relations, both the Duma – the 
new Russian parliament – and the Kremlin agreed on the general democratic rules of the 
game.  Furthermore, the dominance of the Communist Party and other left-wing or 
nationalist groups in the 2d Duma – who are not known for their sympathy for the 
process of federalization – forced the regions to turn toward the federal executive branch 
for legitimization of their autonomy demands. 
 There were two separate streams of assertive regionalism in this phase: political 
and economic.  The first began with a campaign by the ethnic regions to formalize their 
gains from the previous phase via bilateral power-sharing treaties with the center.  Faced 
with a tough federal election cycle in 1995-1996, Moscow chose to selectively 
                                                 
166 See Richard M.  Bird and Francois Vaillancourt, Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.) and Richard Bird, “A Comparative 
Perspective on Federal Finance,” in K.G Banting, D.M Brown and T.J Courchene, eds The Future of Fiscal 
Federalism (Kingston: Queens University of School of Public Policy, 1994).  The authors identify two 
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government unilaterally sets the rules to maximize national policy objectives, such as economic growth, 
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decentralization that takes into account the political necessity of bargaining (e.g. principal-principal model) 
in order to account for geographical and ethnic diversity.  When fiscal decentralization is accompanied (or 
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accommodate certain regions, in terms of both timing and substance, in order to gain 
strategic allies among the regional elite.  An important result of this was the extension of 
the right to sign power-sharing treaties and hold regional elections to the oblasts in 1996.  
In the wake of the gubernatoria l elections, the power struggle between regional and 
federal authorities gradually shifted from the political to the economic sphere.  From 
autumn 1996 through summer 1998, certain regions launched a rebellion similar in 
agenda to the previous “tax revolts” of 1992-1993, but initially much more restricted in 
scope.  The economic crisis that erupted on August 17, 1998, however, exacerbated the 
rebellion and brought the nation to the brink of state breakdown.  The following section 
will look at each of these streams in turn. 
Power-sharing Treaties and the Institution of Subnational Elections  
 
Russia’s wealthiest ethnic republics were the driving force behind the 
“contractual” style of federalism that characterized the treaty-signing process in the mid-
1990s.167  With the exception of Chechnya, the ethnic regions’ autonomy projects were 
not aimed at secession from the Federation.  Instead, the republican elites aimed to secure 
a privileged status within the federation, in essence having their cake and eating it too.  
The Tatar “economic miracle” and prosperous situations in other republics amid the sharp 
economic decline in the country as a whole is a case in point.168  Securing formal 
                                                 
167 Polishchuk, 2000 and Stoner-Weiss, 1999. 
168 In February 1994, the Prime Minister of Tatarstan, M Sabirov, boasted that because of its privileged 
fiscal status, Tatarstan was able to maintain the lowest prices for bread, milk and dairy products in Russia.  
Likewise, the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of Karelia, S Blinnikov, noted that the preferential share 
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sovereignty, would have been “unthinkable.” See M Sabirov, “My Vnosim Nalogi v Federal’nuyu Kaznu: 
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recognition of their privileged status and property rights was a high priority for the 
leaders of resource-rich republics, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha-Yakutia.  
By 1994, both Tatarstan and Bashkortostan had held successful referendums on the issue 
of defining relations with Moscow on the basis of a separate treaty governed by 
international law. 169  The republic of Tatarstan pioneered the agreement-singing process 
in February of 1994, when it concluded a treaty with Moscow delineating spheres of 
competencies over a wide range of jurisdictional matters.  Bashkortostan and other ethnic 
republics soon followed suit.  The treaty afforded the republics a wide range of autonomy 
in various spheres, and in effect legitimized their special legal and fiscal status as well as 
claims for control over natural resources and industrial assets on their territories.  In 
particular, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were able to bargain for virtually complete 
control over natural resources such as oil and the management of industries in the oil-
processing and petrochemical sectors, while Sakha-Yakutia was assigned the lion’s share 
of revenues from gold and diamonds.   
For the federal government, the treaty-signing process allowed it to stabilize 
relations with the most assertive regional leaders and politically volatile regions.  The 
outbreak of war in Chechnya was a glaring example of the consequences of the 
breakdown of the bargaining process.170  In addition, the bilateral agreements provided 
                                                                                                                                                 
no Summa Dolzhna byt’ Real’noy i Obosnovannoi,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 October 1993; S Blinnikov, 
“Nasha Tsel – Ekonomicheskiy Suverenitet,” Delovoy Mir, 28 Feb - 6 Mar, 1994, 14. 
169 Tatarstan was the pioneer of the referendum process (March, 1992); Bashkortostan added a question to 
the constitutional referendum in December, 1993. 
170 It also was an example of the potential for social upheaval and instability within a multiethnic region 
when a nationalist elite replaced the former Soviet one.  Thus, Moscow has had a stake in accommodating 
the demands of the republican leaders who they can bargain with and whose goals are not 
nationalist/secessionist.  In a sense, Moscow was “paying them off” to maintain stability in their regions 
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the federal center with more certainty regarding revenue collection.  For instance, in 
exchange for a highly preferential tax sharing system, Tatarstan agreed to promise 
delivery of a fixed portion of the republic’s revenue to the center.  Moreover, the republic 
was assigned responsibility for financing various federal programs on its territory in 
exchange for the right to keep a larger share of revenue on its territory.   
As soon as Moscow initiated the process of signing bilateral treaties with the 
republics, several oblasts began to clamor for equal treatment.  For instance, in August 
1994, the same month that the republic of Bashkortostan signed a highly preferential 
treaty with the Kremlin, the leadership of neighboring Perm oblast threatened to boycott 
President Yeltsin’s Agreement on Social Accord unless it received formal rights similar 
to those of the ethnic republics – in essence employing blackmail tactics similar to those 
used by Tatarstan in 1992 when it refused to sign the Federation Treaty. 171  A delegation 
of officials from Perm followed up with a visit to Moscow, and, in addition to fiscal 
concessions, Perm received a promise that the treaty-signing process would eventually be 
extended to all regions.172  
In general, the strategy of the most assertive regional lobbyists for “equal rights” 
focused first on holding regional elections and then negotiating with the center from a 
position of strength.  Yuri Nozhikov, head of the administration of Irkutsk oblast, was the 
                                                                                                                                                 
among the various ethnic groups.  Interview with V.  Fillipov, Center for Civilizational and Regional 
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trailblazer, having won permission to hold a regional election in March 1994.  Another 
outspoken proponent of the treaty-signing process, Eduard Rossel was granted 
permission to hold an election in August 1995, which brought him back to power in 
Sverdlovsk.  Although by this time the Kremlin had already scheduled a general round of 
regional elections beginning in fall 1996, several other regional leaders successfully 
lobbied to hold their elections earlier, in December 1995.   
 In some regions, gubernatorial elections motivated regional executives to create 
their own “parties of power” on the local level.  In Sverdlovsk, for instance, Eduard 
Rossel launched the “Transformation of the Urals” party, which had a distinct regionalist 
agenda aimed at securing greater economic autonomy and control over the region’s 
socioeconomic development.  The party facilitated Rossel’s victory against the Kremlin-
backed incumbent, and went on to give him a loyal majority in both houses of the 
region’s legislative assembly.173  In contrast to other regional parties, Rossel’s movement 
also sent representatives to the national- level Federal Assembly, under the umbrella of 
the “Transformation of the Fatherland” party. 174  
Having prevailed over his Kremlin-backed opponent in the regional elections, 
Sverdlovsk governor Rossel spearheaded the bilateral agreement process, signing an 
agreement with Moscow in January 1996.  Once the precedent was set, several other 
regions succeeded in signing power-sharing treaties with Moscow in the first half of 
1996.  The next round began a year after presidential elections in July 1997, and by 
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August 1998 over half of Russia’s regions had signed treaties with the federal center.  
The defining feature of the treaty-signing process was the asymmetrical nature of the 
rights and responsibilities afforded to various regions.  While Sverdlovsk’s treaty 
afforded it a legal status almost equal to that of the republics, other treaties were more 
limited in the recognition of the political aspect of regional autonomy. 175  At the same 
time, many of the wealthier regions were able to negotiate the right to manage shares of 
state-owned enterprises, in order to gain more budgetary discretion and greater control 
over the regulation of mineral deposits and foreign economic activity. 176 
One of the main innovations of the treaties that benefited all the signatories was 
that a portion of federal taxes earmarked for financing federal or joint programs would 
remain in the regional branch of the federal treasury, instead of first going to Moscow.  
This was designed to allow more certainty in budgetary planning, since transfers from 
Moscow for federally and jointly financed programs were often delayed, or simply 
lost.177  In many cases, regions were able to negotiate some sort of a regional investment 
fund based on retention of a certain share of tax receipts, export duties or other federal 
taxes.  In addition, the treaties focused on specific geographical conditions and industrial 
sectors that were not being adequately addressed by federal policy. 178  
                                                 
175 See V.  Lysenko, “Distribution of Power: The Experience of the Russian Federation,” Conference 
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 For Moscow, the decision to gradually accommodate the non-ethnic regions was 
greatly influenced by the federal election cycle in 1995-1996.  The strength of opposition 
parties such as the CPRF and LDPR in 1993 parliamentary elections had demonstrated 
the saliency of the protest vote.  First and foremost, the Kremlin was interested in 
securing the position of President Yeltsin against the Communist challenger, Gennady 
Zyuganov.  Secondly, PM Chernomyrdin had a large stake in the success of the “party of 
power” – Our Home is Russia – in parliamentary elections.  The privilege of holding an 
early election and being among the first agreement signatories was accompanied by the 
responsibility of “delivering the vote” for the federal government.179  Thus, Moscow was 
first and foremost counting on receiving political dividends in exchange for satisfying 
autonomy demands from below.   
The treaties signed with the oblasts also benefited the federal government fiscally.  
One of the most pressing problems in Russia’s fiscal federal system had been the lack of 
hard budget constraints on regional leaders.  After the tax rebellion of 1993, the 
government took a more lax policy toward the regions in terms of enforcing fiscal 
discipline on the subnational level.  Many regional deficits ballooned as regional 
governments showered generous tax privileges on politically important enterprises and 
resorted to barter and other monetary surrogates, while at the same time squeezing small 
businesses for cash.  While encouraging a non-monetary economy that undermined 
federal tax collection, regional governors were quick to blame the center for under-
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financing regional programs and industries.180  The treaties assigned certain 
responsibilities to the regional governments, in many cases with specific sources of 
financing generated within the region, making it more difficult for the governor to “pass 
the buck” to Moscow, a common game played by the regional elites trying to cover up 
their own fiscal inefficiencies and lax tax treatment of regional enterprises.  Moreover, 
some treaties even negotiated mandatory decreases in regional deficits in exchange for 
other concessions.181 
At the same time, third party enforcement of the agreements was particularly 
problematic.  Until the summer of 1999, the State Duma refused to pass legislation to 
either regulate the treaty signing process or support any of the protocols enshrined in the 
treaties, while almost all the treaties violated the Constitution in one place or another, 
some more egregiously than others.182  The sheer number of region-specific addenda and 
protocols made it difficult for government ministries to even keep track of their 
obligations, and each side lacked effective levers of control to consistently force the other 
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into compliance.183  Thus in some cases the agreements brought more in terms of political 
symbolism than consistent material benefits and budgetary certainty for regional elites.  
The simple fact of signing an agreement with the center was seen as a confirmation of the 
governor’s ability to assert regional interests vis-à-vis Moscow.  Many of them looked 
good on paper and were strong arguments during election time, and served to boost the 
governor’s political stature among regional enterprise managers and the electorate.184   
The following table identifies regions that negotiated power-sharing treaties with 
Moscow and held early elections during this phase.  The timing of the event is an 
important indicator of a regional leader’s preference intensity for the formal aspect of 
political and fiscal autonomy.  Many of the most assertive regions were able to secure 
agreements and hold elections before the federal election cycle, when Moscow was in a 
more vulnerable position, and was more dependent on regional leaders to “get out the 
vote” in return for concession.  Following presidential elections in 1996, the federal 
center took more control over the treaty-signing process and in most cases set its own 
timetable, as indicated by the gap from June 1996 – June 1997.   
At the same time, negotiations with some of the more wealthy regions, such as 
Samara, Krasnoyarsk and Moscow City, began prior to the federal election cycle but 
dragged out into 1997 and 1998.  Nevertheless, as indicated by the table below, some 
regions emerged as the pioneers of both the electoral and agreement singing processes 
within their respective cohorts.  For the republics, these include Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia 
                                                 
183 Interview with V.  Reshetnikov, Kirov oblast administration, May 25, 2000. 
184 Interview E.  Volkova, Soviet Federation Apparatus, March, 1999.Volkova noted that the difference 
between what was offered a region on paper and what was actually received was significant, especially due 
to difficulties in federal revenue collection and mounting internal debt payments in the latter 1990s.   
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and Bashkortostan; among the oblasts, Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk pioneered the drive for 
regional elections and bilateral treaties.  At the same time, several of the wealthier oblasts 
did not sign treaties with the federal center at all, including Tyumen, Tomsk and Lipetsk. 
 
Table 3.2: Wealthy Regions’ Elections and Bilateral Treaties 
 







Prior ( 2/94 - 8/95) Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk Republics of Bashkortostan, 
Sakha-Yakutia, Tatarstan, 
Udmurtia 




Orenburg, St Petersburg 
Tomsk, Tver, Yaroslavl, 
and others 
Republic of Komi; Oblasts: 
Altai, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, 
Krasnodar, Leningrad Oblast, 
Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, 
Orenburg, Perm, Rostov, 
Sakhalin, St Petersburg, 
Sverdlovsk, Tver 
After (9/96+) Remainder of Oblasts Cheliabinsk, Kirov, 
Krasnoyarsk, Moscow 
Murmansk, Samara, Saratov, 
Ulyanovsk, Vologda, Voronezh, 
Yaroslavl, and others 
 
 
The Center’s Fiscal Offensive and the Regions’ “Economic Revolt”  
 
 One of President Yeltsin’s first moves after his reelection was an attempt to 
revive the state’s deteriorating financial situation.  Anatoly Chubais took the helm of the 
Ministry of Finance and launched a campaign to rein in errant taxpayers.185  Most 
                                                 
185 Chubais formed the Temporary Extraordinary Commission on Strengthening Tax and Budget 
Discipline; the first part of the name of the committee was the same as that of the Bolshevik committee in 
charge of state security in the years immediately following the revolution. 
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significantly for the regions, in 1997 the MOF began to regularly sequester federal 
expenditures in an effort to trim the mounting federal deficit.186  The cutbacks affected 
articles in the budget for regional investment and social programs, funds through the 
Fund for Financial Support to the Regions, as well as extra-budgetary funds.  In addition 
to outright sequestration, delays in transfers to the regions became commonplace, and the 
federal center was often unable –or unwilling – to live up to its side of the bargain 
contained in the bilateral agreements.187  Chubais also promoted a plan to divide Russia 
into federal tax districts in an effort to dilute some of the regional leader’s influence over 
budgetary flows, and also to broaden the authority of presidential representatives in the 
region over federal ministries, many of which were de-facto under the control of regional 
administrations that paid their salaries.188  
While the federal district idea never materialized, the sequestration of the federal 
budget represented a threat to regional finances similar to that during the onset of fiscal 
stabilization in 1992-1993.  In addition, by now several years had passed and the country 
was still suffering a decline in many sectors of industry.  Increasingly frustrated by 
Moscow’s inadequate role in the economy and unilateral budgetary cutbacks, regional 
executives began to take matters into their own hands.  In the fall of 1996, Omsk 
governor Leonid Pozhelyaev launched a new round of regional protests by challenging a 
presidential decree giving the Ministry of Finance extraordinary powers to punish 
                                                 
186 The government had to cut one-fifth of the planned expenditures in the 1997 budget due to a revenue 
shortfall in the first quarter. 
187 See fn.  60. 
188 In Kirov oblast, for instance, the presidential representative’s office was understaffed and unable to 
keep up with its duties.  The regional administration staff de-facto assumed many of the presidential 
representative’s responsibilities.  Interview with V.  Reshetnikov, and other staff members, Kirov oblast 
administration, May 25, 2000. 
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enterprises not remitting their taxes on time.  Pozhelyaev, together with regional defense 
enterprise managers, effectively issued an ultimatum to the center, claiming that if it did 
not remit 2.5 trillion rubles owed to industries and state workers in the region, Omsk and 
other Siberian provinces would be forced to take matters into their own hands.189  
It is important to note that Omsk authorities cited the center’s ineffective regional 
policy as one of the main reasons for their protest, complaining that the federal 
government relied exclusively on informal channels (e.g. patronage) for dealing with 
regional officials and only tried to “put out fires” – waiting until crises occurred before 
addressing pressing needs.  While the immediate pretext for Omsk’s assertiveness was 
the center’s attempt to flex its muscles and clamp down on regional taxpayers, survey 
data indicates that the root of the problem for regional elites across Russia actually lay in 
the center’s fiscal and economic policy weakness.190  This same theme was sounded in 
similar ultimatums in February 1997 by Maritime Province governor Yevgeniy 
Nazdratenko and Sverdlovsk governor Eduard Rossel.  Rossel, who represented the 
Association of Urals executives, gave the government several weeks to come up with a 
sound industrial policy. 191 
                                                 
189 While the regional protest began as a march organized by local defense industries, governor Pozhelyaev 
played an instrumental role in translating the spontaneous act into an ultimatum directed against the federal 
government.  See Vladimir Golubev, “Counter-Offensive Against Moscow: Regions Answer the VChK’s 
Demand for Payment of Taxes by Issuing Ultimatum,” Trud, 21 November, 1996, 3. 
190 According to an elite survey conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences, the majority of regional 
elites complained that they were forced to take matters in their own hands because of the federal center’s 
lack of effective regional and industrial policy, the poor tax system, and the lack of coordination between 
federal and regional bureaucracies.  “Rossiya: Tsentr i Regiony (Russia; Center-Periphery Relations)” No.2, 
Institute for Sociopolitical Research (Moscow: Russian Academy Sciences,1998), 99. 
191 Viktor Ivanov, Viktor Smirnov and Denis Dyomkin, “Eduard Rossel Gives Moscow until February 20; 
Urals and Maratime Territory Stage Economic Revolt,” Kommersant-Daily, Feb 6, 1997, 2. 
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 In additions to ultimatums, several “tax revolts” took place during this time 
period.  In February 1997, the Sakhalin legislature voted to withhold taxes from Moscow 
in retaliation for the Kremlin’s failure to meet its fiscal obligations in the region.  When 
challenged by the government, the oblast governor, Igor Fakhrutdinov, supported the 
regional legislature, though he convinced it to revoke the decision the following month 
after the federal government paid off some of its debt.  Likewise, Irkutsk governor Vitaly 
Nozhikov launched a short- lived tax rebellion in March, citing that the federal budget’s 
debt to the region had swelled to two trillion rubles, while it had forwarded twice that 
amount to federal coffers for 1996.  An Irkutsk delegation arrived in Moscow to negotiate 
right after the oblast’s announcement, but apparently left empty-handed.192  Three days 
later, the Finance Ministry and Prosecutor General’s Office forced him to cancel the 
decree.  Other regions, such as St Petersburg, Tula and Krasnodar, and later Krasnoyarsk, 
followed suit with threats of tax withholding for similar reasons, often to little or no 
avail.193  The protests did have political significance, however, in redirecting the ire of 
regional enterprises and electorates from regional to federal authorities, in essence 
“passing the buck.”194  Another major theme of regional protests during this period was 
                                                 
192 Dmitry Kamyshev, “Irkutsk Secedes From Russia…for a Month, at least,” Segodnya, March 4, 1997,  
1.  Dmitry Kamyshev and Irina Nagornykh, “Irkutsk Governor’s Tax Revolt is Put Down,” Segodnya, 
March 5, 1997, 1-3. 
193 Irina Nagornykh, “Politically Condemned Prisoners Fall in the Budget Gap: the Regions’ Tax Rebellion 
becomes Nationwide,” Segodnya, March 6, 1997, 3. “Kremlin Succumbs to Blackmail,” Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, Vol 50; No.18 (1998), 14.  Krasnoyarsk was apparently more successful in coercing the 
government to pay of a 50mln ruble debt in May, 1998, as leaders also threatened to hold a referendum on 
the region’s political/legal status in the Federation.   
194 Interview with E. Volkova, Soviet Federation Apparatus, March 1999.  Assertive regionalism was as 
much a political game as a battle for control over concrete economic and fiscal resources (which also had 
political significance in that they allowed the governor to increase the scope of rent distribution).   
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the special rights and privileges enjoyed by the ethnic republics, which had also figured 
prominently in the 1992-1993 rebellion. 195   
 Ultimately Yeltsin’s attempt to restore the state’s fiscal capacity failed, and the 
swelling deficit forced the government to default on its internal debt obligations in 
August 1998, triggering an economic crisis that forced the government to resign.  During 
the five-week interregnum, the federal center effectively lost all levers of control over the 
regions, and speculation of state breakdown into a confederation again dominated the 
headlines.196  The outbreak of regionalism during the first several weeks of the crisis 
differed from prior rounds of regional defiance in that it was more a function of self-
preservation, and not directed at bargaining with the federal center.  As such, it was more 
closely linked to outright autarky rather than the previous patterns of assertion followed 
by negotiation. 197  Nevertheless, even after the new government of Yevgeniy Primakov 
came to power, several regions continued to delay payments or declared new “tax 
revolts,” including Khabarovsk and Omsk, citing traditional grievances.198  
                                                 
195 For instance Krasnoyarsk governor Zubov, during a meeting between Chubais and the Siberian 
Interregional Association, warned that if the federal government did not stop giving preferences to such 
regions as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Moscow, and Ingushetiya, it could no longer count on the 
support of the Siberian governors.  See “Chubais Brings Budget Woes to Siberia ,” Russian Regional 
Report, 02/17, 15 May 1997. 
196 Regional responses included the declaration of state of emergency and formation of emergency 
committees with wide-ranging powers over economic activity in various regions, decisions to create 
gold/hard currency reserves, price controls, restrictions on goods imported and exported to other regions, 
etc.  For a more complete overview: See Sledzevsky, I.V, “Regionalism in the Russian Federation as a New 
Socio-cultural Reality” in Federalism and Regional Relations (Moscow: Ethnosphere, 1999). 
197 See especially Gail Lapidus, “Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia,” Post Soviet 
Affairs, 15 (January, 1999):74-82. 
198 Tomsk had suspended tax payments immediately after the crisis, but resumed after negotiations with the 
new Primakov government.  The rationale given for revolts after the new government was formed was less 
due to a crisis situation and more typical of past actions, e.g. repayment of federal debts to the region.  
Pyotr Akopov, “Fate of United Russia depends on Regional Leaders,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Sept 24, 1998, 





PHASE 3: CENTRALIZATION AND HARMONIZATION 
  
The third phase of intergovernmental relations is distinguished by a marked trend 
of political and fiscal centralization.  The August 1998 crisis reinforced the dangers of 
excessive decentralization and triggered the realignment of both federal and regional 
elites around the necessity of strengthening the central state, while the fall of the 
Chernomyrdin government paved the way for improvements in executive- legislative 
relations that culminated in the Kremlin’s pact with the Communist opposition after 
Putin’s victory in presidential elections.  Indeed, the laissez-faire “Chernomyrdin” model 
of intergovernmental relations, which was built solely on central accommodation of 
regional demands in exchange for political favors, proved inadequate to deal with the 
nationwide problem of economic adjustment and also failed to generate any lasting 
measure of political consensus from below. 199  
 The assertiveness of the federal center structured two major changes that have 
affected patterns of regional behavior.  First, the political window of opportunity for 
regional elites to formally expand their autonomy has largely closed.  Whereas before 
assertive regional governors could play on divisions in the center, since 1999 the federal 
center has more or less acted as a united front vis-à-vis regional elites.   
                                                 
199 For instance, surveys and interviews with regional leaders conducted in 1997-1999 show that issues of 
asymmetry and perceptions of unfairness were among the most salient for regional elites in the oblasts.  V. 
Fillipov and D. Grushkin, Federalism Kak on Est (Moscow: East-West Institute, 2001), 124-218; and 
Rossiya: Tsentr i Regiony, 1998. 
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Second, a united center has been much more active in generating legislation to 
structure the rules of center-periphery relations, and the collective bargaining process that 
takes place in parliament leaves much less room for asymmetry – e.g. special privileges 
and rights afforded to a narrow subset of regions – than the bilateral style of executive 
federalism that dominated the mid-1990s.  Indeed, in 1999 the federal center began to 
harmonize intergovernmental fiscal relations, and these initial efforts grew into a 
concerted campaign in 2000-2002 to take back many of the privileges that were handed 
down during the Yeltsin years and reassert central control over executive agencies in the 
periphery.   
This phase can be divided into two periods.  The first, 1999, was a transitional 
year centered around the federal election cycle (parliamentary elections in December 
1999 and presidential elections in 2000).  In this period assertiveness was expressed as a 
collective effort on behalf of a privileged group of executives who built and/or supported 
regionalist political parties to defend their particularistic interests at the national level.  
Their decisive defeat in parliamentary elections to the Kremlin’s new “party of power” 
effectively doused any hopes of turning back the tide of political centralization.   
The second period began in summer 2000 when President Vladimir Putin launched his 
plan to reengineer the entire system of intergovernmental relations “from above.” 
Assertiveness reverted back to its most typical form in the 1990s – with individual 
regions rather than coalitions as the main actors– although now it took on a distinctly 
defensive form.  Instead of various types of revolts, ultimatums and declarations that 
characterized IGR under the Yelt sin regime, assertive regions have tried to “wait out” the 
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center’s siege via a more passive form of defiance of federal objectives.  Indeed, patterns 
of compliance to President Putin’s mandate to do away with the bilateral power-sharing 
treaties indicate a clear difference between loyal and defiant regions.   
1999: Political Uncertainty and Regional Mobilization 
 
By January 1999, the Primakov government had finally put together an anti-crisis 
program.  Economically, the government favored greater state intervention, while 
politically, a number of major reforms in Russia’s federal system were suggested.  These 
included doing away with the institution of subnational elections and appointing 
governors from Moscow, combining regions into large aggregates, and drawing up 
legislation to remove governors from office for direct violations of the constitution.  At 
the same time, Primakov exercised various “carrots”, such as bringing regional governors 
into the Cabinet and resigning the bilateral power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan in 
February 1999.The “sticks,” however, were never implemented, as President Yeltsin 
sacked Primakov in May of that year.   
The next two prime ministers, Sergei Stepashin and Vladimir Putin, were 
recruited from the ranks of Russia’s security ministries, as the Kremlin attempted to draw 
upon other institutional resources and elite groups to rein in both regional and business 
elites.200  Indeed, 1999 witnessed the beginning of a trend of increased activity by the 
Prosecutor General’s Office and the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the regions, 
foreshadowing President Putin’s more heavy-handed approach in the intergovernmental 
                                                 
200 Stepashin was head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Putin head of the Federal Security Service 
prior to their appointments. 
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arena.  Two other key developments also set the stage for the following period.  First, the 
Ministry of Finance began an overhaul of the county’s fiscal federal system in order to 
optimize revenue and expenditure assignments across levels of government.  This 
gradually entailed a general revision of revenue sharing rates in favor of the federal 
government, as well as phasing out of special privileges for the ethnic republics.201 
Secondly, for the first time in Russia’s transition, executive-legislative relations 
began to normalize, at least between the Cabinet and the Duma.202  This enabled the 
government to finally begin pushing through legislation governing intergovernmental 
relations, and in particular to begin overhauling the Tax Code.  A landmark piece of 
legislation passed in 1999 mandated that all bilateral power-sharing treaties had to be 
brought into conformity with the Russian Constitution and federal legislation or be 
annulled by July, 2002.  This was the federal government’s first real attempt at asserting 
its legislative supremacy and harmonizing the legal status and rights enjoyed by the 
federation’s constituent units.   
With the storm clouds of centralization forming on the horizon, regional 
governors scrambled to position themselves for the upcoming elections.  1999 witnessed 
an unprecedented burst of party building by regional leaders due to two main factors.   
First, Yeltsin’s popularity hit its nadir after the crisis, and more politically ambitious 
regional elites such as Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Samara governor Konstantin 
Titov were eyeing the Kremlin.  A strong showing in parliamentary elections would be a 
                                                 
201 Leonid Smirnyagin, “Russian Federalism: Paradoxes, Contradictions and Preconceptions” in 
Federalism and Regional Relations (Moscow: Ethnosphere, 1999), 37-40. 
202 The inclusion of Communist politicians in the Primakov and following governments did a lot to ease 
tensions between the Cabinet and the Duma in 1999.   
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vital boost for the presidential campaign the following summer.  Indeed, in early 1999 
both Luzhkov and Titov launched their own parties.  Titov’s Voice of Russia proved to 
be an unsuccessful attempt to reconstruct Chernomyrdin’s “Our Home is Russia,” and it 
soon collapsed under the pressure of political rivalry. 203  Luzhkov’s Fatherland party was 
more successful, and included several core members from larger regions such as Nizhny 
Novgorod and Moscow Oblast.   
The second motivation for political mobilization was an attempt by regional elites 
to defend their autonomy on the national political stage.  Luzhkov is known for his 
authoritarian leadership style, and his party’s platform has a distinct unitary bent.204 
Regional leaders feared that he would overturn the status-quo (in particular regarding 
privatization) and attempt to rescind some of the privileges that they had gained over the 
past decade.  In response, the presidents of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, joined by St 
Petersburg governor Yakovlev, launched the “All Russia” party, which has a very strong 
regionalist agenda.  On the eve of the 1999 elections, the party’s platform included 
proposals to increase the fiscal autonomy of regional administrations and to allow them 
more control over personnel decisions in their regions.  Additionally, the party’s platform 
called for reforming Russia’s electoral system in order to eliminate party- list seats in the 
Duma, since regional executives have much more control over the prospects of single-
mandate deputies.205  A key feature of the All-Russia party is that it placed Russia’s 
wealthiest ethnic republics and oblasts on the same side of the fence.  While previously 
                                                 
203 Oleg Petrovich Kudinov, Osnovy Organizatsii I Provedeniya Izbiratel’nykh Kampanii v regionakh 
Rossii, (Kaliningrad: Yantarniy Skaz, 2000), 58. 
204 Barygin, 1999, 115-118. 
205 Ibid.   
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assertive oblasts had led the struggle for “equal rights” with the ethnic regions, by now 
many of them had secured special privileges of their own, and found themselves in the 
same camp as the republics in defense of the status-quo. 
In response to the wave of political mobilization from below, the Kremlin 
launched its own party, Unity, which enjoyed the patronage and active support of many 
federal government officials.  In stark contrast to All Russia, which appealed to richer 
regions, Unity actively courted poorer regions, promising greater fiscal centralization, 
and, accordingly, more federal transfers and subsidies.  In particular, Unity played on the 
theme of asymmetry in Russia’s federal system, calling for greater equalization.  As 
Unity became increasingly successful in garnering support, the leaders of Fatherland and 
All Russia decided to join forces and run on the same ticket.  Luzhkov and Shamiyev 
successfully courted former PM Primakov as the party’s presidential hopeful. 
2000-2002: Central Consolidation and Regional Resistance  
 
The victory of the Kremlin’s “party of power,” Unity, in December parliamentary 
elections dealt a serious blow to both the “Fatherland-All Russia” movement as well as 
the presidential aspirations of its leaders.  The solidarity evidenced during the election 
campaign by the majority of Russia’s wealthy regions quickly dissolved in early 2000, as 
most regional leaders quickly acquiesced to the Kremlin and threw their weight behind 
PM Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign. 206  Not soon after Putin’s victory, 
Fatherland-All Russia and Unity formed a coalition in the parliament, dashing any hopes 
                                                 
206 Some governors caved in sooner than others: Cheliabinsk governor Sumin, a key supporter of All 
Russia, went over to the Unity camp only two weeks after parliamentary elections. 
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that All-Russia leaders might have had of forming a party in the parliament that would 
seriously challenge the Kremlin in defense of regional autonomy.  Accordingly, in the 
summer of 2000, the governors’ fears of centralization and harmonization were justified 
as Putin embarked on a wide-ranging overhaul of Russia’s federal system. 207  Many of 
Putin’s initiatives, such as the centralization of the fiscal system, removal of governors 
from the Federation Council and the institution of the federal dis trict system now met 
with little organized resistance except for vocal criticism from disgruntled regional 
leaders.   
When it came to wrenching back autonomy from individual regions, however, the 
Kremlin encountered sporadic acts of regional defiance, in particular regarding its 
reassertion over personnel decisions in federal agencies.208  The most difficult task for the 
center thus far, however, has been implementing the 1999 law mandating that the 
bilateral power-sharing treaties be either rewritten or annulled.  Due to the juridical status 
of the treaties, they cannot be unilaterally abrogated – a formal document has to be signed 
between the region and the center that states that the prior agreement is annulled.209 
Moreover, the Kremlin made it clear that it was not interested in the first option, and 
                                                 
207 Putin’s institutional innovations are enumerated in Chapter 1, and his effort to institutionalize 
intergovernmental relations and create a “market-preserving” system of federalism will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter 6. 
208 A handful of governors criticized Putin’s envoys for firing or appointing heads of federal agencies 
within their regions without first consulting with them.  Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov 
warned that he would cut off the telephones of all leaders of federal departments and not allow them to 
work in the republic if they were appointed without his consent.  Rakhimov, together with Sverdlovsk 
governor Rossel and Udmurtiya President Aleksandr Volkov, circumvented Putin's decree on removing the 
governors' role in appointing the regional head of the All-Russia State Television and Radio (VGTRK) by 
setting up an alternative television broadcasting company.  “Some Governors Increasingly Defiant,” 
Russian Regional Report, Vol. 5, No.  39, 23 October 2000. 
209 The documents stipulating the dissolution of the agreement are published in Rosiiskaya Gazeta, where 
federal laws and decrees are promulgated. 
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favored doing away with all the treaties altogether, many of which directly challenged 
federal supremacy. 210  
In July 2000, President Putin formed a commission to begin the task of revamping 
the distribution of authority and responsibilities (e.g. spheres of competency) between 
Moscow and the regions.  The commission was tasked with formulating a package of 
laws to be submitted to the State Duma in June 2002.  Deputy head of the Presidential 
Administration, Dimitry Kozak, who Putin chose to head the commission, announced that 
he would give priority to examining the power-sharing treaties between the federal 
government and the regions.  Kozak made it clear that many provisions of the treaties, 
particularly in the areas of environment, health, regulation of trade and resources, etc.  
could be addressed in separate agreements between the corresponding regional and 
federal ministries.  Abrogation of the treaties by July 2002, the deadline contained in the 
1999 law, was high on the Kremlin’s agenda; Putin’s “state of the nation” addresses in 
2001 and 2002 included an exhortation to regional leaders to comply with federal efforts 
to dismantle the bilateral agreement system.211   Putin tasked his seven presidential 
envoys – the leaders of Russia’s newly formed federal districts – to oversee the process 
                                                 
210 For instance, the Russian Constitution (Article 11) authorizes the transfer of authority from the federal 
to regional governments based on bilateral agreements; at the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
such agreements cannot violate federal legislation.  Thus, by submitting legislation contradicting the 
agreements, the government could in effect nullify various parts of the power-sharing treaties.   
211 In his address in 2002, Putin noted that the agreements cause asymmetry not only between regional 
governments, but between citizens themselves.  He noted that there should be an opportunity for bilateral 
agreements between the center and regions, but that it was improper to conclude such agreements “behind 
the backs of other subjects of the federation, and without preliminary discussion and a social consensus.” 
He then went on to stress that any bilateral agreements between Moscow and a particular region governing 
the division of spheres of competency must be passed by parliament.   
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of dismantling the bilateral treaty system that had characterized Russian federalism since 
1994. 
The presidential envoys began their campaign in earnest in May, 2001, and by 
February 2002 almost two dozen regions had officially given up their agreements.212  
Commenting on the reasons why they acquiesced, some governors went as far as publicly 
condemning the treaty-signing process and the asymmetrical federal system that it had 
formed, and urging other governors to follow in their footsteps.  For instance, Perm 
governor Yuri Trutnev, in explaining his decision to become one of the first regional 
leaders to abrogate a treaty, stated that many articles contained in separate protocols were 
never realized – in particular personnel decisions, which were supposed to be a joint 
competency but were de-facto controlled by the center.  Trutnev also complained that 
many parts of the treaty were vague and exceeded constitutional norms, and that there 
was no provision for sanctions against the federal government in the event on non-
compliance.213  
While some regions more readily acquiesced to the Kremlin, others actively 
resisted.  Several regions were labeled as “problem regions” by the Kremlin due to 
difficulties in negotiating over the bilateral treaties.214  For instance, Sverdlovsk governor 
Rossel categorically refused to sign a document sent by Moscow in February 2002 that 
                                                 
212  Mari-El, Astrakhan, Ulyanovsk, Kirov, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Perm, Magadan, Saratov, Buryatia, Altai, 
Amur, Kostroma, Nizhegorod, Rostov, Sakhalin, Tver, Yaroslavl and Samara were in the “first wave” of 
regions reneging their power-sharing treaties. 
213  “Dlya Nashey Oblasti Privilegii net,” Noviy Kompan’on, No.24 (177),17 July 2001, 1.   
214 Indeed, several regions were identified by the Kremlin as “problem regions” due to their particular 
defiance of the Kremlin’s campaign to phase out the treaties, including Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, 
Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg according to the head of the main legal directorate of 
the President, Larissa Brycheva on 19 February 2002.  See also Lyudmilla Romanova,  “Gubernatoram 
Ugrozhayut Otstavkoy,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, electronic version accessed March 5, 2002. 
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would officially abrogate the treaty, instead forwarding his own version of a new treaty to 
the Kremlin.215  Later, on 25 July 2002, on the eve of the July 31 deadline, governor 
Rossel proclaimed that the oblast administration still would not reconsider the agreement 
signed with Moscow. 216  Deputy head of the presidential administration Kozak retorted 
that according to the 1999 law, as of  August 1st the center had the right to protest the 
agreement either in the Sverdlovsk or Ural federal district Prosecutor’s office.  Rossel 
reminded him that any sections of the agreement that violated federal legislation were 
automatically void in any case, but that most of the treaty would still be in force until 
otherwise changed.  Apparently, Rossel was pinning his hopes on both the ambiguous 
legal situation surrounding the treaties and his ability to lobby parliament when it 
considered new legislation affecting the treaty areas, rather than attempt to renegotiate 
with the Kremlin directly.  In mid-2002, Kozak’s legislative packet envisioned over 300 
amendments to existing legislation, and the sheer volume of the legislation gives the 
governors ample opportunity for defending their interests.   
Other governors have attempted to leverage compliance into gaining economic 
concessions.  St Petersburg governor Vladimir Yakovlev reportedly raised the issue of 
receiving additional funds for his city’s 300th anniversary celebrations during a meeting 
with the presidential administration to discuss the power-sharing treaty.  Likewise, 
Kaliningrad has asked for special economic status before giving up the document.217  
                                                 
215 Alexander Polozov, “Rossel Predlagaet Peresmotret’ Svoy Dogovor s Kremlem,” Strana.ru, accessed 
February 2, 2002. 
216 “Sverdlovskaya Oblast: Obladministratsiya ne Budet Peresmatrivat’ Dogovor s Federal’nym Tsnetrom 
o Razgranichenii Polnomochii.  www.regions.ru Accessed 25 Jul 2002. 
217 Maria Arzumanova, "Pochemu Dogovornaya Praktika ne Ustraivaet Federal’ny Tsentr?” Strana.ru, 
accessed March 15, 2002. 
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Irkutsk governor Boris Govorin stated that his region was unwilling to give up the 
guarantee of its control over 15.5% of Irkutskenergo, the regional electric company, 
enshrined in the agreement.  The company was won by his predecessor in a hard fought 
legal battle with the federal government in 1993, and apparently the federal government 
wanted the shares for itself.  Finally, the power sharing treaties also had symbolic 
(ideological) value, as a testimony to the region’s – and in many cases, the incumbent 
executive’s – drive for autonomy and success in being recognized on an equal status with 
the federal center.218  
In some cases, defiance has paid off.  As the center began its harmonization 
campaign, Tatarstan officials refused to part with their treaty, claming that it was an 
integral part of the republic constitution and that a new agreement could not be negotiated 
without a regional referendum.  At the same time, the republic adamantly resisted 
pressure from Moscow to revise its constitution in full accordance with the federal one, 
as ordered by the Russian Constitutional Court.  In exchange for concessions on the Tatar 
side, the federal center offered the republic a highly preferential regional development 
program in summer 2001.219  Even so, the new Tatar constitution drafted in spring 2002 
kept thinly veiled language concerning the republic’s sovereign status, its right to offer 
separate citizenship, and dual language requirements for presidential candidates, and also 
                                                 
218 Ibid. 
219 Sergey Mikheev, “Shamiyev Ustupat’ ne Sobiraetsya.  Poka,” politcom.ru, accessed 17 March, 2003.  
Mikheev notes that the federal program Social and Economic Development of Tatarstan through 2006 
allots the republic over 20 times more funds per capita than for Southern Russia federal district, for 
instance.   
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made mention of the bilateral treaty as making up part of the basic law of the region, on 
the same level as the Russian Constitution. 220  
Likewise, by spring 2002 Bashkortostan’s draft constitution – the result of two 
years of negotiations between Moscow and Ufa – was still ruled by the republic’s 
Supreme Court to contain 33 contradictions with federal legislation, forcing the federal 
district prosecutor to intervene.221  Finally, in December 2002, the republic’s parliament 
approved a constitution that contained neither with the term “sovereign” nor the text of 
the 1994 power-sharing treaty (along with mention of its pervious referendum on 
sovereignty).  The republican administration was also forced to both give up its right to 
appoint mayors and to withdraw its exclusive claim on the region’s natural resources.  
Like the case with Tatarstan, though, Moscow was forced to offer concessions in return 
for compliance.  The republic’s president, Murtaza Rahkimov, was given the blessing by 
the Kremlin to switch the dates for presidential and parliamentary elections in the 
republic, effectively extending his term by one year.222  At the end of 2002, the republic 
still had not abrogated its power-sharing treaty, insisting on renegotiation instead of 
abrogation.   
                                                 
220 At the same time, the republic did remove language asserting that relations with Moscow were subject 
to international law, and that republican laws take precedence over federal ones .  The April 2002 draft 
constitution identified the republic as a state united (ob’edinennoe) with the Russian Federation based on 
the RF Constitution, Constitution of Tatarstan and agreement between Moscow and Kazan, and a subject of 
the Russian Federation.  It gave the Tatar Constitution precedence in areas not covered by federal 
legislation.  Vera Postnova, “Kazan’ ne Postupilas’ Printsipami,” Kommersant; electronic version accessed 
May, 13, 2002. 
221  Gul’chachak Khannanova, “Vtoraya Vlast Pozhalovalas’ na Tre’tyu,” Kommersant, electronic version 
accessed April 8, 2002.  Part of the problem was confusion surrounding the bilateral agreement, which is 
included in the republic’s constitution.  Moscow had yet to decisively claim that the document no longer 
had any force.   
222 See Sergey Mikheev, “Vy nuzhdennaya Druzhba, Otlozhennaya Voina.” Polit.com, accessed March 17, 
2003.  Mikheev notes that Presidential envoy Sergey Kirienko was involved in the decision. 
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All in all, the pattern of loyalty and defiance to the Kremlin’s efforts to harmonize 
their relations with the center has been a significant measure of its political leverage over 
various regions, in addition to a particular region’s commitment to the formal component 
of autonomy, whether due to concrete privileges and property rights or the political value 
of the treaty for the regional government.  It is interesting to note that while the 
presidential envoys have been the driving force behind the campaign to pressure regional 
governments into abrogating the treaties, they have had mixed success within their own 
districts.  Thus, while Kirienko was able to pressure most regions in his district to 
abrogate their treaties, including Nizhny Novgorod, Perm, Samara and Orenburg, others, 
such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Udmurtia, remained in non-compliance past the 
July 2002 deadline.  In the Siberian federal district Leonid Drachevsky has had success 
with Altai, Buryatia and Omsk, but not with Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk at the time.  
Likewise, of the two regions in the Urals federal district that signed agreements with the 
center, presidential envoy Petr Latyshev has forced Cheliabinsk into giving up its 
agreement, but was not able to convince neighboring Sverdlovsk as of August 2002.  In 
the Far East, Konstantin Pulikovskii was able to convince Magadan and Sakhalin, but not 
Khabarovsk and Sakha-Yakutia until after the deadline, in fall 2003.  Moreover, the 
resigning of an amended power-sharing treaty with Sakha-Yakutia in October 2002 is 
evidence that Moscow is prepared to make exceptions in its campaign to do away with 
the whole practice.223   
                                                 
223 The amended treaty was singed in October 2002 .  Treaty accessed in Rossiiskyaya Gazeta archives, 
www.rg.ru.  The Kremlin resigned the treaty after it had successfully engineered the removal of the 
incumbent leader, Nikolyaev from office, replacing him with a more "loyal" candidate.   
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Putin’s First Term: Revolution or Evolution? 
  
In terms of federal strategy, the starkest contrast has been evidenced between the 
Yeltsin and Putin presidencies.  Putin’s most important achievement has been to move 
the main venue of intergovernmental decision-making (e.g.  dispute resolution) on 
jurisdictional and distributional issues from the realm of unilateral actions (phase 1) and 
bilateral bargaining (phase 2) to collective-decision making institutions such as 
parliament, as well as a reformed court system.224  Collective decision-making 
institutions should produce more transparent and fair rules that will lay the foundation for 
greater consensus among elites on the legitimacy of Russia's federal system.225  To the 
extent that the center is able to maintain a united front and sanction assertiveness from 
below, regional elites will be increasingly forced to channel their rent-seeking activity 
into more traditional – and less politically destabilizing – tactics for asserting 
particularistic interests in democratic federations, such as log-rolling, coalition-building, 
committee assignments etc.   
Yet, there are two major aspects of continuity to be found in the federal center’s 
behavior, in particular in its use of informal vs.  formal rules in dealing with the 
periphery.  First, the Kremlin has continued to actively manipulate the internal political 
                                                 
224 One of Putin’s major domestic accomplishments in his first term has been judicial reform, a large part 
of which is aimed at reestablishing the court system hierarchy throughout the country, and standardizing 
procedures.  Kozak was also in charge of preparing legislation for this reform effort. 
225 Even if distributional rules are asymmetrical (e.g., favoring one region over others), the decision-
making process is paramount to ensuring consensus.  Federal legislative venues such as parliament are the 
only ones which collectively include representatives from all regions in the decision-making process.  For 
example, Stepan, notes that the decision to grant Spain’s autonomous regions special status was made 
collectively at the national level (parliament) rather than as a special deal between executives.  The result 
was greater intergovernmental stability and consensus during the transition, as opposed to the Russian case.  
See Stepan, 2000. 
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situation in various regions, especially during election campaigns, as a means of 
dislodging recalcitrant regional leaders.  While the Kremlin had at best lackluster success 
during the 1996-1997 regional election cycle, by 2000-2001 it had further refined its 
tactics and expanded its arsenal of actors.  Compared to his predecessor, Putin has made 
much greater use of state resources “on the ground” in a particular region, such as the 
federal district apparatus, prosecutors, court system, and the Federal Security Service 
(FSB).  Regime changes in Yakutia, Ingushetia and Perm are some of several examples 
where direct intervention via state agencies and institutions played a major role.226  
Interestingly, the use of these "sticks" in a region has been accompanied with 
"carrots" as well.  This has been demonstrated most vividly by the deals made with 
regional leaders whom the Kremlin has convinced to voluntarily leave office, which have 
included federal- level appointments such as high- level positions in the Federation 
Council (former Sakha governor Nikolayev) or in the federal government (former 
Maritime province governor Nazdratenko) or even in the Cabinet (former St Petersburg 
governor Yakovlev).  Thus it appears that personal inter-elite negotiating is still an 
essential element of the Kremlin's leverage over the regions, as during the Yeltsin era.  
While Putin is in a superior bargaining position compared to his predecessor, he has 
                                                 
226 Vladimir Gelman, “Evolving Trends: Democratic Gains Reversed in Regional Elections from Moscow 
to Sakha.” Russian Regional Report.  Vol.  7, No.  5, 6 February 2002 .  It was widely recognized that the 
federal center undertook a concerted (though unofficial) campaign to unseat the longtime incumbent, 
President M.  Nikolyaev, via manipulation of the court system and the federal and local prosecutor offices.  
Nikolaev finally buckled under pressure from the Kremlin and withdrew from the race.  The Kremlin -
backed candidate, V.  Shtyrov, the director of AlRosa, easily won the election, and several months later the 
republic agreed to amendments to its treaty with the federal center with concessions to Moscow regarding 
the diamond company and the region’s natural resources.  In Ingushetia, the candidate backed by the local 
regime, Khamazad Gutseriev, was forced to withdraw on a technicality after interference by presidential 
envoy Victor Kazantsev.  Following Gutseriev's disqualification, Federal Security Service General Murat 
Zyazikov, a deputy to Kazantsev, was elected in a second round victory.  In Perm, presidential envoy 
Sergei Kirienko successfully mobilized the region’s resources against the incumbent Igumnov. 
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nonetheless eschewed the use of formal procedures for removing governors of regions in 
violation of federal legislation from office enshrined in legislation passed in the 
beginning of his term.  This could, of course, indicate that it is particular political or 
personal agendas rather than objective constitutional violations that motivate the 
Kremlin’s decision to pressure certain regional executives to step down. 227 
Secondly, various observers have noted that the approach of the 2003-2004 
federal election cycle caused the Kremlin to temper its centralization drive somewhat.  
This has been particularly demonstrated by the Kremlin's backtracking on legislative 
initiatives to limit governors' monopoly over political resources in their regions, such as 
restrictions on term limits and instilling party- list voting in regional legislative 
elections.228  Indeed, an amendment passed in January 2001 with the active support of the 
pro-Kremlin Unity party gave 69 of Russia’s 89 regional leaders the opportunity to run 
for a third term, and 17 – mostly republican leaders – for even a fourth. 229  Additionally, 
                                                 
227 For instance, clan based rivalry might have motivated the Kremlin’s offensive against governors 
associated with Yeltsin’ “Family,” such as Spirindonov in Komi and Nikolayev in Yakutia.  Also, Putin 
had never been fond of St Petersburg governor Yakovlev after they ended up on different sides of the 
mayoral election campaign in 1996. 
228 See especially Gelman, “Evolving Trends…” Two of Putin's major legislative initiatives designed to 
rein in regional leaders have included a law limiting governors to two terms (incumbent advantage – access 
to administrative resources – is often a prevailing factor in regional elections) and mandating that regional 
legislatures allot half their seats to party list candidates (to increase penetration of federal parties in the 
periphery).  Ultimately, the former law was amended to allow a third and in some cases fourth term for 
governors in certain cases, while the Kremlin has put the latter on the back burner.  The Kremlin’s about-
face on the gubernatorial term limit law was widely regarded to be a concession to regional heavyweights 
such as Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shamiyev in exchange for their 
electoral support.  Other executives not in favor with the Kremlin were pressured not to run (Nikolyaev in 
Yakutia, Aushev in Ingushetia), or were blocked on technicalities (e.g.  St Petersburg Governor Yakovlev). 
229 Federal legislation dictates that governors are allowed only two terms; the amendment, however, moved 
up the date that the legislation became effective to just before the second round of gubernatorial elections in 
2000-1, in effect discounting their first term.  Leaders already in their second term, especially republican 
presidents who had achieved early elections (e.g.  1991-1993) were allowed to “start from scratch,” and run 
for two more terms if regional legislation allows.  Dimitry Kamyshev, “Tatarskii Pretsident,” Kommersant, 
January 30, 2001. Electronic Version.   
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specific concessions have been made to certain regional heavyweights in exchange for 
their willingness (and demonstrated ability) to "deliver the vote" during parliamentary 
and presidential elections.230  This pattern is similar to the one evidenced during the 
1995-1996 election cycle, when the Kremlin also made major concessions to assertive 
regional elite in the power-sharing treaties and allowance of early elections.  As Gel’man 
notes, Putin, like his predecessor, has concluded an “informal contract” with regional 
elites, allowing them to further consolidate their authority in their jurisdictions in 
exchange for electoral support.231  
Thus, while Putin has made significant progress in building the formal 
institutional framework for a rule-based, democratic federal system, the Kremlin still has 
preferred to play by the informal rules of the game when the stakes are higher, as 
demonstrated by its interference in regional elections and strategic accommodation of 
regional leaders ahead of the federal election cycle.  These elements of continuity are 
important when considering regional elites’ rational expectations.  The defensive form of 
assertive regionalism under Putin, expressed as defiance of federal efforts to harmonize 
intergovernmental relations, is still the product of the same cost-benefit calculations as 
the offensive form of regionalism that characterized the 1990s.  Both are based primarily 
                                                 
230 Sergey Mikheev, “Vynuzhdennaya Druzhba, Otlozhennaya Voina,” Politru.com, accessed March 17, 
2003.  Examples of the latter include turning a blind eye both to Bashkortostan President Rakhimov’s 
decision to effectively extend his term for a year by switching regional-level presidential and parliamentary 
election dates in the republic, and to Tatarstan’s recent State Council election, which violated federal 
legislation, as well as grudging support for Sverdlovsk governor Eduard Rossel’s re-election campaign by 
the Kremlin’s party of power, United Russia. 
231 Gel’man, “Evolving Trends…” In essence, a tactical “cease-fire” with defiant regions.  Treisman, After 
the Deluge, 1999, also points to an informal political exchange as underlying intergovernmental relations in 
the Yeltsin era: central accommodation (in this case, increased transfers) in exchange for regional support 
during the federal election cycle.  The additional funds translated into political dividends for the governors 
as well, who were able to pay state salaries on time and meet other fiscal obligations.   
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on informal rules, mainly the bargaining chips available to the region to influence the 
balance of power at the federal level, and thus the center’s political will to either use the 
formal sticks it has available or to “bend” the rules in the region’s favor.  Table 3.3 below 
shows a partial listing of assertive actions by Russia’s wealthy regions across the three 
phases outlined in this chapter. 
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Table 3.3: Assertive Regionalism among Heavily Industrialized Regions, 1990-2002 
 
Phase 1, 90-93: Expanding Autonomy   
Declarations of “Republic” Status  
(1990-1993) 
(1990) Republics of Bashkortostan, Komi, Sakha-
Yakutia, Tatarstan, Udmurtiya  
(1993) Oblasts: Sverdlovsk, Vologda, several 
others begin preparations   
Early Elections (1991) Republics of Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia;  
Cities of St.  Petersburg and Moscow, other 
republics  
Referenda on a region’s status (1992-
1994) 
Republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan;  
 
Oblasts: Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk, and Vologda  
Tax Rebellion, 1992-1993 Republics of Bashkortostan, Komi, Sakha-
Yakutia, Tatarstan and others;   
Oblasts: Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, 
Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, etc.  
Phase 2, 94-98: Formalizing Gains   
Early Elections, Oblasts  (before 12/95)  Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk   
Early Power-Sharing Treaty (before 
June 1996 presidential elections) 
(1994-1994) Republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha-
Yakutia, Tatarstan and Udmurtiya  
(1996) Republic of Komi; Oblasts: Irkutsk, 
Khabarovsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Orenburg, 
Perm, St Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, and others 
“Economic Revolt”, 1996-1998 Republic of Tatarstan; Oblasts: Irkutsk, 
Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Maritime, Omsk, St.  
Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, Tula and others   
Phase 3, 1999-2002: Defending Gains    
“All Russia” party leadership council, 
1999 (regionalist party building) 
Republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan;  
Oblasts: Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and St Petersburg  
Treaty Abrogation: “miss” July 2002 
deadline*  
Republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia, 
Tatarstan, Udmurtiya;  
Oblasts: Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, 
Murmansk and Sverdlovsk  
Labeled as “Problem Regions” by the 
Presidential Administration**   
Republics: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan  
Oblasts: cities of Moscow and St Petersburg, 
Sverdlovsk 
Leaders (regions assertive across all 
three phases in at least one category):  
Republics: Tatarstan (all relevant categories), plus  
Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia & Udmurtiya;  
Oblasts:  Sverdlovsk (all but one) plus Irkutsk, 
Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk & St.  Petersburg  
*Based on official notice of abrogation in Rossisskaya Gazeta. Sakha and Khabarovsk did comply in late 
2002, after the July 2002 deadline; Sakha renegotiated, while Khabarovsk rescinded the treaty.  Other 
instances of abrogation occurring after 2002 are not included in this table: the assertiveness index covers 
the period from 1990-2002.   





While assertive regionalism took different forms across the three phases of 
intergovernmental relations from 1990-2002, the overall nature of the bargaining game 
has remained the same.  Whereas in the first two phases, assertive regions took the 
offensive and attempted to use declarations, ultimatums, referenda, “tax revolts” etc. to 
coerce the center into accommodations over jurisdictional and/or distributional rules, in 
the third phase the regions were put on the defensive.  After an abortive collective effort 
by both ethnic and non-ethnic regions in the 1999 parliamentary elections to change the 
balance of power at the federal level in their favor, assertiveness reverted back to its most 
typical form in the 1990s – with individual regions rather than coalitions as the main 
actors– although now it has taken on a distinctly defensive form.  Assertive regions have 
tried to “wait out” the center’s siege by resisting the implementation of federal legislation 
on the harmonization of the federal rules.  Defiant executives do have some rational 
expectations of success: in all three phases, Moscow has evidenced a willingness to 
negotiate.  Putin, in particular, has avoided direct confrontations with defiant regions, 
preferring to work behind the scenes and through various federal agencies in the 
periphery. 
Given the federal center’s propensity for informal rules and selective 
accommodation throughout the transition period, the various forms of assertive 
regionalism can be viewed as part of a continuous strategic effort to secure regional 
autonomy, with the rational expectation that sufficient resolve and bargaining power will 
lead to concessions.  Of course, the nature of the accommodations has changed 
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dramatically, from Yeltsin’s “take all you can handle” in 1990 to Putin’s grudging 
tactical retreats in selected areas prior to the 2003-2004 election cycle.  While the entire 
period from 1990-2002 was characterized by the predominance of intergovernmental 
bargaining over the federal rules, some regions consistently pursued assertive strategies.   
The unilateral actions that characterized the first phase were important bargaining chips, 
in terms of credibility of threats and reputation of regional executives, for negotiations 
with Moscow in the second phase.  Defense of the political autonomy formally devolved 
to the regions in the second phase then served as bases of political mobilization and 
individual instances of defying Moscow in the third phase.   
This period demonstrated two uniform patterns in regional behavior, with certain 
regions, such as the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and Sverdlovsk oblast, 
consistently assertive across all three IGR phases.  At the same time, other highly 
industrialized regions, such as Samara, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod and Tomsk, more often 
displayed “loyalty” to the federal center.  This wide range of variation in regional 
behavior will be examined statistically in Chapter 4.   
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Chapter 4:  Testing the Theory 
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence that national- level businesses have 
helped to structure more cooperative patterns of center-periphery relations throughout 
Russia's democratic transition.  The top echelon of individual enterprises and vertically-
integrated energy companies has served as a “tie that binds” federal and regional elites’ 
political interests by acting as a shared resource, explaining unexpected restraint among 
wealthy regions in the context of under-institutionalization of the federal system and 
weak national party penetration in the periphery.   
The first section of the chapter identifies the “national- level” subset of Russian 
businesses based on two major criteria – size and corporate structure – that influence the 
degree to which various types of alliances between big businesses and political elites 
fragment or integrate the federal state.  The institutional context that has amplified the 
political role of big business in Russia’s federal system is then overviewed.  The next 
section constructs the dependent variable, the regional assertiveness index, based on the 
observations outlined in the previous chapter, and then lists the control variables found in 
the comparative literature.  Several versions of multivariate regression analysis are then 
presented.  Finally, the theoretical implications of the findings are discussed, setting the 







IDENTIFYING NATIONAL-LEVEL BUSINESSES 
Criterion #1: Size  
 
 The main criterion for national- level business is size, which is a measure of an 
enterprise’s strategic importance in the national economy, as well its influence in a given 
region. 232  While many large businesses have the resources to forge symbiotic, informal 
ties with regional administrations, only a handful of strategically important business 
actors have the clout to also maintain steady channels of influence to key policymakers at 
the federal level.  It is this “vertical,” or intergovernmental, aspect of business alliances 
with federal and regional levels of government that is important in terms of their ability 
to integrate rather than fragment the federal state.  In addition to its influence over a 
particular level of government, the size of an enterprise also determines its level of 
dependence: the larger the enterprise and the more important role it plays in the national 
economy and federal budget, the more apt it is to remain under the scrutiny of federal 
politicians, which makes it less able to “hide” behind the patronage of regional 
administrations.   
 The measure used for size is the volume of sales (output), indicative of an 
enterprise’s financial, political and fiscal influence.  As evidenced in Table 4.1, Russia’s 
largest enterprises can be divided into two groups, with the top 20 enterprises 
demarcating a first echelon, or the tip of the pyramid.  Stability in the rankings across 
                                                 
232 For instance, Pappe makes a distinction between large enterprises in general and those which are 
strategically important at the national level; the latter are constantly under the patronage as well as the 
oversight of the federal government.  See Yakov Pappe, “Treugol’nik Sobstvennikov v Regiona’lnoy 
Promyshlennosti (The Triangle of Stakeholders in Regional Industry),” in Klimanov and Zubarevich, 2000, 
109-121.   
125 
time demonstrates that a relatively distinct cohort of business actors occupy this first 
echelon; other enterprises have broken into the top rank for brief intervals (e.g.  one or 
two years maximum), and then in most cases only to 19th or 20th place.   
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Table 4.1: First and Second Echelon Enterprises, 1995-2001233   
 






First echelon companies 
1.  Gazprom Natural Gas 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 20,128 
2.  UES  Power 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 17,362 
3.  Lukoil Oil/gas 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 11,512 
4.  YUKOS Oil/gas 6 5 6 9 7 4 4 6 6,776 
5.  Surgutneftegaz Oil/gas 7 6 5 6 4 5 5 6 5,336 
6.  Norilsk Nickel Non-Ferrous 9 11 9 8 5 6 9 8 4,080 
7.  Avtovaz Auto 8 7 7 7 8 12 8 8 3,132 
8.  Tatneft Oil/gas 12 8 11 13 10 8 11 10 3,713 
9.  Sibneft Oil/gas --- 9 8 10 12 11 10 10 2,906 
10.  Tyumen Oil Oil/gas 10 17 17 11 11 7 6 11 3,298 
11.  Sidanko Oil/gas 5 4 4 5 20 22 16 11 3,090 
12.  Rosneft Oil/gas 11 12 12 16 9 9 13 12 3,144 
13.  Severstal Metallurgy 14 15 13 12 14 13 15 14 2,290 
14.  Slavneft Oil/gas --- 19 14 15 15 10 12 14 2,264 
15.  Bashneftkhim Oil/gas --- 10 10 4* 6* 17 26 15 2,378 
16.  Magnitogorsk Metallurgy 15 14 19 18 16 15 17 16 2,067 
17.  AlRosa Diamonds 19 21 20 14 13 14 14 16 1,725 
18.  Novolipetsk Metallurgy 13 16 18 19 17 16 21 17 1,879 




18 18 18 1,959 
20.  GAZ Auto 17 20 16 17 18 20 27 19 1,453 
Reference: Top five in second echelon  
21.  Orenburg Oil Oil/Gas 20 26 21 20 19 23 --- 22 883 
22.  Nizhny Tagil Metallurgy 18 22 22 30 25 27 --- 24 1,076 
23.  W Sib.  Metal Metallurgy 21 24 31 26 22 29 --- 25 833 
24.  Krasnoyarsk 
Aluminum  
Non-Ferrous 23 29 24 25 21 28 --- 25 737 
25.  Nizhekamsk Oil/gas 31 28 23 24 23 25 34 27 777 
                                                 
233 Source: Expert Top 200 Russian Enterprises , 1996-2002 issues.  Average output for 1996 and 2001 
(some oil companies did not report this data in 1995).  *Bashneftkhim and Bashneft were consolidated 
under Bash Fuel in 1998 and 1999.  
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Reference: Mergers, Newcomers in Top 20 
Eastern Oil Oil/Gas 16 18 --- ---- --- --- --- Acquired by Yukos 
(#5) 
Rusal Non-Ferrous --- --- --- --- --- --- 7 Inc.  Kras.  Al.  
(#24) 




 Altogether, the top twenty enterprises represent the “commanding heights” of 
Russia’s national industry.  In addition to domestic production, all these enterprises are 
heavily oriented toward international markets, making them key sources of hard currency 
receipts, which increases their dependency on the federal level of government.234  In 
addition to the highly lucrative oil and gas sector, the list includes the “big three” of 
Russia’s steel industry – Severstal, Magnitogorsk and Novolipetsk – Russia’s top auto 
producers, VAZ and GAZ, and the non-ferrous giant Norilsk Nickel.   
Criterion #2: Structure  
 
 The second criterion, which applies specifically to the oil and gas sector, is 
corporate structure, or the level of vertical integration.  While metals and machine-
building enterprises have one primary production (e.g.  manufacturing) asset and 
headquarters concentrated in the same town or district, oil holdings have multiple assets 
across the production chain (e.g.  individual extraction units, refineries, petrochemical 
plants, etc.), which are dispersed throughout multiple districts or regions.  Unlike metals 
                                                 
234 For the period of observations, 1990-2002, the largest Russian businesses were all primarily export-
oriented, save RAO UES.  The energy VICs are especially dependent on the federal government’s control 
over gas and oil export pipelines, as well as federal-level taxation of resource extraction and exports (e.g.  
via State Customs Committee).  In addition, many export-oriented or import-substitution sectors, such as 
metals and automotive companies, rely on national policymakers for defense of their interests abroad and 
for export quotas or favorable import tariffs.   
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and machine-building giants, constituent enterprises of oil holdings by themselves are 
generally not large enough to be strategically important in the national economy, and thus 
have to rely on integration into a larger corporate structure for steady channels of 
influence at the federal level. 235   
 Under the Soviet Union’s system of economic “departmentalism”, or 
administrative regionalism in industry, vertical ties between an individual enterprise and 
the relevant sectoral ministry were much more important for successful business 
operations than “horizontal” ties to enterprises in neighboring regions, as is the case in a 
market economy. 236  During the phase of spontaneous privatization as the Soviet 
governmental ministries crumbled in the late eighties and early 1990s, groupings of 
federal and regional bureaucrats and politicians fought to gain control over privatization 
of the fragmented oil industry.  State monopolies such as Gazprom (natural gas) and 
RAO UES (electric power) are the most successful examples of reconstructed economic 
hierarchies, and together with Moscow-based oil holdings and financial- industrial groups 
they have served the purpose of economic reintegration (e.g. consolidation of federal-
level control over the country’s key assets).   
Thus for individual oil and gas assets, corporate structure is significant, since 
smaller, geographically dispersed assets need to be organized in order to act collectively.  
The key to differentiating between national- and regional- level oil companies is the 
                                                 
235 Basically, an economy of scale effect in terms of lobbying power. 
236 See Vladimir Gel’man, Sergei Ryzhenkov and Michael Brie, Making and Breaking Democratic 
Transitions: The Comparative Politics of Russia’s Regions (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Little field: 
2003), 44-50, and Sergey Pavlenko, “Administrative Regionalism: Stages, Actors, Legitimization and 
Prospects,” in Klaus Segbers/Stephan De Spiegeleire, eds., Post Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political 
Economy of the Former Soviet Union ( Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995).   
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degree of vertical integration across regions.  Table 4.2 ranks the first-echelon oil and gas 
companies according to the degree of their vertical integration.   
 
 
Table 4.2: Structure of First-echelon Oil and Gas Enterprises, 1995 237 
 
Company Level of Vertical Integration 





Sidanko  Medium 
Rosneft Medium 
Slavneft Medium 





In three cases, vertical integration on the national level has been absent: Tatneft 
(#8) Bashneft (#19)/Bashneftkhim (#15).  Indeed, the republics of both Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan managed to stave off the integration of oil assets on their territories into 
Moscow-based holdings during the early phase of privatization, instead setting up 
regionally-based companies.  At the same time, other ethnic republics, such as Udmurtia, 
as well as the wider set of oil-producing oblasts, were less successful in this regard, and 
saw a good portion of their oil industry absorbed into national- level businesses.  Among 
the integrated oil majors, Tyumen Oil has had a more decentralized and regionally-based 
corporate structure, although it was acquired by Alfa Group, which is headquartered in 
                                                 
237 Source: David Lane and Iksander Seifulmulukov, “Structure and Ownership [of the Post-Soviet Russian 
Oil Industry],” in David Lane, ed., The Political Economy of Russian Oil (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999), 21.   
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Moscow.  Due to their “flat”, e.g. regional structure, Bashneft and Tatneft will be 
considered as regional- level businesses, while Tyumen Oil is tested both ways, as both a 
national- and regional- level enterprise. 
Again, this second criteria does not apply to the single-actor machine and metal 
giants, since they do not face the organizational/collective action dilemmas that the 
various production and refining units do in oil companies, which need to be united under 
one roof to act as a single entity.  If the “roof” was built by national- level bankers and 
bureaucrats, and vertically integrated across regions, then these assets would be beholden 
to federal level actors, while those organized by regional elites, with nationally 
decentralized structures, would be more beholden to that region for their livelihood and 
less likely to act independently of its leadership.   
Political-Institutional Context  
 
The political and economic environment in Russia during the first dozen years of 
the transition has magnified the influence of big business on the federal, and especially 
regional, levels of government.  Due to the underdevelopment of market and legal 
institutions, the post-Soviet political economy has remained highly politicized, forcing 
businesses to seek stable, mutually beneficial alliances with political elites in order to 
compete – and survive – on regional or national markets.238  In particular, national- level 
business actors are primarily dependent on alliances with federal officials for competition 
                                                 
238 Some of the major problems are weak contract enforcement, unstable property rights and inefficient 
(easily manipulated) bankruptcy legislation, while the judicial branch has been semi-autonomous at best.  
An overview of the main characteris tics of the rent-seeking nature of the Post-Soviet Russian economy can 
be found in the introduction to Peter Rutland, Business and the State in Contemporary Russia (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2001).   
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with other rivals on national and international markets, and their aversion to regional (e.g.  
sub-national) autarky and protectionism – a central ingredient of assertive regionalism in 
the Russian case – makes them natural allies of the federal center.  Due to their political 
dependence on federal officials and preference for a unified national market space, they 
are more likely to use their political resources to counter regional assertiveness and 
mediate intergovernmental disputes in order to ensure a stable operating environment.239  
 While business is apt to seek political patronage due to the politicization of 
market institutions, the reverse is also true: the inefficiency or weakness of fiscal and 
political institutions has made politicians more reliant on business for mobilizing 
resources.  Throughout the 1990s, the Russian fiscal system suffered from a cash crunch, 
due to the inefficiency of tax collection and proliferation of monetary surrogates and 
barter.240  For federal level officials, close relations with national- level businesses, 
especially those with access to hard currency (e.g.  export receipts), have been vital for 
mobilizing financial resources and managing the economy. 241   
                                                 
239 As Polishchuk argues, business actors operating on the national market such as Moscow-based financial 
industrial groups are interested in national market cohesiveness, including the free movement of labor and 
capital, and consistent defense of contracts and property rights across various regions.  Although they can 
achieve this via informal ties with various regional officials, ultimately the federal government is the best 
defense of their national market interests.  A single set of rules (and a single enforcer) is more efficient than 
89 sets of rules and enforcers (number of Russian regions); a unified national legal space is conducive for 
economies of scale.  See L.  Polishchuk “The Russian Model of Negotiated Federalism: a Political and 
Economic Analysis” in Klimanov, V. and Zubarevich, N, eds., The Regional Dimension of Politics and 
Economics (Moscow, St.  Petersburg: Studia Politica, 2000). 
240 See, for instance, Schliefer and Treisman, 2000.   
241 For instance, Gazprom was considered a quasi-fiscal actor due to its fiscal role, such as extending loans 
to the budget for wage and pension payments and subsidizing inputs (along with UES) across the country.  
Russia has a “top-heavy” fiscal system, where a narrow group of large companies account for the lion’s 
share of proceeds.  Thus, the government has always leaned on the largest tax payers, such as energy 
companies – which have steady access to hard currency – rather than raising personal income tax (which 
would only exacerbate tax evasion).   
132 
 Furthermore, on the sub-federal level, the fiscal federal system has greatly 
restricted regional governments’ formal authority to raise additional sources of revenue, 
which was exacerbated by the devolution of social and infrastructure expenditures at the 
beginning of the transition.  Since 2000 an economic recovery has taken place, gradually 
easing the cash crunch.  However, it has also been accompanied by fiscal centralization, 
with the federal government claiming a larger share of the total pie.242  Thus, federal 
encroachment has continued to limit the financial resources available to regional 
governments, making them not only internally reliant on various informal (extra-
budgetary) arrangements, but also highly dependent on external sources of capital. 243  
 Turing toward political institutions, the electoral rules and voter behavior under-
girding Russia’s party system have limited its effectiveness as a vertically- integrating 
mechanism in Russia’s federal system.244  Meanwhile, regional officials have actively 
resisted the penetration of national- level parties, making direct alliances between regional 
executives and business actors virtually indispensable around election time.245  While 
Putin’s personal popularity and base of support in the security and “law and order” 
ministries have afforded the national government a much higher degree of autonomy 
from business, the reverse trend has taken place at the regional level.  Political 
recentralization has deprived regional governments of formal regulatory weapons (and 
                                                 
242 Country Report: Russia (Paris: OECD, 2000 and 2003) 
243 See for instance, Yuliya Latynina, “Byudzhetny Feodalism,” Expert, No.1, 12 January 1998, 15-18.   
244 Russia’s political party system was under-institutionalized and had little penetration in the periphery 
during the 1990-2002 period. On the underinstitutionalization of Russia’s party system, see especially 
Robert Moser, “Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Post-Communist States,” World Politics 51 
(April 1999): 359-384.  On their vertically integrating role, see Ordeshook and Shevtsova, 1997. 
245 Stoner-Weiss, 2001. 
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hence political leverage) to curb the expansion national- level business actors into the 
periphery.   
Finally, federal systems in and of themselves magnify the influence of big 
business by offering multiple venues (e.g.  access points to government) for actors to 
pursue their strategic interests.  In the triangle of the federal government, sub-national 
governments and business, the latter is the most mobile, both horizontally, vis-à-vis sub-
national governments (e.g.  ability to change regional jurisdictions), and, especially, 
vertically – playing off one level of government against the other to further its own 
interests.  Indeed, business has been named as one of the main culprits for the fragmented 
social and regulatory policy space in developed democratic federal systems such as the 
US.246  
   However, the dissertation’s thesis implies that in the Russian case, the influence 
of big business actors has extended beyond the economic and social policy sphere to the 
nature of political interaction between the center and regions.  In line with the bargaining 
model of federalism, influential non-state actors can be a valuable financial and political 
resource (or constraint) for one or another level of government.247  The relative 
politicization of market institutions and underdevelopment of vertically- integrating 
                                                 
246 Robertson and Judd maintain that the multiple veto points and opportunities for goal displacement in the 
US federal system undermine national policy coherence.  The authors’ most scathing critique of federalism 
focuses on the unfettered power of business interests vis -a-vis subnational governments.  The ability of 
capital to “vote with its feet” and use alternate regional or national arenas to advance its interests leaves 
investment-minded state governments especially vulnerable to particularistic interests.  Robertson and Judd 
argue that the US federal system and ensuing dominance of business vis -a-vis labor has been a principle 
obstacle to earlier movements to establish a comprehensive welfare system.  Robertson and Judd, 1989.  
247 The bargaining model of Russian federalism lasted into Putin’s first term as well (up until the 2003-
2004 election cycle).  See Chapter 3.   
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institutions, such as national party systems and fiscal federal arrangements, have 
exaggerated the political role of big business actors in Russia’s federal system.   
 A high degree of mutual interdependence between state and business officials – in 
particular at the regional level – has been a common thread uniting the index period, 
1990-2002.  The presence of business actors beholden to the federal government in a 
region increases the Kremlin’s political leverage in the federal bargaining game, to the 
extent that they force regional elites to “share” control over key assets within their 
jurisdictions with national elites.  At the same time, national- level businesses are also 
able to co-opt otherwise assertive regional elites by offering various “carrots,” including 
electoral support and access to outside investment resources.  Although regional leaders, 
ceteris paribus, would prefer to have maximum formal autonomy and the largest fiscal 
distributional gains (and not share them with federal- level actors, e.g.  a “winner take all” 
strategy), such arrangements do provide material and political benefits that can substitute 
for gains achieved by more assertive – and risky – autonomy-seeking strategies.248  
Finally, big business itself benefits from patterns of exchange and reciprocity giving it 
influence in executive and legislative decision-making bodies.249  
                                                 
248 See chapter 5 for specific examples of these “carrots.”  
249 Patterns of exchange include giving business representatives executive posts in the regional (and 
federal) administration and relevant committee assignments in the legislature (e.g. taxation and economic 
policy) in exchange for electoral support and financing of public projects, as well as the appointment of 
regional executives to the boards of corporations and related banks.   
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CONSTRUCTING THE MODEL 
 
Independent Variable  
 
Having identified a stable cohort of “national- level” businesses across time, two 
methods of constructing the independent variable are suggested: a region’s weight in the 
national- level political economy or, conversely, the relative weight of national- level 
business actors in a region’s political economy. 
The first variation gauges incentives for national- level actors to “manage” the 
political situation in a given region.  The higher the concentration of nationally strategic 
assets in a given region, the greater the incentives for national- level businesses, and their 
patrons, to counter assertive regionalism in order to prevent these assets (or their 
earnings) from being taken over by regional elites.250   The second variation measures the 
influence of national- level holdings in a regional economy.  The larger the relative weight 
of national- level business actors, the greater their ability to influence regional strategic 
behavior via the “carrots” and “sticks” discussed earlier.  Both variations of the 
independent variable are expected to be negatively correlated with regional assertiveness. 
 Each variation of the independent variable can be further broken down by sector.  
Controlling for sectoral differences is important: if it is primarily sector (broadly defined 
as oil & gas or machine & metals) rather than size and vertical integration that has a 
greater effect of regional political behavior, then the oil & gas and machine & metals 
variables should have different signs, or only one should be significant.  In the regression 
                                                 
250 For instance, autonomy projects in some of the most assertive regions, such as Sverdlovsk and 
Tatarstan, have included state-led redistribution of profits from the mineral sector toward industry and 
agriculture.  
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analysis, each variation of the independent variable will be tested in its aggregate form 
and then disaggregated by sector, as indicated in table 4.3. 
   
Table 4.3: Operationalization of the Independent Variable 
1. National Ratio (NatRat) Incentives for national- level business actors to influence 
regional politics, or their “stake” in a region 
   a.  Aggregated Ratio of the output of national- level businesses in a 
region to total national- level business output in the 
country (average for time period, expressed as percent) 
   b.  Disaggregated  
      Fuel            ---oil and gas enterprises only 
      Machines/Metals (M/M)            ---metallurgy and auto sectors only 
2. Regional Ratio (RegRat)  Relative influence of national- level businesses in a 
regional economy 
    a.  Aggregated Ratio of the output of national- level businesses in a 
region to total industrial output in the region (average 
for time period, expressed as percent) 
   b.  Disaggregated   
      Fuel            ---for oil and gas enterprises only 
      Machines/Metals (M/M)            ---metallurgy and auto sectors only 
 
National- level businesses include all the top 20 enterprises (first echelon) listed in Table 
4.1, with the exception of the oil companies listed in Table 4.2 that were not vertically 
integrated on the national level during the index period. 
  
Dependent Variable: Regional Assertiveness Index 
 
 Table 4.4 provides a detailed breakdown of the assertiveness index.  While the 
forms of assertive regionalism have changed across time as the federal center has 
strengthened (which has structured a shift from “offensive” to “defensive” assertion 
under Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, respectively), the substance has remained the same: 
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securing the dominant elite group’s control over political and financial resources within 
the region.  Moreover, the dichotomous pattern among the wealthy regions has remained 
consistent. 
 The index includes three areas of regional assertiveness: jurisdictional, 
distributional and regionalist political mobilization.  Jurisdictional issues deal with the 
formal aspect of autonomy in terms of intergovernmental property rights, the juridical 
status of the region, etc., while distributional issues are related to the amount of federal 
income returned to a region from the central budget, in addition to the regional impact of 
national economic policies. 
 The third category measures the degree of regionalist political mobilization 
associated with autonomy-seeking strategies.  For regional executives with a more 
strategic view of the federal bargaining game, holding early elections and popular 
referenda added democratic legitimacy to their claims while at the same time 
demonstrating their grip on the internal political situation in their regions, which has been 
a powerful bargaining chip vis-à-vis Moscow.  Likewise, support by the executive for 
“strong region” parties, for which various aspects of regional autonomy and regional 
development are central points on the agenda, has been an indication of a regional 
executive’s commitment to the regional autonomy project – especially when doing so 
meant not openly supporting the “party of power.”251  
                                                 
251 Due to regional leaders' desire to strategically position themselves for all electoral contingencies, 
"fence-sitting" has been a common phenomenon, where governors will appoint various regional officials to 
join several parties with prospects for victory.  In order to control for this behavior, this part of the index 
will also be substituted with a weighting based on the actual vote for regionalist parties as well.  In the 1999 
parliamentary elections, a weight of 2 is given for shares of votes in a region that are 1.25 times higher than 
the national average for Vsya Rossia, 1 from .75-1.25, and 0 for less.   
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 The index is a “snapshot” of the various waves of assertive regionalism and is 
weighted to take into account differences in preference intensity and timing.252  It does 
not purport to capture all types of regionalism, in particular instances of “creeping 
autonomy” (agency costs), whereby regions appropriate policy authority, economic 
assets, etc.  without challenging the center.253  Instead, it focuses on assertive regionalism 
within the context of the federal bargaining game, where the consent of the federal center 
is necessary to alter the formal rules of intergovernmental relations, and fiscal and 
economic policy toward the region. 254  
                                                 
252 As noted in chapter 3, during the wave of "republic" declarations from 1991-1993, for instance, a 
handful of regions actually raised their jurisdictional status through acts of regional legislatures, while a 
much broader group issued declarations of intent (e.g. plans to hold referenda, deliberation, etc.).  The 
signaling of intent is weighted less than actually following through.  Regional executives  who took the 
leading role in various forms of assertiveness generally faced greater uncertainty regarding the federal 
center’s response than those who followed in their footsteps.  Likewise, various groups of regions held 
elections at different times, with some regions acting as pioneers in the process of sub-federal 
democratization.   
253 Measuring various agency problems in the policy process (e.g. shirking, information asymmetry) and 
the ineffectiveness of federal bureaucratic oversight across all the wealthy regions is beyond the scope of 
the dissertation.  See Stoner-Weiss, 1999, for case studies of national policy fragmentation.   
254 Only public actions are counted in the index since these are necessarily known to the federal center, 
even if it chooses to ignore them.   
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Unilateral Upgrading of Juridical Status (1990-1993) 
+2 Region declares “republic” status; or  
+1 Region threatens to declare only; or   
+0 No public declaration/threat  
 
Bilateral Power-sharing Treaties: Signing and Annulment (1994-2002) 
+2 Signing of treaty; region resists annulment by July 2002 deadline imposed 
by Moscow; or 
+1 Signing of treaty; region rescinded treaty by July 2002 deadline; or  
+0 No signing of agreement  
 
+1 Early Treaty Signing (First wave: 1994-1995)  
 





“Battle of the Budgets”1992-1993 
+2 Successfully implemented single -channel tax status; and 
+1 Each instance of “tax revolt,” summer 92&93 
 
“Regional Economic Revolt”: 1996-98 
+2 Region maintained privileged fiscal status 
+1 Economic Revolt: public threat of withholding tax transfers or  




Defense  of 
Autonomy  
Early Elections (1991-1995)  
+2   Election of regional executive in 1991; or  
+1   Election prior to 1995-1996 federal cycle (12/93 – 12/95); or    
+0   Election after 1995-1996 federal cycle (9/96+) 
 
+1 Referendum on Region’s Status in Federation  (1992-1994)  
 
Collective Assertion: Formation of Regionalist Parties (1995; 1999 elections) 
+2 Governor on political council of party with distinct regionalist agenda; or 
+1 Overt identification of governor with regionalist party; 
 or 




                                                 
255 Certain regions were identified by the Kremlin as “problem regions” due to their particular defiance of 
the Kremlin’s campaign to phase out the treaties, including Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg according to the head of the main legal directorate of the President, 






 Table 4.5 highlights the control variables used in the model.  The first set of 
control variables encompasses macro-structural factors, including per-capita GRP (gross 
regional product), the degree of agricultural output in a region, and geographic factors 
such as proximity to international markets.  According to modernization theory, higher 
levels of socioeconomic development lead to more sophisticated demands from society in 
terms of self-governance, encouraging democratization. 256  More developed regions 
should be more apt to demand greater autonomy from the federal center.  Even in 
advanced democracies such as Western Europe, regions with higher per-capita GRP have 
been found to exhibit more assertive behavior.257 Conversely, industrialized regions that 
also have large agricultural economies might be more dependent on federal subsidies. 
 In addition, economic geography might play a large role, particularly in terms of 
border regions.  Apart from Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave in northern Europe, the 
Russian Far East macro-region is the best situated for acting as a portal to international 
trade, in this case from Eastern Asia.  If spatial factors (proximity to foreign markets) do 
                                                 
256 See, for instance, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts” 
World Politics, 2 (January 1997): 155-183. 
257 On the relationship between economic development and assertiveness, see Milica Zarkovic Bookman, 
The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development: Regional Disparities and Inter-regional Conflict  
(New York: Praeger, 1991).  For an excellent literature review (and empirical test) of economic factors and 
region1al assertiveness in Europe, see Pieter van Houton, “Regional Assertiveness in Western Europe: a 
Statistical Exploration,” a paper prepared for the meeting of the Laboratory in Co mparative Ethnic 
Processes, Duke University, 21-23 April, 2000.   
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play a large role in regional economic assertiveness, then the dummy variable for Far 
Eastern oblasts should be positive.258  
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 The next set of control variables includes aggregate measurements of the 
economic and fiscal incentives for assertive behavior within the region itself, including 
the presence of exportable natural resources in a region, the size of a region’s industrial 
base, and the degree of a region’s budgetary dependence on Moscow.  According to the 
literature on fiscal federalism, the first two factors should be positively correlated with 
assertive regionalism.259  The latter factor, however, should be negative.  Regions that are 
less dependent on Moscow would have more to gain from pursuing autonomy than those 
that benefit from fiscal centralization (e.g.  the center’s ability to collect more revenue 
from self-sufficient regions and distribute it to poorer regions).260  
Political Resource Mobilization  
 
 The third set of variables measures political- institutional factors that affect 
regional behavior.  Status as an “autonomous ethnic republic” within the Russian 
Federation inherited from the multi- tiered Soviet ethnofederal structure has been 
identified in the literature as the most powerful predictor of regional assertiveness due to 
                                                 
258 See Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political 
Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 1998). 
259 See, for instance, Krasnick, 1986. 
260 In the German case integration with the European Union has caused the more competitive Lander in the 
West to clamor for greater fiscal and economic autonomy while the more disadvantaged Lander in the East 
have been seeking greater engagement by the national government (redistribution).  See Arthur Benz, 
“From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock after 50 Years,” Publius: The Journal 
of Federalism 29: 4 (Fall 1999), 55 and Richard Deeg, “Economic Globalization and the Shifting 
Boundaries of German Federalism,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 26:1 (Winter 1996), 27-52. 
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the wave of national self-determination that accompanied democratization in the FSU.  In 
particular, Russia’s “internal republics” occupied a privileged position in the Soviet 
hierarchy, providing incumbent leaders with greater political and institutional resources 
as well as a vested interest in maintaining this special status.261  
 In addition, some non-ethnic regions (oblasts and krays) contained ethnic sub-
divisions, or autonomous okrugs.  Theoretically, the presence of titular ethnic populations 
could also be a bargaining chip for oblasts in pressuring Moscow for autonomy.  Indeed, 
several of the power-sharing agreements signed were actually trilateral, including the 
federal center, the oblast and the autonomous ethnic district within it.  However, ethnic 
districts were not allowed to independently sign power-sharing agreements with the 
federal center, which is why they are not treated as separate observations in the model. 
 Population size is also a measure of region’s political bargaining power, 
especially in light of the fact that the federal center was in the weakest position during 
election cycles, when it depended on regional leaders to manipulate administrative levers 
to “get out the vote” for Yeltsin and pro-government parties in the Duma.262  Conversely, 
a protest-minded electorate could also be considered a bargaining chip that could be used 
                                                 
261 Since the subset of wealthy Russian regions tested in the model includes only four ethnic republics (e.g.  
officially designated homeland of titular ethnic group) compared to 38 predominantly Russian regions 
(oblasts), factors specific to ethnicity, such as language and religious differences, history of repression, 
relative deprivation, etc., will not be tested in this model.  Instead, a dummy variable will control for the 
distinctions between the ethnic homelands and the other oblasts.  The significance of language and 
religious factors in regional assertiveness has already been fleshed out by Treisman, 1997. 
262 See, for instance, Vladimir Popov, “Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules Versus Electoral Politics,” 
Working Paper, http://www.nes.ru/public-presnetations/Papers/Popov.htm, accessed on December 13, 
2002. 
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against the center.263  The electoral partisanship variable controls for “red belt” regions, 
based on a low percentage of votes for Yeltsin in the 1996 elections. 
 Elite Continuity: Regional executives that have a very tight grip on power in their 
regions would be more readily able to mobilize political and administrative resources 
independent of national level actors.  Executive elite continuity is a proxy for the strength 
of regional leaders.  Those who were in power at the end of the Soviet period (e.g. 
leadership positions in nomenklatura in 1991) and were able to consolidate their grip on 
power during the following round of elections (1995-1996 for the majority of oblasts, 
earlier for republics) could be considered as “regional heavyweights.” During the second 
part of the index period, such powerful regional executives would be expected to be more 
assertive, as the credibility of their threats would hold more weight than those with 
weaker power bases, and would be more vulnerable to “punishment” by the Kremlin at 
the next elections.264  
 Prior Assertiveness: Finally, prior assertiveness is also factored into the index for 
the 1995-2002 time period.  As Treisman notes, the credibility of a region’s threats – and 
hence its bargaining power – is enhanced by previous instances of assertion and 
successful resource mobilization. 265  If the likelihood of regional assertiveness is 
dependent on prior instances of assertion (e.g. reputation building), then this variable 
should be positive.   
                                                 
263 Treisman (1999) demonstrates that voting against the incumbent president and party of power was 
positively correlated with additional transfers from the federal center.   
264 Dowley (1997) notes that Soviet-era elite continuity is positively related with a higher preference for a 
decentralized federal system during the 1990-1995 time period.    




 In order to control for the possibility that large enterprises in general – not just 
those defined as national- level enterprises – have a significant effect on regional 
behavior, a control variable is used that measures the distribution of the top 200 Russian 
enterprises on a region’s territory, a much wider base than those designated as “national-
level” above.  According to Stoner-Weiss (applying Frieden’s modern political economy 
approach), this variable should be positively correlated with regional assertiveness in that 
a higher concentration of large enterprises able to "capture" the regional administration 
promotes collective action and cohesiveness among regional elites, enhancing the 
alliance’s ability to act as a united front in opposition to the center.266 ` 
                                                 
266  Stoner-Wiess, 1997; Frieden, 1991. 
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Per Capita GRP 268 (PCGRP) Average per-capita Gross Regional Product,  1995-
1999  
Agricultural Economy (Agro) Ratio of agricultural output to Russian average, 1995  
Far Eastern Region (FarEast)  Dummy variable: coded 1/0  
Fiscal Federalism  
Natural Resources (NatRes) Regions possessing reserves of oil, natural gas, 
precious/non-ferrous metals, or exportable timber: 
coded 1/0  
Industrial Base269  (IndBase) Average industrial output, RUR mln 
Budgetary Dependence 
(BudDep) (1995+ only)    
Average percent of regional budgetary expenditures 




Ethnic Republic (Republic) Internal “ethnic republic” status in the Soviet federal 
system, coded 1/0 
“Matrioshka” Region 
(Subdivide) 
Region contains autonomous ethnic districts, coded 
1/0 
Population Size (Population) 1991 Population Size  
Electoral Partisanship (Redbelt) “Red Belt” Region: coded 1/0 if vote for President 
Yeltsin in 1996 below 50%  
Elite Continuity (EliteCon) 
(1990-2002) 
Regional executive held nomenklatura position in 
1991 and was popularly elected by 1995: coded 1/0 
Prior Assertiveness (PriorInd) 
(1990-1994)   
Level of assertiveness for the 1990-1994 Period 
(based on Table 4) 
Industrial Concentration 
(IndConc) 
Ratio of average output of enterprises within the top 
Russian 200 enterprises, RUR mln, to total regional 
industrial output 
 
                                                 
267 Source: Goskomstat Annual Statistical Bulletins, 1995-2001 (Moscow: Goskomstat); Rossiiskie 
Regiony -2000, 2001, 2002 (Moscow: Goskomstat); Selected Regional Goskomstat Bulletins  
268 GRP data is only available from 1995 onward; for the first phase of the index (1990-1994), the 1995 
level is used. 
269 This variable was also substituted with export earnings and the region’s share of the national tax base, 
all of which are highly correlated with industrial output (85-95%).  Average industrial scores were 





 The regression analysis is conducted on the wealthier cohort of Russian regions 
(n=44), which account for the lion's share of big business actors in Russia.270  I used both 
variants of the independent variable, in its aggregate form and broken down by sector 
(see Table 4.3 above).  Four variations of the assertiveness index have been run against 
the set of predictors in tables 4-3 and 4-5.  The first regression covers the entire time 
period under study, 1990-2002.  It is important to note that from 1990-1994, most 
vertically- integrated oil and gas companies were still in the process of consolidating their 
assets in the periphery.  Thus, the second variation carves out the 1995-2002 time period, 
by which time the process of reorganization of the fuel sector (formation of national- level 
holdings) had largely been completed.  This time period covers the bilateral treaty life 
cycle through the initial deadline for abrogation in July 2002.  It also includes a regional 
“economic revolt” from 1996-1998 and formation of regionalist parties during the 1995 
and 1999 parliamentary elections.   
 The third and fourth variations are organized according to unilateral and bilateral 
actions.  The former include various forms of fiscal protest, declarations of jurisdictional 
authority and political mobilization, while the latter represent the bilateral power-sharing 
treaty life cycle.  The unilateral index is further broken down across time to control for 
the earlier period of the transition, when many oil assets were still in the process of being 
                                                 
270 Regions above the median industrial output for Russia’s 89 regions during the 1990-2002 time period 
are included in the model.  The only exception in Moscow City, which is considered the financial center in 
terms of center-periphery relations (e.g. headquarters of Moscow-based financial industrial groups that 
control national-level businesses).  The breakaway republic of Chechnya is not included in the analysis 
since the situation there rapidly evolved outside the parameters of the federal bargaining game into armed 
conflict.   
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integrated into national- level structures.  The bilateral agreement process was 
concentrated almost exclusively in the 1995-2002 time period.  The non-ethnic regions 
are tested separately, since the center generally accommodated ethnic homeland regions 
more quickly and generously than non-ethnic ones.   
 Each block of Table 4.6 contains the results for four separate regressions: one for 
each construction of the independent variable in Table 4.3.  For the national- level 
business variable, t-statistic values are also given to measure variations in their 
significance (e.g. robustness).  For the control variables, only the signs are given in this 
table (full regression results are listed in Appendices A, B, C and D).   
 
Table 4.6: Summary of Statistically Significant Variables 
 
Variation 1: 1990-2002 
 1.  Incentives (NATRAT) 2.  Influence (REGRAT) 
 a.  Aggregate b.  By Sector a.  Aggregate b.  By Sector 
National-
Level 
-3.725*** Fuel: -4.147*** 
M/M: -3.029*** 





















R2/Adj.R2 .834/.763 .873/.812 .779/.683 .805/.710 
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Variation 2: 1995 - 2002 
 1.  Incentives (NATRAT) 2.  Influence (REGRAT) 
 a.  Aggregate b.  By Sector a.  Aggregate b.  By Sector 
National-
Level 
-3.468*** Fuel: -3.907*** 
M/M: -2.409** 


















R2/Adj.  R2  .791/.700 .803/.709 .746/.636 .754/.635 
 
 
Variation 3: Unilateral Actions Only (all expect Bilateral Treaty Cycle)  
 1990-1994 1995 -2002 




























R2/Adj.   .732/.628 .747/.649 .793/.681 .808/.704 
 
Variation 4: Bilateral Actions (Treaty Signing and Annulment) 
 1.  Incentives (NATRAT) 2.  Influence (REGRAT) 



























R2/Adj.R2  .665/.486 .527/.250 .625/.425 .455/.138 
 
*=significant at the p<0.1 level (90% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
**= significant at the p<0.05 (95% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
***=significant at the p<0.01 level (99% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
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Model Results  
      
  Among the control variables, two stand out as being the most consistently 
correlated with higher levels of regional assertiveness across the variations: ethnic 
republic status and elite continuity.271  Likewise, per-capita GRP, population size, level of 
industrial concentration, proximity to international markets (FarEast), and prior levels of 
assertion were all positive and significant in one or more variations.  Conversely, greater 
dependence on federal transfers for expenditures and a larger agricultural sector (which 
also depends heavily on federal subsidies) were negatively correlated with assertiveness.  
All these findings are in line with the literature on assertive regionalism and bargaining in 
federal systems.   
 In the first two variations, the proxies for both the stakes of national- level 
businesses (NATRAT) and their relative level of influence (REGRAT) in a given region 
were significant and negatively correlated with regional assertiveness.  The higher the 
relative weight of a region in total national level business output, the lower its level of 
assertiveness.  Likewise, regions which had higher proportions of national- level business 
output in their economies were less assertive.  This supports the thesis that national- level 
business actors have reduced economic incentives and political opportunities for regional 
assertiveness.   
                                                 
271 Regional leaders that retained their Soviet-era dominance over the political, administrative and financial 
resources and were able to win the first round of elections enjoyed greater bargaining power (and hence 
rational expectations of accommodation) than their neighbors with less secure power bases and less 
effective political machines.  For a weaker leader that could face serious competition from rival regional 
elites, loyalty to the center would be a more rational strategy for staying in power.  This may explain why 
the Kremlin has placed increasing emphasis on influencing the outcome of subnational elections: 
engineering “regime change” in problem regions has been one of the more effective responses to assertive 
regionalism by the Putin regime. 
150 
  In general, the NATRAT variable is the more robust (according to t-values) of the 
two.  Incentives for national- level businesses to counter assertive regionalism – based on 
the stakes involved, or the relative importance of a given region in the total output of 
national- level businesses – seem to be somewhat more weighty than the relative level of 
influence in a certain region.  Indeed, political influence in a particular region is basically 
latent without incentives to wield it. 
 Dividing national- level business actors by sector reveals that fuel assets (Fuel) 
had a stronger effect than did metals and machine-building (M/M), which likely stems 
from the fact that throughout most of the index period, the oil and gas sector was 
vertically integrated while the metals and machine-building sectors were more 
fragmented.  As the country’s “cash cow” the fuel sector was the first on federal 
politicians' list in terms of consolidation and closely guarded against regional 
fragmentation. 
 The third variation captures the difference across time, from the 1990-1994 to the 
1995-2002 period.  The most important finding here is that the wave of national- level 
business expansion in the first half of the 1990s mattered for Russia’s federal system.  
For the fuel sector (Fuel), neither NATRAT nor REGRAT are significant in the first period 
due to the importance of structure: during this time the fuel sector was for the most part 
still regionally fragmented and not vertically integrated.  The only national- level business 
in the fuel sector that was fully formed during this period was the state natural gas 
monopoly, Gazprom.  By 1995, most of the national- level oil companies had been 
formed, giving the center additional leverage in certain fuel producing regions, and a 
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greater interest in using it.  Conversely, the first echelon machine and metal enterprises 
(M/M) that remained intact from the Soviet period had a statistically significant effect 
during the first period, although they were slightly more robust in the 1994-2002 time 
period.  The starkest change, however, is in the Fuel component of the national- level 
business variables; the vertical integration of the energy sector also acted as a political 
integrating mechanism in Russia’s federal system.  The fourth variation indicates that the 
NATRAT, rather than REGRAT, had an effect on the agreement signing process.  The 
effect is strongest on the oblasts, which were unable to use the “ethnic card” as the 
republics did to pressure Moscow.   
 Also important is the fact that the IndConc variable is significant in several 
regressions and always positive.  Conventional wisdom holds that a greater concentration 
of big business actors enhances incentives and opportunities for assertion, inasmuch as 
political and economic elites maintain a united front in exerting rent-seeking pressure on 
Moscow. 272  While the relationship between higher concentrations of large enterprises 
and greater regional assertiveness was demonstrated in the regression analysis, there was 
a change in the sign, from positive to negative, as the field of enterprises was narrowed 
from the wider set of Russia’s top 200 enterprises (IndConc) to the national- level 
businesses included in the independent variable (NATRAT, REGRAT).   
 This supports the thesis that relative size and structure matter.  Even among larger 
businesses, there are important distinctions.  Those that are strategically important in the 
national economy will have a restraining effect on regional behavior, while businesses 
                                                 
272 See for instance, Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Dowley, 1998; Frieden, 1991; Solnick, 1999; Treisman and 
Schliefer, 2000. 
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which are important on a regional scale, but not on a national one, have to rely primarily 
on the regional administration for their rent-seeking objectives.  This, in turn, makes them 
more ardent supporters of assertive strategies aimed at increasing regional regulatory 
authority (e.g. privatization and bankruptcy) and control over financial resources needed 
to protect them from take-over by national- level rivals.   
 
PATTERNS OF REGIONAL STRATEGIES 
 
Table 4.7 classifies the wealthiest portion of the regions included in the regression 
analysis in the previous chapter (all 5 republics and the upper half of the oblasts) 
according to the unilateral and bilateral sections of the index. 273  The rows indicate the 
overall level of unilateral assertiveness, including jurisdictional declarations, economic 
protests and regionalist political mobilization, while the columns reflect the bilateral 
treaty life cycle, including initial signing under Yeltsin and then subsequent compliance 
with Putin’s campaign to enforce federal legislation mandating abrogation of the treaties 
by July 2002.274   Ethnic republics are italicized.  Regions with asterisks had medium to 
high levels of national- level business penetration on average across the entire index 
                                                 
273 The overall sample used in the quantitative analysis here is 44 regions (5 republics and 39 oblasts) , or 
the upper half of Russia’s 88 regions ranked by per-capita industrial output, excluding war-torn Chechnya 
and Moscow City (see fn 270). 
274 The signing of bilateral power-sharing treaties is considered as an act of regionalist assertion due to the 
ad-hoc nature and asymmetrical outcome of the treaty-signing process in terms of intergovernmental rules; 
the initiative clearly came from below, and although there were some elements of fiscal harmonization that 
were advantageous to the center, most treaties centered on privileges specific to a given region.  Essentially 
the treaty-signing process was seen as a stop-gap measure to stem the rising tide of assertive regionalism 
(Gubogolo, 1997).  At the same time, a certain level of regional assertion is necessary in well-balanced 
federal system, to offset the natural tendency of the federal center to encroach on regional competencies 
and to more effectively deal with specific local issues. 
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period.275   The gray-shaded area indicates a zone of cooperative-type federalism, with 
relatively lower levels of unilateral assertiveness combined with treaty-signing under 
Yeltsin followed by compliance under Putin. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Index Results for Republics and Upper Half of Oblasts276 
  

















     Very High (8-9) 
      ------------------- 

















      


























 Italics = “Ethnic Republic” 
 *= Mediu m to high levels of national business penetration (over 20%) on average for the entire 
period, based on both REGRAT and NATRAT variables 
 
 
The inverse relationship between national- level business penetration and 
assertiveness illustrates the results of the regression analysis just presented.  With the 
                                                 
275 Based on the REGRAT variable, averaged across 1995-2002.  The lower boundary for classification as 
“medium to high” is 20% (the highest value in the “lower” category is 15%; the lowest value in the 
“medium to high” category is 22%.) All the same regions would be included in the wealthiest half of the 
oblasts according to the NATRAT variable as well, though individual rankings would be different.   
276 Certain regions were also labeled as “problem regions” by the Putin administration in 2002, including 
Sverdlovsk, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, St Petersburg and Moscow.  See Tables 4.4. and 5.2. 
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exception of Yakutia, an ethnic republic, all the regions listed above with a significant 
level of national business penetration (e.g.  those with asterisks) exhibited low to medium 
levels of assertiveness.  Conversely, with the exception of Yakutia, all the regions 
exhibiting higher levels of assertiveness had lower levels of national business penetration.   
The difference between the ethnic republics and oblasts is clearly evident, with 
the former clustered in the upper left quadrant.  At the same time, variation within the 
subsets can be explained by the national- level business variable.  Both Yakutia and 
Udmurtia were less assertive than the wealthier republics without penetration, 
Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.  For the oblasts, a lower level of national- level penetration 
was not a sufficient condition for higher levels of assertiveness, but it was necessary.  
Conversely, the majority of “loyal” oblasts (low to medium levels of assertiveness) have 
higher levels of penetration by national businesses, and those that do not could be 
explained by control variables such as large agricultural sectors (Krasnodar and 
Volgograd), and other federally subsidized industries such as coal (Rostov and 
Kemerovo). 
On the other hand, macro-structural factors such as the absolute size of the 
regional economy do not fully explain levels of assertiveness.  Table 4.8 lists the top 
fifteen wealthiest oblasts for the index period according to levels of assertiveness.  It is 
apparent that ranking according to economic size alone does not explain variation in 
assertiveness.  This is particularly true of oblasts ranked closely together, such as 
Sverdlovsk (2) and Samara (3), and Irkutsk (9) and Perm (10), which are on opposite 
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ends of the assertiveness spectrum.  These four regions will be examined more closely in 
the next chapter.   
 
Table 4.8: 15 Wealthiest Oblasts Ranked by Assertiveness 
 
Level of Assertiveness, 
entire period 
Fifteen Wealthiest Oblasts 
(Ranked per Industrial 
Output) 
High (7-10) Sverdlovsk (2), Irkutsk (9),  
St.  Petersburg (11) 
Medium (3-6) Cheliabinsk (4), 
Krasnoyarsk (5), Kemerovo 
(6), Niznhy Novgorod (8), 
Vologda (12), Omsk (15) 
Low (0-2) Tyumen (1), Samara (3), 
Moscow Oblast (7), Perm 




Returning to Table 4.7, it is also evident that sectoral differences are less 
important than size and structure (e.g.  national vs.  regional- level businesses).  Oil 
regions could be highly assertive, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, or relatively 
passive, such as Tyumen and Perm. 277   Likewise, metal and machine-building regions 
were distributed across the categories, including Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk among the more 
assertive oblasts and Nizhny Novgorod, Samara and Vologda among the more loyal ones.   
Significantly, unilateral assertiveness was neither a necessary nor sufficient strategy for 
formalizing regional autonomy in a bilateral agreement.  The gray shaded area in Table 
                                                 
277 Although Bashkortostan and Tatarstan are both republics, while Tyumen and Tomsk are oblasts, 
Udmurtia is an example of an oil-producing republic with higher levels of national business penetration 
(and correspondingly lower levels of assertiveness).  Likewise, the difference across time demonstrated in 
the quantitative analysis indicates that oil was only a constraining factor for oblasts after their assets were 
vertically integrated.    
156 
4.7 indicates a zone of cooperative-type federalism: lower levels of unilateral 
assertiveness combined with central accommodation in the form of treaty signing, 
followed by regional compliance with the federal law mandating that they be abrogated 
by July, 2002.278  In particular, regions in the lower row of this area -- Perm, Samara, 
Orenburg, etc.  -- demonstrated substantially lower levels of assertiveness, yet signed 
power-sharing agreements along with the majority of regions in the middle and upper 
rows.  Thus, a strategy of loyalty was an alternative avenue to accommodation from the 
center, in contrast to the more competitive type reflected by Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, and others in the upper row.   
 
                                                 
278 This “defy vs. comply” variable is based on an amendment to the federal register that the agreement had 
been abrogated or revised (as reported in Rossiyskaya Gazeta).   
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has used regression analysis to establish a causal link between the 
relative influence of national- level business actors and regional strategic behavior.  The 
greater the stake national- level businesses have in a region, and the larger their weight in 
a region’s economy, the lower the level of assertiveness exhibited by the region.  This 
supports the thesis that national- level business actors have reduced economic incentives 
and political opportunities for regional assertiveness.  By structuring greater constraint, 
while also supporting alternative strategies for autonomy-seeking, such as “loyalty” to the 
federal party of power,  national- level businesses have helped to reduce the transaction 
costs of center-periphery bargaining, acting as a “balancing” force in Russia’s federal 
system.  To further support this argument, the next chapter takes a more in-depth look at 
the process of national- level business expansion in the wealthy regions. 
.
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Chapter 5: Comparing Patterns of National-Level Business Expansion 
 This chapter suggests a way of categorizing the wealthy regions through the prism 
of the dissertation's political economy framework.  Three general typologies of regions 
are identified, based on the timing of “penetration” by national- level business actors, and 
ensuing patterns of conflict or cooperation with regional administrations.  One category 
includes those regions that have managed to protect strategic sectors of the local 
economy from integration into national- level business groups from an early point in the 
transition and, as such, have had consistent incentives and greater opportunities to pursue 
assertive strategies across the index period.  Another category appears on the opposite 
end of the spectrum. These are regions where newly formed national- level businesses 
emerging from the Soviet ministries consolidated their control over key sectors early in 
the transition and have maintained more or less cooperative relationships with regional 
administrations.  The various carrots offered by these businesses have reduced incentives 
for assertiveness, resulting in more consistent patterns of restraint and “loyalty” relative 
to the consistently assertive regions. 
 A third category includes regions where penetration in a strategic sector occurred 
at a later point in the transition, and was generally accompanied by more conflictual, or 
“imperialistic” relations between Moscow-based capital and the region.  While these 
regions have exhibited medium levels of assertiveness, there is evidence that they are 
gradually converging toward the “loyal” end of the spectrum.  As demonstrated below, 
regional elites have become increasingly accommodative of expansion by national- level 
actors, partly due to the overall trend of increasing integration of key sectors in the 
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national economy, and partly due to big businesses' greater emphasis on investment in the 
“real” economy and corporate social responsibility following the August 1998 financial 
crisis.   
 To review, the presence of national- level actors shapes both the incentives and 
opportunities for assertive strategies toward Moscow.  In order to preserve their power 
base, regional elites have strong incentives to maintain both formal and informal levers of 
control over strategic enterprises within their jurisdictions. 279  The expansion of outside 
business actors into a region threatens both of these levers; the replacement of key 
managers disrupts informal channels between the enterprise and the regional 
administration, while corporate restructuring and downsizing can sever established inter-
enterprise relationships and also impact budgetary revenues.  In addition, limiting the 
influence of national- level business actors in a region serves to keep political power more 
concentrated within existing regional- level elite groups, depriving the federal center of a 
potential channel of influence over electoral outcomes.280  In turn, this increases a 
region's relative bargaining power, giving the regional executive greater opportunity for 
assertion and less fear of punishment in the next elections.281  
 For regional administrations, protecting strategic sectors from penetration by 
national- level business actors, which are heavily reliant on federal patronage, requires 
assertion of jurisdictional rights, including control over privatization and regulation of 
                                                 
279 Gel'man et al, 2003; M. Mendras, “How Regional Elites Preserve their Power,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 
15, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1999), 295-311; Stoner-Weiss, 1997.   
280 See Natalya Zubarevich, “Prishel, Uvidil, Pobedil? (Krupniy Biznes I Regional’naya Vlast)” Pro et 
Contra  7, No.1 (Winter 2002): 107-119, on the increasing activity of big business in regional elections.   
281 Part of the bargaining power of regional strongmen in the ethnic republics, for instance, stems from 
their ability to ensure political stability in their respective regions.  Interview with Irina Katogoshchina, 
Russian Academy of Sciences Center for Civilization and Regional Studies, April 2002.   
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bankruptcy, mergers, acquisitions etc.  As demonstrated below, these have been integral 
parts of broader autonomy seeking strategies.  Furthermore, regions that have been 
successful in keeping strategic assets in the hands of regional elites have also been more 
assertive in the distributional arena as well, in order to keep important regionally-based 
enterprises afloat during Russia’s transition to the market.   
 In regions where national- level actors have maintained an established, and 
generally cooperative, presence since the beginning of the transition, jurisdictional issues 
were solved via power-sharing settlements between big businesses and the regional 
administration.  In the cases outlined below, the integration of regional enterprises into 
larger national structures has brought them specific benefits in terms of financial 
resources, management expertise, expanded markets and additional lobbying power.  The 
injection of outside financial resources, together with the presence of steady informal 
channels to federal decision-makers provided by big business, can help solve 
distributional problems and ease the strain of economic adjustment, especially as big 
business has become more attentive to its image in strategic regions under Putin.  At the 
same time, the presence of powerful national- level actors among regional constituents 
serves to constrain support for assertion “from below,” inasmuch as assertive regionalism 
could disrupt vital relations with federal patrons and has often been associated with more 
populist, distributive economic policies.282    
     The chapter is organized as follows.  It begins by constructing three general 
categories of regions based on the level of national business penetration and the regions’ 
                                                 
282 See Chapter 3 for a description of various economic agendas associated with regional assertiveness.   
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corresponding strategic behavior throughout the entire index period.  It then proceeds into 
a description of representative regions in each category, focusing on Sverdlovsk in the 
“consistently assertive” category, on Perm and Samara in the “consistently loyal” 
category, and on Irkutsk as an example of declining assertiveness.  Other regions are also 
briefly mentioned for the sake of comparison and contrast.  Instead of a continuous case 
study, the narrative highlights certain time periods that are important to understanding the 
nature of national- level business penetration in a given region.   
 
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN REGIONAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Table 5.1 categorizes the ten wealthiest regions that signed power-sharing treaties 
with the federal center, which allows for a more precise comparison of regional behavior 
across time, since only the regions that signed power-sharing treaties in the 1990s (see 
Table 4.7, left two columns) could be in defiance of the federal mandate that they be 
annulled or renegotiated by July 2002.  The rows depict the level of assertive behavior 
during the second phase of intergovernmental relations under Yeltsin, from 1994-1999, 
which takes into account the vertical integration of the fuel sector during the early 
nineties.283  
                                                 
283 By carving out the 1994-2002 part of the assertiveness index from the previous chapter (Table 4.4), the 
first wave of national-business expansion is better taken into account, especially for the oblasts. By 1996, 
when the oblasts, which are the primary focus of this chapter, began to sign power-sharing treaties with the 
federal center, most national-level energy companies had completed the integration of regional assets into 
their corporate structures.  See, for instance, the examples of Perm and Samara below.   
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Table 5.1: Behavior across Time of Ten Wealthiest Regions with Power-sharing 
Treaties284 
     
2001-2002: Comply 





Non-compliance with federal 
mandate by deadline285 
 
 
Compliance with federal 
mandate by deadline 
  
HIGH, 3 -5  
 
Tatarstan    
Bashkortostan   
Sverdlovsk   
Irkutsk   
St Petersburg   
 
MED–LOW, 0-2   
 
Krasnoyarsk*   
 
Perm*.   
Chelyabinsk*   
Nizhny Nov.*   
Samara*   
 *= medium to high levels of national-business penetration on average for 1994-2002 period: 
NATRAT or REGRAT score over 20%.   
  
 
The columns identify the outcome of the Putin administration’s success in enforcement of 
the federal mandate.  Regions denoted by asterisks had medium to high levels of 
national- level business penetration on average throughout the entire index period.   
                                                 
284 The dissertation is not able to measure the type of agreement signed and its relative value to the region.  
However, regions such as Samara, Krasnodar, St Petersburg, Komi etc., that were in the compliant group 
signed treaties giving them wide-ranging autonomy and special privileges on par with Irkutsk and 
Sverdlovsk in the defiant group.  See Guboglo, 1997 and Lisenko, 1998. The main difference is in the 
timing, with the assertive group being accommodated substantially earlier than the loyal group on average.  
The “quieter” regions that were rewarded for their loyalty under Yeltsin could be expected to resist the 
central government’s attempts to revoke their autonomy alongside the more assertive ones that pioneered 
the drive.  In fact, this did occur for a certain period of time.  Almo st all of the wealthy regions – from both 
the “assertive” and “loyal” camps – banded together to resist the mounting trend toward political and fiscal 
recentralization that appeared on the heels of the August 1998 financial crisis (All-Russia party).  However, 
not long after Putin’s electoral victory the Kremlin launched its centralization campaign, and the wealthy 
regions eventually split into “defiant” and “loyal” camps in the same manner as before. 
285 According to federal legislation passed in 1999, the deadline for renegotiation or abrogation (which was 
the Kremlin’s preferred outcome) of the power-sharing treaties was end-July, 2002.  The data is based on 
the official timing of treaty nullification, as published in  Rossiskaya Gazeta.  This measure captures only 
the formal outcome of the process, e.g.  whether the action was officially recorded as having taken place 
prior to August, 2002. 
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Cross-time analysis demonstrates the polarization of the wealthiest regions into 
two distinct camps, “assertive” in the upper left hand quadrant and “loyal” in the lower 
right.  Across both periods, eight of the top ten regions that signed agreements remained 
consistent in terms of their level of national business pene tration and corresponding 
strategy, while two deviated during the Putin era.  Krasnoyarsk, with a relatively high 
level of national- level business influence, held out beyond the deadline while St.  
Petersburg, with relatively low penetration, succumbed to pressure a couple months prior 
to the deadline.286  
A closer examination of the 1999-2002 time period reveals an important 
distinction among the more assertive regions in the upper left cell in Table 5.1.  As the 
deadline was nearing, the Presidential Administration publicized a list of “problem 
regions,” which were overtly defying the Kremlin and publicly criticizing the federal 
center’s mandate as an encroachment on regional autonomy.  The staunchest defenders of 
the asymmetrical federal system under Yeltsin included several, but not all, of the same 
regions that would defy the deadline put forth in the legislation; however, there were also 
regions on this list which eventually did comply.  The columns of Table 5.2 below 
measure the outcome of the Kremlin’s campaign to phase out the power-sharing 
agreements by the initial deadline, which could be structured by a number of factors 
involved in bilateral negotiations, while the rows measure the region’s initial response, or 
                                                 
286 Both cases were in fact linked to changes in the strength of the power base of the regional executive, 
which is significant and positive in the regressions.  St Petersburg was cited as a problem region, but the 
Kremlin was able to erode governor Yakovlev’s power base through its influence in the city legislature, 
ultimately dashing his hopes for a third term – something that undermined his bargaining power.  On the 
other hand, the election of Alexander Lebed, a federal politician, in Krasnoyarsk in the late 1990s afforded 
the region additional bargaining power vis -à-vis the center while he was in office.  Saint Petersburg is also 
Putin's hometown, which has given it closer federal scrutiny.   
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stance, in the public political arena to the campaign itself. 287  Regional politicians most 
zealous of their autonomy would be expected to be the most overtly defiant and vocal in 
opposition to the threat of federal encroachment.   
 




#Labeled as “problem region” by the Presidential Administration, February 2002.  The City of 
Moscow was also listed as a problem region, but it is not included in the study. 
        *= medium to high levels of national-business penetration on average in 2000-2002: NATRAT or 
REGRAT score over 20%. Irkutsk passed this threshold in 2001.  
 
When both aspects of the agreement annulment process are examined, the 
distribution of regions within the Putin period remains exactly the same as in Table 5.1 
with one exception: Irkutsk (marked in bold) falls out of the highest category of 
assertiveness in the upper left quadrant.  During the second wave of national business 
expansion from 2000-2002, Irkutsk’s economy increasingly fell under the control of 
                                                 
287 Measuring a region’s unilateral response better pinpoints the most defiant regions.  Bilateral 
negotiations could drag on beyond the deadline due to a number of external factors, such as the timing of 



























national- level business groups.  Accordingly, after 2000, both its NATRAT and REGRAT 
values increased from the “low” to “medium” categories.  Like Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk 
deviated from the staunchest assertive regions in the Putin period.288   
Based on these observations, Table 5.3 outlines three main categories of 
intergovernmental relations.  The first and second categories can be envisioned as certain 
points on a spectrum based on observed behavior across the Yeltsin and Putin periods, 
from less assertive, or consistently “loyal” on one end to consistently assertive on the 
other. 289  The third category represents regions that have moved along the spectrum over 
time; the overall direction of the movement has been from the assertive to the loyal end.   
                                                 
288 Both Irkutsk and Kransoyarsk were oblast pioneers in terms of petitioning for republic status back in 
late 1991.  Irkutsk in particular was also consistently assertive in the Yeltsin period, matching Sverdlovsk 
in terms of earlier treaty-signing and (along with Krasnoyarsk) gubernatorial elections (i.e.  before the June 
1996 presidential elections), tax revolts in 1997 and support for a regionalist party leading up to the 1999 
Duma elections (in the case of Irkutsk, Vsya Rossiya).  See Chapter 3 for more details.   
289 It is important to note that the extent of a region’s “loyalty” is relative to the actions of its assertive 
neighbors and the existing norms of center-periphery interaction, and may not necessarily indicate 
satisfaction with the existing federal arrangement.  For regional executives, remaining “quieter”  may be 
considered a strategy of loyalty when other regional leaders are pursuing assertive strategies.  In times 
where the center takes the offensive, loyalty is reflected in acquiescence to central mandates.  As shown 
earlier, the ends pursued via a strategy of loyalty can be the same as those pursued by strategies of 
assertiveness – accommodation by the center – but the means, and therefore the qualitative nature of 
intergovernmental relations, are profoundly different in this case.  A strategy of loyalty is based on 
expectations of reciprocity, in that the region expects to be rewarded at a later point, while assertive 
strategies are based on unilateral actions and threats to coerce the center into accepting the region’s terms 
and timing.   
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Table 5.3: Categories of Wealthy Regions Based on Timing of Penetration  
 Category Representative 
Region 
National – Level 
Penetration   













Medium, High  
 




Irkutsk Low increasing to 
Medium  
Significant penetration during 
second wave, 1999-2002 
 
 
The selection of these four regions controls for other variables affecting regional 
behavior.  In terms of economic potential, Sverdlovsk and Samara have similarly large 
and diversified economies, taking second and third place among all the Russian regions, 
while Irkutsk and Perm are ninth and tenth largest, respectively.  Likewise, in order to 
control for republic status (e.g.  status as a titular ethnic homeland), which is significant 
and positive in all the regressions, only the non-ethnic regions listed in Table 5.2 will be 
the primary focus of the comparative study below.  The second control variable that is 
robustly positive in most regression variations is executive elite continuity, which is 
evenly distributed across these four regions: Sverdlovsk and Samara have demonstrated 
executive elite continuity across the entire index period while Irkutsk and Perm have 
not.291   At the same time, examples of other ethnic republics and oblasts listed in table 
4.7 will be cited at certain points for the sake of comparison and contrast.   
                                                 
290 This column measures a significant change in the level of penetration, from low to medium/high 
(REGRAT or NATRAT above 20%). 
291 There were brief intervals when regional leaders were sacked by Yeltsin in 1993, only to return to 
power during the first round of gubernatorial elections (e.g.  Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, Novosibirsk, etc.) In 
the case of Sverdlovsk, E. Rossel was sacked by Yeltsin in late 1993, only to return to power in 1995. 
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Organization of the Narrative 
 
The narrative is divided into both the Yeltsin and Putin periods.  The Yeltsin 
period covers the “first wave” of national- level business expansion: the formation of 
vertically- integrated energy companies and initial integration of  regional assets from 
1992 -1996,  followed by the further privatization of state-owned shares in both oil and 
metals companies by Moscow-based financial- industrial groups during the “shares for 
loans” auctions surrounding the 1996 presidential elections.292  Some national- level 
businesses, such as the oil holdings Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, remained under the 
control of the managers and bureaucrats that had facilitated their formation.  For the 
purposes of the dissertation, the share of state control is not as important as the actual 
process of regional expansion, or the nature of relations with the regional administration.  
This is especially true under the Yeltsin administration, when the state was far from being 
a “hands-on” manager of its assets; the senior management of even the most strategic 
companies like Gazprom was allowed wide-ranging autonomy and privileges.293  The 
transfer of ownership of national- level assets via the highly contested “loans-for-shares” 
                                                 
292 The first wave of national-level business expansion under Yeltsin involved the creation of national-level 
energy companies, including Russia’s two largest corporations – Gazprom (natural gas) and United Energy 
Systems (electricity) – at the very beginning of the transition.  The next step was the creation of national-
level oil companies: from late 1992-1995, the controlling interests of 30 oil-extracting and 28 oil-refining 
companies dispersed across various regions were consolidated within ten state oil holding companies, each 
of which met the size and structural criteria for national-level enterprises.  The oil sector was first 
consolidated as early as 1991, including LukOil and Surgutneftegaz; Gazprom was als o privatized in this 
phase.  This was followed by a series of presidential decrees  from November 1992 to April 1995, setting up 
Yukos (1993), followed by Slavneft, Eastern Oil Company and ONACO in 1994 and  then Rosneft and TNK, 
Sidanco in April 1995 .  In addition, Rosneft and Transneft/Transneftprodukt remain state-run companies.  
See Lane, 1998. 
293 For instance, Russia's chief architect of privatization in the first half of the 1990s, Anatoly Chubais, 
remarked that during 1993, only five of 150,000 state enterprise directors were removed from their posts, 
even though abuse of state assets was widespread.  Yelena Kotelnikova, “Meeting of the Government 
Presidium: Private Owners Will Officially Run State Enterprises,” Kommersant-Daily, May 20, 1-2, CDSP, 
Vol XLVI, No.20 (1994), 10.   
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auctions in the second phase did matter, however.  As demonstrated below, acquisition of 
national- level businesses by Moscow-based financial- industrial groups (FIGs) often led 
to large-scale corporate restructuring, changes in regional management and corporate tax 
homes, all of which disrupted existing relationships between the enterprise and the 
regional administration.   
The post crisis period, which falls under Putin's presidency, includes the “second 
wave” of national business expansion following the August 1998 financial crisis.294  
During this time, the lion’s share of strategic enterprises in the metals sector was 
consolidated into national- level businesses.  This main focus of this period will be the 
emergence of the third category of regions: those with declining levels of relative 
assertiveness due to the integration of their strategic assets into national- level businesses. 
 
FIRST WAVE OF EXPANSION UNDER YELTSIN 
Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk: Resisting Penetration Early On  
 
Sverdlovsk is indicative of the first category of wealthy regions that have been 
consistently assertive throughout the index period, while Irkutsk exemplifies the third 
category, or regions which demonstrated declining amounts of assertiveness due to 
penetration by national- level business actors under Putin.  In order to emphasize the 
initial similarities between these two regions – mainly their ability to limit national- level 
business penetration during the first wave of expansion in the early to mid-1990s– they 
will be discussed together in this section.  In addition, this section will also include some 
discussion of the most assertive ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in 
                                                 
294 Putin was appointed Prime Minister in the fall of 1999 and elected President in March 2000.   
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order to highlight the similarities in strategies among the ethnic and non-ethnic regions.  
These ethnic regions served as trailblazers for the assertive oblasts such as Sverdlovsk 
and Irkutsk. 
Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk, along with the other assertive regions in the upper row of 
Table 5.1, all have two factors in common. 295  First, they did not inherit any first-echelon, 
or national- level, enterprises (as classified in Table 4.1) from the Soviet era.296  Second, 
during the first phase of national business expansion, from 1991-1996, they were able to 
stave off the penetration of newly forming national- level businesses into their 
jurisdictions.  As a result, throughout the 1990s these governors’ business constituencies 
consisted primarily of regional- level enterprises, allowing them to organize corporatist-
type arrangements protecting regional industries in order to preserve the nomenklatura 
ties that underpinned their power base.   
Maintaining a “winner-take-all” strategy – attempting to keep the region’s 
strategic economic assets within the hands of the existing regional elite group – required 
both formal protection from federal encroachment on regional regulatory authority 
(especially in the spheres of privatization, bankruptcy, etc.) as well as a strong degree of 
economic self-sufficiency in order to meet the needs of regional enterprises faced with 
greater competitive pressures from market reform.  This, in turn, created incentives for 
assertion in both the jurisdictional and distributional arenas.  With the influence of the 
                                                 
295 Irkutsk is included in the first category during the earlier part of the Yeltsin period, since it was 
gradually “penetrated” at a later period, from 1997-2002.   
296 Sverdlovsk had one very large regional-level enterprise that is classified as borderline – Nizhny Tagil, 
which is tested both ways.  If classified as national-level, it does not change the significance of the 
coefficients, except that the r2 decreases by 0.6. The enterprise was eventually integrated into 
EvrazHolding, which in 2001 entered the first echelon of Russian businesses (see Table 4.1). 
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third player in the federal triangle – national- level business – minimized in these cases, 
these issues were mainly decided in the classic two-player game between the federal 
center and regional governments.  Within this context, regionalist political mobilization 
was used to increase the respective region’s bargaining power by adding a stamp of 
democratic legitimacy to its claims.   
 Jurisdictional Arena: Asserting Control over Privatization  
 
The outcome of the struggle for control over the privatization of major industrial 
assets during this phase was the most decisive determinant of a region’s ability to sustain 
strategies of assertiveness.297  It is important to note that the most assertive ethnic 
republics set the example for non-ethnic regions.  For instance, Bashkortostan and 
Tatarstan were able to leverage their sovereignty declarations and early presidential 
elections into the formation of regionally-based oil companies (Bashneft and Tatneft), 
which were not included in the dozen state holding companies set up by the state from 
1992-1995.  In addition to the formation of autonomous oil companies, authorities in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan manipulated market institutions to actively discourage 
participation of outside (Moscow-based) capital in regional companies and restrict key 
managerial posts to members of the ruling elite group, often relatives of key 
governmental officials.298 
                                                 
297 Both Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk were highly assertive during the first and second phases of regional 
assertion, from 1991-1993 and 1994-1999, respectively.  See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of their 
activities.   
298 In essence, the republican elites aimed to set up statist regimes with a strong degree of governmental 
control over corporate activity.  For instance, in 1993 the Bashkir President intervened when it came to his 
attention that Moscow-based companies were purchasing large shares in the republic’s Uchaly Mining and 
Concentrating Combine, and bent market rules to close off the company.  See Gulchachak Khananova, “An 
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Oblast executives followed suit and asserted control over strategic assets on their 
territories.  The Irkutsk regional administration successfully kept the region’s most 
strategic asset – the Irkutskenergo hyrdo-electric power station – from being forcibly 
integrated into one of the largest national- level business actors, United Energy Systems, 
the state energy monopoly which was formed by presidential decree in the early 1990s.299  
In addition to jurisdictional assertiveness – Irkutsk was one of the first non-ethnic regions 
to demand republic status in 1991 – the region’s governor, Yuri Nozhikov, took the case 
to the Supreme Court before Moscow finally acknowledged his claim over the power 
station.   
Sverdlovsk’s autonomy project centered on securing control over the non-ferrous 
sector.  From 1990-1991 Rossel won expanded control over foreign trade activity in the 
region, including the distribution of export quotas and a certain percentage of revenues 
from raw materials sales.300  Rossel was able to use this regulatory authority to set up a 
narrow group of “authorized” non-ferrous metals exporters close to the regional 
administration.  The constitution of the Urals Republic declared in the summer of 1993 
afforded the regional government wide-ranging rights over the privatization and 
regulation of regional industries, similar to that declared by Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unprecedented Decision by the Bashkir Authorities: the President Authorizes an Open-type Company to 
become a Closed-type Company,” Kommersant-Daily, February 7, 1995, CDSP Vol XLVII, No.  6 (1995). 
299 The power-generating station is particularly important due to the dominance in the region of aluminum 
production, which is electricity intensive.  Control over the station allowed the regional authorities to 
maintain lower prices than otherwise would have been possible if prices were set in Moscow, in effect 
allowing them to subsidize local industry.  See Alexsei Tarasov, “Political Power Engineering: Siberians 
Don’t Want to Turn Power Plants Over to the Center,” Izvestiya, Feb 17, 1993, 5; CDSP XLV, No.7, 
(1993). 
300 “Business, Urals Style,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol 42 No.45 (1990), 25.   
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In particular, it confirmed Rossel’s control over foreign trade activity in the region, 
attempting to formalize the ad-hoc concessions awarded by President Yeltsin earlier.301 
   However, the Urals Republic never came into being. Rossel was dismissed by 
President Yeltsin in November of 1993 as the Kremlin, in an effort to restore order after 
the resolution of the Constitutional Crisis, began to crack down on the most assertive 
regional officials among the oblasts. The newly appointed governor of Sverdlovsk, A. 
Strakhov, promptly initiated a redistribution of ownership within the aluminum sector in 
an attempt to undermine Rossel’s influence over the sector.  Only upon winning the right 
to hold an early election in August 1995 – in which Strakhov was defeated – was Rossel 
able to reassert control over privatization in the sector, thwarting Strakhov’s last-ditch 
effort to create a holding company uniting the region’s aluminum enterprises and then 
transfer its ownership to a Moscow-based financial group.302   
The case of Sverdlovsk emphasizes the importance of popular elections for 
“winner-take-all” autonomy projects: due to the weakness of property rights, changes in 
executive power often entailed a redistribution of property.  Strakhov’s attempt to re-
subordinate the region’s most lucrative sector to national- level business elites (who in 
                                                 
301 Rossel used the treaty to consolidate his control over non-ferrous exports, one of the most lucrative 
sectors in the region.  His defeat over Strakhov in the election paved the way for him to re-establish control 
over the aluminum sector in the months following.  Yelena Tregubova, “The Father of the Urals Republic 
Regains his Governor’s Post,” Segodnya, Aug 22, 1995, 1,CDSP, Vol. XLVII, No. 34 (1995), 14. 
302 Right before the election, the federal government gave Strakhov the right to dispose of the state-owned 
packages of shares in all enterprises in the Urals aluminum complex.  Strakhov hastily transferred the 
shares to a new holding company, ALKOR (Aluminum corporation), which was bought for a symbolic 
price by the Rossiisky Kredit Financial Group.  When Rossel returned to power after the election, he 
petitioned the prosecutor’s office to investigate the transfer, which was eventually reversed.  In addition, he 
vowed to review all privatization decisions in the oblast during his interregnum, intending not as much to 
reverse the privatization process but to prevent “further transfer of the province’s property to Moscow.” 
See Viktor Smirnov, “Sverdlovsk’s Newly Elected Governor, Eduard Rossel: I Will Leave a Province that 
is a Monument to Independence,” Kommersant-Daily, August 26, 1995, 23, CDSP , Vol.  XLVII, No.  34 
(1995). 
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turn relied on patronage from federal officials) demonstrates that jurisdictional 
assertiveness is only effective to the degree that the regional executive is insulated from 
the reach of national-business working through their influence in the Kremlin.303  The 
assertive ethnic republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, had managed to hold early 
elections in 1990/1991, when Moscow was preoccupied with the power struggle between 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin.  Both Nozhikov and Rossel – eager to protect their control over 
key regional assets – were also two of the most vocal oblast lobbyists for holding 
regional elections.304   
The assertive regions were also among the pioneers in the power-sharing treaty 
cycle, with Tatarstan and Sverdlovsk being the first republic and oblast, respectively, to 
sign treaties with the center.  The power-sharing treaties were designed to secure their 
respective region's gains from the first phase of privatization.  Thus, Tatarstan’s and 
Bashkortostan’s treaties afforded them near total control of privatization over the oil and 
oil processing sectors on their territories, as well as major regional industries such as 
Kamaz in Tatarstan. 305  Sverdlovsk’s treaty confirmed the regional administration’s rights 
over privatization of various federally owned enterprises, control over foreign trade 
activity, and set up a regional investment fund from export/mineral taxes that would have 
                                                 
303 As a Kremlin loyalist, Strakhov was also under the influence of national-level business interests: the 
fact that the federal government enabled Strakhov to transfer control over the region’s aluminum industry 
to Rossissky Kredit  – one of the Kremlin’s “authorized banks” –  right before the elections indicates the 
influence of national financial interests in the Kremlin’s policy toward privatization in the regions.  The 
connection between PM Chernomyrdin and Gazprom, which acquired shares in many debtor enterprises 
around the country, is one of many other examples.   
304 Nozhikov won the right to hold an election in April 1994, over a year before Rossel did in August 1995.  
The first round of multiple regional elections (a dozen or so regions) took place in December 1995, 
followed by the general round of oblast elections starting in September 1996.   
305 See Chapter 3 for more details on these power-sharing treaties. 
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otherwise been beyond the purview of the regional budget.306  Finally, Irkutsk secured the 
right to manage the state’s 40% stake in Irkutskenergo in its power-sharing treaty.   
Distributional Arena: Sustaining Localist Corporatist Arrangements  
 
Regional assertiveness under Yeltsin was not only a function of sheer political 
opportunism, or entrepreneurial politicians taking advantage of central weakness in order 
to “steal the state.”307  In the run-up to the signing of bilateral power-sharing treaties, 
assertive regional leaders also emphasized the need to control the privatization and 
regulation of key sectors in order to increase their effectiveness in dealing with the strains 
of economic adjustment, including cushioning the effect of inflation, protecting large 
employers, and spurring a recovery in manufacturing amidst the national economic 
recession. 308  Indeed, assertiveness was accompanied by various forms of statist 
economic policies – based on  local corporatist arrangements, redistribution and regional 
protectionism – designed to enhance their political base while at the same time shielding 
key industries from “penetration” by national- level rivals.   
                                                 
306 Legislation passed by the oblast legislature established strict control of the regional administration over 
privatization, bankruptcy, and changes in board of directors for the region’s largest enterprises.  This was 
possible since the power-sharing treaty transferred jurisdiction over many federal enterprises to the regional 
level.  See Victor Smirnov “Governor Rossel Launches Fight With Federal Authorities for Control Over 
Privatization”, Kommersant-Daily, December 16,1995, 2, CSDP, Vol XLVII, No.  51(1995), 23. 
307 The reference here is to Steven Solnick’s “Stealing the State,” which focuses on the breakdown of 
political hierarchies and ensuing agency problems and that accompanied the collapse of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. Steven Solnick,  Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
308 Smirnov, 1995.  Rossel indicated that his goal in lobbying for the transfer of the jurisdiction over 
enterprises in the region was not only a one-off augmentation of the oblast budget (e.g. privatization 
proceeds), but also in the longer-term to increase the administration’s ability to effectively manage 
Sverdlovsk’s economy.   
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While varying degrees of state interventionism and corporatist arrangements have 
been prevalent in most regions, the dominance of regional- level enterprises in these 
governors’ constituencies reinforced trends toward assertiveness in the distributional, as 
well as jurisdictional, arena.  Rather than “sharing” control over regional industry (and 
thus political influence) with national- level financial- industrial groups, top regional 
managers and politicians attempted to maintain local cartel- like structures that were 
primarily financed by regional fiscal resources.   
Insulating the regional political economy from national- level businesses carried a 
heavy price tag, however, and not only in terms of the risky jurisdictional assertiveness 
(e.g.  republic declarations) which got Rossel fired, and nearly Nozhikov. 309  The 
financial burden of clearing up the vicious circle of non-payments in industry – especially 
wage arrears, which were the most politicized – and scraping up funds for investment 
into manufacturing was substantial, even for the wealthy regions.  Local resources and 
policy discretion alone were not sufficient to deal with the extent of the industrial decline 
during the 1990s.310  Thus, even after gaining as much control as possible over 
privatization, natural resource rents, taxation, and corporate governance and restructuring 
within their jurisdictions, regional executives also endeavored to wrench back fiscal 
resources from the common (federal) pool. 
                                                 
309 Rossel was removed in November 1993 due to his vigorous pursuit of an independent “Urals Republic” 
in the region. See Chapter 3 for more details.   
310 According to an elite survey conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences, regional executives 
tended to blame Moscow for not doing enough to deal with the nationwide economic decline.  See 
“Rossiya: Tsentr i Regiony (Russia; Center-Periphery Relations)” No.2, Institute for Sociopolitical 
Research (Moscow: Russian Academy Sciences, 1998).  In this context, assertive regionalism can be 
viewed as demonstratively “passing the buck” for the economic hardship. 
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Thanks to their privileged status as ethnic homelands, Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan enjoyed highly preferential tax regimes throughout the Yeltsin era, which 
left them a disproportionate share of the consolidated tax base.  Combined with their 
jurisdictional gains, this allowed them to closely guard regional assets from outside 
control, while at the same time stimulating the regional economy. 311   The relative ease in 
which Mintimer Shamiev and Martuza Rakhimov were re-elected throughout the 1990s – 
while at the same time maintaining an assertive stance vis-à-vis the Kremlin and 
Moscow-based capital – attests to their success.312 
The contrasting stories of Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk are indicative of the mixed 
success experienced by assertive oblast executives in constructing similar arrangements.  
Edward Rossel in Sverdlovsk was generally successful in building a coporatist-type 
arrangement that gave the regional government and affiliated financial interests a central 
role in facilitating inter-enterprise trade and solving corporate finance problems (e.g. 
settling of liabilities, funds for guaranteed orders) for a privileged group of regional- level 
enterprises, particularly in the defense and metallurgy sectors. 313   
                                                 
311 Executives in these regions used their control over the privatization process to build patronage networks 
that gave them excessive influence over businesses in their region.  See for instance, S. Peregudov, N. 
Lapina and S.  Semenko, Interest Groups and the Russian State, (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1999), 195-
210.   
312 In February 1994, the Prime Minister of Tatarstan, M Sabirov boasted that because of its privileged 
fiscal status, Tatarstan was able to maintain the lowest prices for bread, milk and dairy products in Russia.  
Likewise, the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of Karelia, S Blinnikov, noted that the preferential share 
of hard currency receipts left to the republic allowed it to finance several major investment projects (e.g.  
railroad) and maintain an extensive welfare program, which, if not for the republic’s drive for economic 
sovereignty, would have been “unthinkable.” See M Sabirov, “My Vnosim Nalogi v Federal’nuyu Kaznu: 
no Summa Dolzhna byt’ Real’noy i Obosnovannoi,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 October 1993; S Blinnikov, 
“Nasha Tsel – Ekonomicheskiy Suverenitet,” Delovoy Mir, 28 Feb - 6 Mar, 1994, 14. 
313 The regional budget acted a clearing center and guarantor for the various financial transactions 
concerning enterprises the group, in which the administration was often a shareholder.  Smirnov, 1995 and 
Startsev, 1999. 
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Likewise, Yuri Nozhikov in Irkutsk presided over a localized brand of 
corporatism, using subsidies, tax incentives and credits to increase the administration’s 
leverage over the main pillars of the regional economy. 314  Irkutskenergo was one of the 
chief instruments for subsidizing local industry; together with the region’s gold deposits, 
the power station had been the central focus of regional assertiveness in the jurisdictional 
arena in the early 1990s.  Via its stake in the company, the regional administration could 
maintain prices for local electricity at considerably lower rates than in neighboring 
regions, which helped to stimulate the region’s aluminum industries.  By 1997, the power 
station had come to be the largest creditor to regional industry. 315  
For both regions, however, the finiteness of local resources and the staggering 
magnitude of industrial debt, coupled with an austere monetary policy at the national 
level, made it virtually impossible to resuscitate the local economies at the regional level 
alone, no matter how wide-ranging autonomy jurisdictional autonomy.  Thus, in addition 
to privileges enshrined in the power-sharing treaty, Rossel lobbied heavily for national 
monetary and industrial policies more conducive for stimulating an economic recovery in 
the region.  Frustrated with the lack of response through traditional channels, Rossel 
issued a policy ultimatum in February 1997 designed to pressure the center into 
responding to the needs of domestic manufacturers in the Urals region. 316  Likewise, in 
March 1997, Irkutsk governor Nozhikov also tried to lobby the Ministry of Finance for 
                                                 
314 See Michael Bradshaw, Alexander Chernikov and Peter Kirkow, “Irkutsk and Sakhalin,” in Phillip 
Hanson and Michael Bradshaw eds, Regional Economic Change in Russia, (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: E. Elgar, 2000), 200-205. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Viktor Ivanov, Viktor Smirnov and Denis Dyomkin, “Eduard Rossel Gives Moscow until February 20; 
Urals and Maritime Territory Stage Economic Revolt,” Kommersant-Daily, Feb 6, 1997, 2. 
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additional funds.  When his requests fell on deaf ears, he initiated a short- lived tax revolt 
and threatened to unilaterally implement an anti-crisis program in the region. 317  
Rossel ultimately proved more adept than his Irkutsk counterpart in meeting the 
needs of his regional- level constituency.  Although his grip on political resources in the 
region was considerably looser than his counterparts in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, he 
managed to retain his gubernatorial seat throughout the Yeltsin period.  Meanwhile, in 
Irkutsk the web of non-payments had become such a strain on the regional budget that 
Nozhikov was forced to resign after it became apparent that the federal government was 
not going to cave in to his tax revolt, which was viewed as a last-ditch effort to wrench 
live cash from the center to help alleviate the debts owed regional industries.318  The 
failure of Nozhikov’s corporatist scheme had instant repercussions: debt- laden 
enterprises in the local economy became more vulnerable to penetration of Moscow-
based capital.  In early 1997, the Angarsk refinery was taken over by the national- level 
oil holding Sidanko.  At first, relations between the refinery and regional administration 
quickly deteriorated, as the refinery implemented a restructuring program and changed 
management, which reduced the regional administration’s leverage over the enterprise as 
well as the amount of tax receipts flowing into regional coffers.319 
                                                 
317 Irkutsk’s anti-crisis program had much in common with Rossel’s, including heavy state intervention 
(increasing administrative control over the economy), nationalization, currency emission, re-distribution of 
income from the natural resource sector to manufacturing sector (charging rent, anti-monopoly policy to 
reduce energy and transport tariffs, etc.). Dmitry Kamyshev, “Irkutsk Secedes From Russia…for a Month, 
at least,” Segodnya, March 4, 1997, 1.  Dmitry Kamyshev and Irina Nagornykh, “Irkutsk Governor’s Tax 
Revolt is Put Down,” Segodnya, March 5, 1997, 1-3. 
318 The growing non-payment problem eventually brought about the downfall of the Nozhikov 




It is important to note that Nozhikov’s successor, Irkutsk mayor Boris Govorin, 
was supported by the same regional- level business constituency as Nozhikov; 
correspondingly, the region continued to demonstrate assertive behavior in the following 
years.  Furthermore, Govorin and Sidanko eventually came to terms over the Angarsk 
refinery.  Nevertheless, after Nozhikov’s failure and the Angarsk refinery takeover the 
regional administration’s influence and power base had narrowed considerably, which 
opened the door for a more significant expansion of national- level enterprises in the 
region during the 1999-2002 time period, as demonstrated below.   
Earlier Penetration: “First Wave” Regions  
 
This section will focus on the consistently loyal regions, Perm and Samara.  In 
these regions, corporatist-type arrangements between the regional administration and 
national- level businesses helped to structure more stable federal relations.  In contrast to 
the “winner-take-all” strategies evidenced above, these models are indicative of “power 
sharing” arrangements with national- level business actors.  Both jurisdictional and 
distributional issues were primarily solved along the second segment of the federal 
triangle – between national- level businesses and the regional administration – reducing 
the need for more costly assertive strategies vis-à-vis Moscow, as has been the case with 
the consistently assertive category.  For the sake of contrast, the second part of this 
section will briefly highlight two other regions, Udmurtia and Krasnoyarsk, where 
penetration was less cooperative and more contested.   
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Big Business as a Carrot: Perm and Samara  
 
In Perm, the process of integration of the region’s various oil companies into the 
Lukoil holding began in the early 1990s, culminating with the formation of Lukoil-
Permneft and a group of smaller associated enterprises.320  Lukoil’s consolidation of oil 
and petroleum product assets in the region was hardly the case of a “hostile” takeover: 
plans for integration of regional oil assets into Lukoil enjoyed support from local 
economic managers whose companies were threatened by the precipitous decline in 
production throughout the economy.321 While the regional administration could provide 
tax relief and various incentives to stimulate production, the scope of the problem went 
far beyond the region’s financial capabilities and jurisdictional boundaries.  Perm’s fuel 
companies were located on the periphery of the traditional Soviet oil sector, which was 
concentrated further to the east, in Western Siberia.  Having been relatively neglected by 
Soviet planners and somewhat isolated geographically (in terms of the main oil 
distribution routes), the region’s enterprises were in need of heavy capital investment, 
and in particular access to broader markets.322  
Having formed earlier than most oil holdings (1991), Lukoil was in a position to 
offer immediate material benefits: integration into global and international markets and 
greater access to officials in Moscow.  The regional administration played the role of 
arbiter between national- and regional- level business elites, and brokered an agreement 
between the Perm financial industrial group and Lukoil, headquartered in Moscow, in 
                                                 
320 “Po Standartam Lukoila,” Neft Rossii, no.4, 2002, 30-33. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Dmitry Gorbuntsov , “Vtoroe Dykhanie Lidera” Neft Rosii, No.4.  25-29. 
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which each side received a 50% interest in Lukoil-Permneft.  Lukoil also signed a formal 
agreement with the regional administration outlining its investment responsibilities.  
Beyond the agreement, the arrangement with the regional administration was beneficial 
for Lukoil to the extent that it was able to maintain an “insider” status in the region, 
effectively gaining a de-facto monopoly position in the region’s fuel markets.323  
Over two years before the merger was official, Lukoil management in Moscow 
helped the company develop a financial and strategic marketing plan that would alleviate 
its colossal debt burden and eliminate redundancies in its management structure, 
including vertical integration and the consolidation of several smaller enterprises.  By 
March of 1995 cooperation with Lukoil Moscow had begun to bear fruit, as Permneft was 
able to eliminate wage delays.  Likewise, the petrochemical company 
Permnefteorgsintez, which began negotiations with Lukoil over vertical integration into 
its national structure in 1991-1992, boasted in 1995 of achieving European and US 
ecological gasoline standards thanks to the expertise of Lukoil specialists.324  While there 
were points of conflict between the regional administration and the Moscow corporate 
office during the 1990s, such as disputes over the use of pricing techniques (transfe r 
pricing) that reduced tax receipts on oil in the region, the two sides were able to quickly 
come to terms.325  
                                                 
323 See N.  Lapina and A.Chirikova, Strategii Regional'nykh Elit, Ekonomika, Modeli Vlasti i Politicheskiy 
Vybor (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social Sciences, 2000), 110-114, 123-133. 
324 “Po Standartam Lukoila,” 33. 
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among the national-level businesses in the region.  For instance, the Perm administration entered into a 
protracted conflict with Gazprom for control over an independent gas producer in the region in the late 
nineties. At the same time, Gazprom and the regional administration also regularly worked together to 
stimulate diversification in local industry. Lapina and Chirikova, 2000, 89. 
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Indeed, one reason for Perm’s lower level of assertiveness in the 1990s is the 
cooperative relations established with Lukoil.  While the region was called upon to join 
the Urals Republic proclaimed by governor Rossel in nearby Sverdlovsk oblast in 1993-
1994, it was already in the process of settling its central jurisdictional issue – control over 
the oil sector – with Lukoil.326  And in return for sharing control over the region’s most 
strategic assets (whereas Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk pursued a 
“winner-take-all” strategy), the administration received various distributional advantages, 
securing access to external financial resources without the need for the assertiveness 
displayed by the consistently assertive regions in this arena throughout the 1990s.  
Finally, the synergy between Lukoil and governor Igumnov in Perm in terms of lobbying 
federal officials reduced the need for regionalist political mobilization to get Moscow’s 
attention. 327  
 The case of Samara is similar to Perm in this regard.  Although the region’s 
economy is substantially larger, there have been more national- level actors involved, 
including the nation’s largest automaker, VAZ,  Samaraenergo (part of UES), Gazprom 
and the national- level oil company Yukos.  As in Perm, the Samara regional 
administration adopted a more accommodative strategy in the early part of the transition 
toward national- level businesses, and supported the transfer of much of the regional oil 
complex to Yukos.328  In particular, Samara’s oil complex was suffering from the same 
                                                 
326 Negotiations with Lukoil were underway in 1993-1994, Gorbuntsov, 25.  LukOil-Perm (predecessor to 
Lukoil-Permneft) was formed as early as 1992.  “Po Standartam Lukoila,” 30. 
327 As Peregudov et al note, synergy between national-level businesses and regional executives in lobbying 
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328 See Dimitri Badovskiy, 'Samarskaya Oblast v Pervoy Polovine 2000g.” in Rossisskiye Regiony-99 
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problems as Perm, in terms of reintegration into the national oil market (e.g. supplies for 
its oil refineries and markets for distribution) and the need for heavy capital investment.  
Yukos acquired and integrated smaller regional companies, including Samaraneftegaz 
and other oil companies in the region. 329   In return for pledges to help revive the region’s 
industry, Titov lobbied for Yukos’ interests in the region, helping it to gain an advantage 
on local markets.330  
 While the consolidation and vertical integration of individual regional oil 
companies into Yukos was sanctioned by the regional administration, in the beginning 
the relationship had more rough edges than the Lukoil/Perm arrangement.  Yukos began 
to transfer regional managers to its headquarters in Moscow, replacing them with 
personnel from outside the region, which forced governor Titov now had to deal with 
corporate headquarters to solve problems that previously could be addressed with the 
regional elite.331 
In addition to the disruption of existing relationships between the regional 
administration and oil industry in the region, there were also economic problems that 
arose.  Yukos initially had trouble coordinating supplies for regional assets such as 
Kuibyshevneftorgsintez within its national structure, resulting in lower levels of 
                                                 
329 See Yakov Pappe, “Fuel and Energy Complex Elites in the Political Economy of Contemporary 
Russia,” in Klaus Segbers and Stephan De Spiegeleire, eds.,  Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political 
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output.332  In the same vein, the relationship between the regional administration and 
Yukos initially deteriorated after its acquisition by Bank Menatep in mid-1996, which 
changed its tax home, denting regional coffers.  While this problem was solved by mutual 
agreement in Perm, the conflict between the region and Menatep over regional revenue 
forced Titov to appeal to Moscow, and the question of the allocation of revenue between 
Yukos and the regional administration was addressed in the region’s bilateral power-
sharing treaty. 333 
  Likewise, AvtoVAZ, the nation’s largest auto-maker, certainly had sufficient 
economic clout to lobby its interests at the federal level, while its large share of the 
region’s budget and workforce (esp.  in Toliatti) gave it considerable influence within the 
oblast.334  For instance, in 1994, VAZ's general director had a seat on the Presidential 
Council along side national politicians and regional governors.  The company also had 
access to outside financing and markets, mainly through national financiers, such as Boris 
Berezovsky (LogoVAZ, sales/distribution network and bank).  While these channels 
generally allowed the company to circumvent the regional administration in its rent-
seeking activity, Titov’s connections with the Prime Minister (via his position on the 
leadership council of the party of power, Our Home is Russia) and formal power attained 
through the bilateral treaty allowed him to defend both Yukos and VAZ from the tax 
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authorities at various times.335  The result was a more cooperative relationship, while each 
side maintained their autonomy.   
At the same time, the presence of strategically important national- level businesses 
in a region is a constant source of leverage for the federal center.  In November 1996, 
VAZ was put on a list of companies being prepared for bankruptcy due to arrears owed to 
the federal budget.  This overlapped with negotiations between Samara and the federal 
government over the region’s bilateral power-sharing treaty.  In fact, several observers 
believed that the two events were linked and saw the placement of VAZ on the tax police 
“black list” as an attempt by the federal government to undermine Titov’s bargaining 
position, due to VAZ’s importance for the regional economy.  Ultimately, Titov was able 
to hold his ground; VAZ and the government arrived at agreement on restructuring its 
federal excise tax. 336  
 In general, the cases of Perm and Samara reflect the same type of corporatist-type 
arrangements between the regional administration and business as in the cases of Irkutsk 
and Sverdlovsk.  However, the presence of national- level businesses in Perm and Samara 
resulted in “vertical” corporatist arrangements, providing alternate channels to federal 
level patrons and reducing the need for the degree of reliance on internal resources that 
motivated assertiveness.  The role of national- level businesses as “carrots” was 
widespread among other loyal regions as well, including Nizhny Novgorod and 
                                                 
335 The power-sharing agreement included provisions to restructure tax debt of major enterprises into 
shares held by the regional administration until the debt was paid off.  IEWS, Russian Regional Report, 6 
September, 1997. 
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Leningrad oblast, where governors also actively depended on national- level business 
actors for financing state pension payment schemes and capital investment.337   
One of the key features of the stability of arrangements between national- level 
businesses and regional political elites in these regions is the relatively even balance of 
power: both governors have enjoyed their own power bases in regional industries apart 
from more independent national- level actors.  For instance, Titov’s power base comes 
from the region’s export-oriented defense (high-tech) sector, which is among the most 
competitive in Russia.  Governor Igumnov in Perm presided over the chemical sector in 
the region, and (similar to Rossel in Sverdlovsk) set up a corporation that controls 
virtually all exports of chemical fertilizers in the oblast.338  In addition, the process of 
penetration is also important, as in both cases the entrance of national- level businesses 
was negotiated, based foremost on formal agreements with the regional administration.   
The Other Side of the Coin: Big Business as a Stick  
 
While the initial phase of expansion in Samara and Perm was primarily the result 
of economic necessity and cooperation among national- level businesses and the regional 
administration, others instances of expansion by Moscow-based banks tended to be more 
conflictual.  For instance, not all oil-rich ethnic republics were as successful as Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan in keeping control over their resources and strategic assets largely in 
                                                 
337 See Andrey Chugunov, “Neft Ukhodit na Pensiyu,” Kommersant, no.6, 18 February 1997; 
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the hands of the local nomenklatura.  Despite resistance from local elites, the republic of 
Udmurtia saw the majority of its oil assets (wells and refineries) integrated into the 
Sidanko holding, a national- level oil company which came under the control of the 
Oneksim group.   
Having gained a foothold in the region, in 1996-1997 Oneksimbank was able to 
use its financial clout to expand its control over key assets in the republic’s oil complex 
and financial infrastructure.  For instance, the bank leveraged an agreement with the 
republic administration whereby it extended a loan for 100 billion rubles (prior to 
currency redenomination) in return for the right not only to service regional budgetary 
flows, but also to take control of the bank servicing the regional budget, and to receive a 
stake in the republic’s main oil product distribution company. 339  Local observers saw 
Oneksim’s “takeover” of the region’s fiscal system as a threat to the region’s economic 
and political autonomy.340  The same type of pattern took place in other regions; in 
Yaroslavl, Oneksim paid off a 1 trillion ruble debt of the administration to commercial 
banks and the federal budget in exchange for control over regional fiscal flows and the 
servicing of federal programs, despite the dubious legality of the measure.341  
                                                 
339 Sidanko controlled about 70% of oil extraction in the republic by 1997.  The bank received a stake in 
"Udmurtnefteprodukt," the republic’s sales and distribution network of oil products.  “Bank s 
Gosudarstvennym Myshleniem Stroit Sobstvennoe Gosudarstvo,” Finansovye Izvestiya, 11 February 1998. 
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instance, gubernatorial elections came to be dominated by shifting coalitions of national-level companies in 
competition with one another.   
341 Ibid. For instance, Oneksim bank’s capital in 1996 was more than three times the entire regional budget, 
and it extended a 1 trillion ruble loan to the oblast.  Having taking over servicing of the regional budget, the 
bank also gained political influence in the region since the majority of regional enterprises depended on the 
regional budget for support.  It also took over the servicing of federal programs, mainly through its personal 
contacts in MinFin.   
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 Likewise, the struggle over Norilsk Nickel in Krasnoyarsk is an example of how 
the change in ownership of national- level manufacturing enterprises could engender a 
shift from cooperative to conflictual relations between the regional administration and 
national- level business.  Upon acquisition of a stake in Norilsk Nickel in late 1996, 
Oneksimbank entered into a struggle with its CEO, Anatloy Filatov, for effective control 
over the company, which was heavily in debt to RAO UES, and also to its workers.  The 
bank was able to gain the workers on its side by purposely exacerbating the wage arrear 
problem. 342   Of particular interest is the synergy between Oneksim and the federal 
government, in terms of the increased scrutiny Filatov came under: Norilsk was visited 
by a plethora of government commissions, from the prosecutor’s office, tax police, 
special government commission – and even a foreign auditor.  Despite appeals to PM 
Chernomyrdin and President Yeltsin, Filatov was eventually forced to resign by the trade 
union.  The bank then “found” 10 billion rubles in financing and debt-relief in Moscow to 
address the company’s indebtedness and pay the workers.  
 The change in management immediately impacted the regional budget of 
Krasnoyarsk, due to reduced tax payments from lowered profits attributed to the 
enterprise’s local operations, which contribute a significant share of the regional 
budget.343  In the beginning of 1997, Governor Zubov appealed to the federal government 
to have Oneksimbank stripped of its Norilsk Nickel shares and to have them placed under 
the control of regional officials.  Despite the governor’s continued pleas, Onesksim won a 
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contested privatization tender later in 1997 awarding it a controlling stake in the company 
– thanks largely to its patrons in the federal government.344 
 In less cooperative forms of expansion, big business’ entry into a region was 
accompanied by the virtual takeover of the region’s fiscal infrastructure, as in the case of 
Udmurtia, or a protracted conflict between national- level businesses and regional 
political elites, as in the case of Kransoyarsk.  In both cases, however, the end result was 
lesser degrees of assertiveness.  In effect, Oneksim bank was the intermediary between 
the federal budget (as an authorized bank which received the right to service federal 
funds) and Udmurtia’s budget; as such, it offered the republic an alternate channel for 
solving the region’s fiscal problems other than direct assertiveness.  Likewise, 
Krasnoyarsk authorities sought the support of the federal center in their struggle with 
Oneksimbank, which raises the costs of assertiveness toward Moscow.   
 These instances provide contrast to the relatively smooth process of national- level 
consolidation in Samara and Perm.  In general the “imperialistic” form of expansion was 
generally unstable: while it forced loyalty for some periods, shifts in the balance of power 
and flare-ups of resentment of being “taken over” by “Moscow-based” elites – an 
increasingly common electoral theme by the end of the 1990s – set the stage for further 
assertiveness, including a “tax revolt” by Governor Lebed, and support of pro-region 
parties in the la te 1990s.345   Moreover, both Udmurtia and Krasnoyarsk would eventually 
hold out beyond the July 2002 deadline for treaty abrogation.   
                                                 
344 Ibid. 
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SECOND WAVE OF EXPANSION UNDER PUTIN 
 
The months immediately following the August 1998 financial crisis provided a 
strong impulse for regional autarky: political uncertainty and the paralysis of the fiscal 
system weakened both the federal center’s political will and its ability to effectively 
police the national market.  Assertive and loyal regions alike attempted to expand their 
control over economic activity within their jurisdictions, and perhaps “grab back” 
strategic assets on their territories, as the financial arms of national- level businesses 
collapsed or were forced to divest assets.  At the same time, the window of opportunity 
proved to be rather narrow, and none of the national- level businesses were broken up and 
taken over by regional elites.346 
On the contrary, in 1999 a resurgent united federal center began to encroach upon 
both the fiscal resources and policy authority of regional governments, especially in the 
regulatory and law enforcement spheres.  Concurrent with the mounting pressure for 
political and fiscal recentralization, a second wave of national- level expansion and 
consolidation began, especially in the metals sector.  Empowered by the positive effects 
of devaluation on relative prices, national- level actors began to transform themselves into 
more tightly integrated business groups formed around flagship industrial assets instead 
of “authorized banks,” as was the case previously. 347   
                                                                                                                                                 
May, 1998, as leaders also threatened to hold a referendum on the region’s political/legal status in the 
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The Kremlin’s attempt to strengthen central state autonomy from a narrow group 
of insiders that emerged in the mid- to late 1990s, evened the playing field for national-
level businesses competing for choice regional assets.  A meeting between President 
Putin and the business “oligarchy” in summer 2001 resulted in an informal pact affirming 
the principal of non- interference: the Kremlin would remain aloof from business, while 
business would stay out of politics.348  Some regional observers equated the second wave 
of expansion with the construction of an “economic vertical of power” complimenting the 
construction of Putin’s political hierarchy embodied in the institution of the federal 
district system.349  
An important aspect of the second wave of national-business expansion from 
1999-2002 is that the 1998 crisis and decline of the role of Moscow-based “authorized 
banks” served to align the interests of national- level business elites with regional 
politicians to a greater degree, since the “real economy” (rather than financial arbitrage, 
contorted intra-group asset-transfers and tax-evasion schemes) became the bread and 
butter of national- level business groups.350  Asset stripping has been largely replaced by 
capital investment in regional factories; while capital flight remains a major problem, 
domestic investment on the part of big business groups has increased sharply. 351  Thus, 
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after 1998, there was more common ground for cooperation between regional political 
and national business elites.352   
 At the same time, under Putin national- level businesses are more often being used 
a “stick, ” especially in terms of effecting a change in leadership in a particular region, 
rather than merely a carrot as in the 1990s (e.g. corporatist arrangements which might not 
necessarily benefit the federal center).  Some of the examples below indicate this trend of 
increasing synergy between the national- level businesses and the Kremlin in influencing 
electoral outcomes at the regional level. 353 
Second Wave of Penetration: Divergence of Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk 
 
The stories of Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk had similar beginnings, as executives in 
both regions were able to protect strategic sectors of their economies from integration 
into national- level businesses during the first wave of expansion.  However, during the 
second wave, Irkutsk’s enterprises increasingly became the targets of acquisition.  From 
1999-2002, a handful of large metal and machine-building holdings emerged, including 
RusAl and Sibal, which account for over 70% of national aluminum production, as well 
as SuAl, controlled by Alfa Group.  In particular, RusAl meets the criteria for a national-
level business according to both size and structure (see Table 4.1, second to the last row).  
An important consequence of the emphasis on vertical integration in this sector has been 
the increased interest of national- level business elites in regional electricity generating 
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stations (aluminum production is electricity- intensive) and automobile factories.354  Also, 
national business groups began to expand in the coal sector, which is a major fuel 
supplier to the electricity sector and an alternative to natural gas, the supply of which is 
largely controlled by the Gazprom monopoly.   
During the second wave of expansion, several key regional- level manufacturing 
enterprises in Irkutsk were integrated into national- level business groups, including  the 
Bratsk Aluminum Plant (RusAl) and Irkutsk Aluminum Plant (Sual/Alfa Group).  The 
redistribution of control over the region’s strategic assets also led to a dispersal of power 
within the region, continuing the process already begun by the incorporation of the 
Angarsk refinery into Sidanko (Oneksimbank) mentioned above.  In particular, the 
region’s key economic asset, Irkutskenergo, became a target of rivalry between the 
national- level businesses operating in the region, as did its coal, gas and gold fields.  
Unable to completely fend off national- level expansion, Irkutsk governor Govorin instead 
chose a strategy of selective co-optation in order to preserve the influence of the regional 
administration as broker in the power struggle between national- level actors in the region.  
Ahead of the 2001 gubernatorial elections in the region, Govorin forged an alliance with 
RusAl and Alfa to counter Oneksimbank, which was supporting a challenger in the 
gubernatorial campaign.  In exchange, Govorin used his voting packet to appoint a 
general director at Irkutskenergo who was supported by Rusal and Alfa.355   
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Sverdlovsk oblast was also affected by the second wave of national- level 
expansion on the heels of the financial crisis.  Governor Rossel participated in the 
creation of joint gas, oil and steel companies with various national- level businesses.356  
Compared to Irkutsk, however, Sverdlovsk has a much wider base of large regional- level 
enterprises, many of which were part of the bloated Soviet defense sector.  In addition, 
Sverdlovsk is in the minority of wealthy regions demonstrating executive elite continuity 
from the Soviet period.  Although Rossel by no means has a monopoly on political 
activity in the region, he still enjoys a well-established administrative power base and 
steady support from local industrialists.357   
Thus, after the second wave of expansion, the political influence of national- level 
businesses in the region was limited enough that Rossel was able to maintain an assertive 
strategy (unlike Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk was among the “problem regions” cited in Table 5.2) 
without having to fear that the use of national- level businesses as “sticks” would be 
enough to unseat him. The Kremlin did try, however.  There was a half-hearted attempt 
by the Kremlin-supported party of power, United Russia, to establish Sergey Nosov, 
director of the local metals giant Niznhy Tagil (part of Evrazholding, which emerged as a 
national- level business in 2001) as a viable competitor to Rossel in the gubernatorial 
elections.358 However, the unexpected success of Za Rodnoy Ural, Rossel’s party which 
enjoys a strong base of support in regional- level industry, in local legislative elections 
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doused United Russia’s hopes of unseating Rossel in the gubernatorial race, 
simultaneously lowering the Kremlin’s political leverage over the governor.359 
 Although all the formerly assertive regions were affected by the second wave of 
expansion, a bifurcation began to take place.  Sverdlovsk’s industrial base has been 
sufficiently large and diversified to absorb national- level expansion without undermining 
Rossel’s power base.360  Irkutsk’s political economy, on the other hand, is made up of a 
substantially narrower group of enterprises.  With the rise of national- level business 
influence in the oblast, especially over the management of Irkutskenergo, the regional 
administration was forced to switch to a strategy of sharing effective control over major 
regional assets – and, respectively, influence over the regional economy – with national 
business elites.  The value of the power-sharing agreement as a tool to protect the 
region’s chief assets from outside control had proved to be rather limited.  In addition to 
RusAl’s greater influence over Irkutskenergo, the Angarsk refinery, Bratsky aluminum 
and Irkutsk aluminum enterprises were also integrated into national- level businesses, 
accounting for the bulk of the region’s strategic assets.361  
For the sake of comparison, two ethnic republics with higher levels of 
assertiveness in the 1990s, Komi and Yakutia, will be briefly mentioned.  Komi’s largest 
oil company, KomiTek (which was an autonomous republic company similar to Bashneft 
and Tatneft), was taken over by Lukoil in 1999.  The takeover of KomiTek was 
accompanied by an electoral defeat for the incumbent governor, Yurii Spiridonov, who 
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had opposed Lukoil’s expansion into the region. 362  The change in leadership and 
subsequent rise of national- level business influence in the region’s political economy also 
had an impact on its level of assertiveness: among the wealthy republics, Komi was the 
only one to comply with the July 2002 deadline for abrogation of power-sharing 
agreements.363  
 In a similar vein, the republic of Yakutia also underwent a change in leadership 
with the participation of a national- level business.  The republic is highly dependent on 
Russia’s largest diamond company, AlRosa, for a significant portion of its revenues.  In a 
scenario similar to the ousting of Filatov from Norilsk Nickel in the 1990s, as part of its 
drive to unseat incumbent President Mikhail Nikolyaev, the Kremlin activated the Audit 
Chamber and other federal organs to pressure the company, securing the loyalty of 
Vyacheslav Shtyrov, general director of the company. 364  Nikolyaev ultimately conceded 
to the Kremlin’s pressure and Shtyrov became president of the republic.  Although 
Yakutia held out beyond the deadline for abrogation of the power-sharing treaties, it was 
not included in the list of problem regions (as were the republics Bashkortostan and 
Tatarstan, for instance).  Moreover, in a sign that the leadership change bore fruit for the 
Kremlin in terms of overcoming regional defiance, the republic complied with the federal 
law and re-negotiated its treaty not long after the deadline, in November 2002.365  
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Deepening Penetration: Loyal Regions  
 
The loyal regions generally witnessed a deepening of national- level penetration 
during the 1999-2002 period, marked by continuity in the “vertical” corporatist 
arrangements established in the early to mid-nineties.  Regions that had already adopted a 
power-sharing strategy with national- level business were less assertive of their individual 
autonomy in this period.  Both Perm and Samara complied with the Kremlin’s campaign 
to phase out the power-sharing arrangements by the July 2002 deadline, while Governor 
Yuri Trutnev in Perm was one of the first to publicly support the annulment of the 
treaties.366  
 The parliamentary elections in 1999 and ensuing wave of gubernatorial elections 
in 2000-2001 highlighted the continued influence of national- level businesses in these 
regions.  Since 1995, the leaders of both regions supported the federal government’s 
party of power, Our Home is Russia, which had effectively disintegrated after its leader, 
V.  Chernomyrdin was rejected as Prime Minister by the Duma in fall 1998.  During the 
1999 parliamentary election campaign, Samara governor Titov joined the SPS party 
(Union of Right Forces), a pro-Kremlin party that received financial and political support 
from Anatoly Chubais, head of the United Energy Systems, one of the largest national-
level business structures.367 
In Perm governor Igumnov identified with the All Russia party, which was pitted 
against the Kremlin’s party of power, Unity.  Initially, Igumnov’s identification with the 
                                                 
366 “Dlya Nashey Oblasti Privilegii net,” Noviy Kompan’on, No.24 (177), 1.  See chapter 3 of the 
dissertation for a more detailed discussion of these region's reactions to the federal mandate.   
367 Samaraenergo (part of UES) is also an influential national-level business in Samara.   
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party reflected the specific influence of national- level business on the political orientation 
of regional executives.  Lukoil headquarters in Moscow participated in the creation of All 
Russia, in hopes of creating a successor party to NDR (Our Home is Russia), the “party 
of power” since 1995 parliamentary elections.368  Following the lead of its head office, 
Lukoil-Perm also threw its support behind the party. However, Lukoil Moscow 
eventually cooled off towards “All Russia” as it became more regionalist in orientation, 
especially after it merged with Luzhkov’s “Fatherland” party.  Indeed, the party’s main 
base of support in the outgoing Duma, the “Russian Regions” faction led by Oleg 
Morozov, issued a statement to its regional cells that they could also solicit votes for the 
Unity party, already anticipating the strategic alliance between the two that was to take 
place on the eve of presidential elections in March 2000.369  The difference between 
Lukoil’s position (mirrored by Oleg Morozov/Russia Regions faction) and the regional 
leaders on the leadership council (Tatarstan’s Shamiev, for instance) is that the former 
were much less concerned with defending the asymmetrical federal system and more 
concerned with being on the “winning” side, favoring corporatist over programmatic 
goals.  Thus compared to the assertive regions in the first category, Perm’s support for 
pro-regionalist parties was considerably less enthusiastic.  Unlike Igumnov, the leaders of 
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Irkutsk were on the leadership council, while Rossel 
presided over his own home-grown party, Za Rodnoy Ural.   
Subfederal elections also reflected the deepening influence of national- level 
businesses.  By 2000, many of the rough edges of the relationship between Yukos and 
                                                 
368 Lapina and Chirikova, 2000, 154-172. 
369 Ivan Rodin,”Vremya Rykhlykk Soyuzov Minovalo,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 10, 2001, 2.   
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Samara had been smoothed over, in part due to changes in Menatep group’s management 
style and its commitment to investment and growth in its strategic regions.370 Another 
motivation for a tighter alliance was the 2000 gubernatorial race, when Yukos emerged as 
a key supporter of Titov, whose grip on power was initially challenged by another 
national- level business in the region, Gazprom, which had forwarded the candidacy of 
one of its former executives.371  Upon Governor Titov’s re-election, he cemented his 
relationship with Yukos via an “exchange of cadres.” Yukos executive vice president, V.  
Kazakov, who headed up Titov's campaign headquarters, was appointed deputy governor 
of Samara, while Titov’s son was given a position in a Yukos-related bank.372  
In Perm, Lukoil-Perm modestly supported governor Igumnov’s reelection bid, 
although the company had to temper its enthusiasm due to considerations of its federal-
level ties.  The presidential representative for the Volga region, Sergey Kirienko, was 
trying to engineer Igumnov’s defeat in the elections to Yuri Trutnev, the mayor of the 
city of Perm. 373  Trutnev defeated Igumnov in the election, and the new governor and 
Lukoil quickly found common ground and signed a new cooperation agreement in 2001.  
The agreement included a five-year plan allotting financing to develop various social 
projects in the oblast, in the spheres of education and training, infrastructure, housing, 
                                                 
370 Badovsky notes that in the late 1990s Yukos also began to rotate managers back to Samara that had 
earlier been transferred to Moscow (V.  Tarkhov, V Kazakov). Badovskiy, 420-423.  See also Serenko, 
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371 Ibid.   
372 Turovskiy, 2002, 3. 
373 Center for Political Information, “Volga Federal District,” 2002, 8-12. Apparently, Lukoil helped 
Trutnev during the campaign as well, instead of putting all of its eggs in one basket. 
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etc.374  After signing the agreement, Trutnev acknowledged that relations between Lukoil 
and the regional administration remained the most important for the region. 375  At the 
same time, Lukoil provided former governor Igumnov with a golden parachute: the 
outgoing governor went to work for Lukoil-Permneft at the end of his term. 376    
The cases of Perm and Samara in 1999-2002 represent continuity in cooperative    
arrangements between national- level business actors and regional political elites, together 
with exchanges of cadres between the executive branch and businesses.  Having current 
or former managers in the regional administration was obviously beneficial for national-
level business, in terms of influencing regulatory and administrative decisions, especially 
given the dominance of the executive branch in the Russian polity. 377 Likewise, alliances 
with national- level businesses have extended beyond electoral support, to include support 
for family members and golden parachutes.  Such patterns of exchange have helped to 
cement rela tions between big businesses and regional administrations in other loyal 
regions as well.378  In the case of Perm, the relative ease at which Lukoil entered into an 
alliance with the new governor reflects the fact that cooperative-type penetration is 
predicated on more than just personal relations in the consistently loyal regions.379  
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 This chapter has presented a framework for categorizing the wealthy regions 
based on the timing and nature of national- level business expansion.  Within the context 
of Chapter 3, which charted out the dynamics of regional assertiveness across the three 
phases of intergovernmental relations from 1990-2002, three categories can be identified.  
Two of the categories, consistently assertive and consistently loyal, emphasize continuity.  
Regions in the first category have repeatedly asserted their jurisdictional rights to protect 
strategic sectors of the economy from penetration by national- level businesses in the face 
of shifting federal strategies over time.  These regions were the boldest seekers of 
autonomy in the early 1990s when Yeltsin implored the regions to “take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow;” they pushed for the best deals during the period of 
selective accommodation (e.g. asymmetrical federalism) in the mid to late 1990s; and 
have most vigorously resisted the harmonization of regional rights and abrogation of the 
power-sharing treaties under Putin.  Likewise, the heavy amount of financial resources 
needed to protect strategic regional enterprises from being taken over by national- level 
businesses has dictated continued assertion in the distributional arena.  Sverdlovsk, for 
instance, was one of the most vocal regions in terms of fiscal and economic protests in 
support of local industries in the 1990s.   
Likewise, there has been a deepening, or gradual institutionalization, of the 
relationship between national- level businesses and regional administrations in those 
consistently loyal regions such as Perm and Samara.  The cooperative relationship 
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between Lukoil and the Perm regional administration has survived changes in regional 
leadership, suggesting that it has evolved beyond merely personal connections.  The 
“carrots” offered by national- level businesses to regional enterprises in Perm and Samara 
have included integration into broader markets and greater sources of financing and 
technical expertise.  Moreover, national- level businesses have played a major role in 
financing regional development programs, as in Perm.  In the case of Samara, many of 
the initial rough edges between Yukos and the administration following its acquisition by 
Menatep were smoothed over with an electoral alliance and solidified by an exchange of 
cadres.  Both regions have demonstrated lower levels of assertion under Yeltsin, and 
were among the first to abrogate their bilateral power-sharing treaties under Putin. 
While the first two categories emphasize continuity on either side of the spectrum, 
the third category highlights a pattern of change.  As the independent variable in this 
study – the degree of penetration of national- level business – has increased, the 
dependent variable, regional assertiveness, has decreased.  As national- level businesses 
have expanded into Irkutsk, for example, the opportunities for the regional administration 
to pursue a “winner-take-all” strategy have diminished, while federal elites’ political 
leverage has grown.  As the region became increasingly overrun by national level 
businesses, such as RusAl, Alfa, Oneksim, Yukos, etc., the formal value of the region’s 
power-sharing treaty as a tool to protect strategic regional assets ultimately proved to be 
ineffective, which may be one reason why the region was less publicly defiant (relative to 
Sverdlovsk, for instance) in the face of the Kremlin’s campaign to phase out these 
treaties.  Finally, among the ethnic republics with increasing levels of penetration, 
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national- level businesses have also served federal interests in both Yakutia and Komi, by 
acting as a counterweight to the administrative resources of incumbents, both of whom 
were replaced.  Accordingly, all of these regions saw declining assertiveness from the 
Yeltsin to the Putin period relative to regions in the first category.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation ultimately centers on a puzzle.  In the comparative literature, 
natural resource wealth and industrial development have traditionally been associated 
with higher levels of assertive behavior by regional governments in federal systems, such 
as demands for state restructuring and expansion of control over fiscal and political 
resources.  Yet, empirical observations of regional behavior across both the Yeltsin and 
Putin presidencies reveal a seemingly inexplicable divergence among similarly endowed 
regions.  While some wealthy regions have consistently pursued assertive autonomy-
seeking strategies, others have demonstrated much more restraint and “loyalty” toward 
the center.  The traditional drivers of regional behavior found in the Russian area 
literature cannot explain this puzzle adequately.  While the Soviet Union’s ethnofederal 
legacy does explain part of the variation, it cannot account for the divergence of behavior 
within the subsets of equally wealthy “ethnic” republics and “Russian” regions.  
Moreover, this divergent pattern has remained consistent across time despite the redesign 
of federal institutions and changes in national leadership.  Solving the puzzle has 
important implications not only for Russia’s political future, but also for our 
understanding of the role of federalism in transitional regimes.   
 This study is intended to fill in the gap in the literature.  My central argument is 
that unexpected patterns of restraint and cooperation can be explained by the role of a 
“third player” in the federal bargaining game: national- level businesses.  Due to its size 
and structure, the top echelon of businesses in Russia influences both economic 
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incentives and political opportunities for regional assertiveness.  National- level 
businesses’ primary dependence on federal politicians to operate successfully in national 
and international markets, coupled with their aversion to various forms of regional (e.g.  
sub-federal) protectionism and economic populism, make them natural allies of the 
federal center.  In regions where they have strategic interests, national- level businesses 
have used their political influence and financial resources as both “carrots” and “sticks” 
to mediate intergovernmental conflict and deter potentially disruptive behavior by 
regional politicians.   
 Both quantitative and qualitative modes of analysis support the thesis that 
national- level business actors have helped structure federal relations in Russia.  The 
multivariate regression controls for customary explanations of assertive regionalism, and 
finds that the relative amount of resources controlled by national- level businesses in a 
region is negatively correlated with its assertiveness from 1990-2002.  The higher the 
concentration of national- level business actors in a region, the lower that region’s level of 
assertive behavior.  This effect has been strongest following the “first wave” of national 
business expansion that took place in the first half of the 1990s, when the energy sector 
was consolidated and carved up into vertically- integrated companies, most of which have 
been based in Moscow.   
Moreover, controlling for the wider set of large regional enterprises in the model 
reinforces the dissertation’s thesis that the relative size of business actors affects their 
ability to integrate, rather than fragment, the federal state.  Consistent with the 
conventional wisdom, heavier concentrations of regional industries were positively 
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correlated with assertive regional behavior in the regressions.  However, when the subset 
of national- level businesses is tested separately, the sign changes from positive to 
negative.  As “shared resources,” national- level businesses have helped restrain 
intergovernmental competition in the Russian Federation.   
 A more in-depth look at four Russian regions – Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, Samara and 
Perm – suggests that the wealthy regions can be placed into three general categories.  
Two could be seen as being on the opposite end of a spectrum: consistently “assertive” 
and consistently “loyal” regions.  For instance, the regional administration in Sverdlovsk 
has been relatively successful in limiting (or participating in) the penetration of national-
level businesses in strategic sectors of the region’s economy, which has allowed it to 
more consistently pursue assertive strategies in the intergovernmental barga ining game.  
In regions where national- level businesses have maintained a strategic presence since the 
early part of the transition, such as Perm and Samara, pressing jurisdictional and 
distributional issues were generally resolved via power-sharing settlements between these 
businesses and the regional administrations, in place of more risky strategies of assertion 
toward Moscow.   
 The third category encompasses regions in the middle of the spectrum that have 
demonstrated a change in behavior over time.  The case of Irkutsk reflects a trend toward 
declining assertiveness associated with the “second wave” of national- level business 
expansion into the periphery that has taken place in the metals and machine-building 
sectors since 2000.  As national- level businesses have expanded into Irkutsk, regional 
elites have been increasingly forced to “share” control over the region’s most strategic 
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assets.  This has altered the political balance of power in the region, reducing incentives 
for the regional administration to pursue a defiant, “winner-take-all” strategy toward 
Moscow.  As the influence of national- level businesses has grown in the periphery under 
Putin, so too have the number of regions that have gravitated toward the "loyal" end of 
the spectrum.   
 The empirical findings suggest that models of elite bargaining in developing 
federal systems more fully explain patterns of regional behavior when the political role of 
big business is taken into account.  In the Russian case, a higher concentration of 
national- level businesses in a particular region has been associated with lower levels of 
assertiveness.  Incorporating the political constraints placed by national- level businesses 
on regional executives helps to explain the dichotomous pattern among Russia’s 
wealthier regions.  Based solely on macro-structural variables, such as levels of industrial 
output, export capacity, and natural resource endowments, all the wealthy regions, both 
ethnic and non-ethnic, have had strong incentives for assertion and high levels of 
bargaining power.   
 Likewise, focusing on formal state structures and political institutions alone does 
not capture the full range of variation in federal outcomes across regions.  Non-state 
actors have mattered in the development of Russia's federal system.  Various federal 
strategies employing carrots and sticks –  such as selective accommodation under Yeltsin 
and the strengthening of executive vertical accountability under Putin – have also been 
supplemented with changes in regional politicians’ cons tituencies as national- level 
businesses have expanded into the periphery.   
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 The capacity of big businesses to act as mechanisms of political integration 
reflects a different side of state-business relations than the customary view found in the 
literature on the Yeltsin era.  While big businesses certainly have had a “horizontally” 
fragmenting effect on government at the federal level by dividing the loyalties of 
government officials among competing financial- industrial groups, they have also played 
a “vertically” integrating role. The vertical integration of key sectors of Russia’s 
economy, such as oil and gas, and more recently, metals and machine-building, has 
facilitated the construction of economic hierarchies binding the Russian federal state 
alongside political ones.   
 Understanding the dynamics of the triangular relationship between the central 
government, sub-national governments and business actors in federal systems is also 
important for the comparative study of federal systems.  Globalization has increased the 
influence of big businesses vis-à-vis both national and regional governments.380  By 
presenting a theoretical framework that differentiates between the size and structure of 
business actors and the likelihood of alliances with various levels of government, this 
study lays the groundwork for further research on the effect of state-business relations on 
patterns of governance in multi- tiered states.   
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IMPLICATIONS: BIG BUSINESS AND THE "FEDERAL BALANCE" 
Federalism and Democratic Governance 
 
 I argue that national- level businesses have served as vertically- integrating 
mechanisms in Russia's federal system, explaining unexpected restraint among the 
wealthy regions in the context of under-institutionalization of federal institutions and 
weak national party penetration in the periphery.  The first concern that follows from this 
assertion is whether this is a desirable outcome for the consolidation of Russian 
democracy.  Is regional assertiveness – in the form of demands for greater 
decentralization and resistance to recentralization – necessarily a thing to be avoided?  
Secondly, should big business play a political role as an integrating mechanism in 
Russia's federal system? 
 In and of itself, the assertion of jurisdictional and distributional claims against the 
federal center by regional governments, accompanied by various forms of regionalist 
political mobilization, is not necessarily detrimental for democratization. 381  
Democratization and market reform have gone hand in hand with decentralization in 
many areas of the world, such as Latin America, Africa and Europe.  In states with 
culturally heterogeneous populations and geographically diverse territories, the 
decentralization of political authority and fiscal resources can promote consensus 
building and the accommodation of diverse interests in society (e.g. pluralism); increase 
democratic accountability and policy innovation at the local level; and enhance the ability 
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of regional governments to more readily adapt to the fluid opportunities and competitive 
pressures resulting from market reform and global economic integration.   
 However, the divergent experiences of various transitional states over the last 
decade have shown that decentralization can be a double-edged sword.  In the absence of 
sufficiently strong political coordination from above, federal systems can ultimately 
erode democratic accountability, worsen public sector performance and exacerbate 
distributional tensions, setting the stage for ethnic conflicts, and political and 
macroeconomic instability.  The literature on the third wave of democratization reviewed 
earlier singles out federal systems as institutional arrangements that can exacerbate these 
“dangers of decentralization” due to the perverse incentives and resource mobilization 
opportunities that they create for regional politicians to assert their geographically 
particular interests.382    
 Inasmuch as federalism is a doctrine of balance, the central issue for transitional 
states is finding a middle ground between intergovernmental competition and cooperation 
that ensures political stability and a unified national legal and market space while 
constraining the federal center from routinely encroaching on regional competencies, 
which could undermine incentives for policy innovation and efficiency-enhancing 
interregional competition.  During the 1990s, Russia's federal system was decidedly out 
of balance.  The federal state was plagued by partisan conflict, resulting in weak political 
hierarchies and excessive, ad-hoc accommodations of regional demands.383 
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 Within this context, regional assertion posed a real threat to the central state's 
ability to manage both the political and market transition.  In essence, the penetration of 
national- level businesses into the periphery has helped to substitute for weak political 
hierarchies, by deterring regional assertiveness in the public political arena and 
structuring more cooperative federal relations.  At the same time, it is well understood 
that the magnification of the political influence of big business actors (e.g.  Russia's 
system of “oligarchic capitalism”) has also had deleterious effects on formal state 
capacity at various levels of government.  In particular, the political influence of Russia’s 
business oligarchs has been blamed for slowing Russia's market transition. 384  
 As stated earlier, Putin has addressed this problem via administrative, legislative 
and constitutional reforms, such as expanding the authority of the federal district 
bureaucracy, revamping the Federation Council, the tweaking of Russia’s fiscal federal 
system, abrogation of the bilateral power-sharing treaties and clarification of the rights 
and responsibilities of federal, regional and local governments (e.g. Kozak Commission 
legislation) by parliament.  These actions could further restore the “federal balance” by 
enhancing the federal center's capacity to govern more effectively and by making 
decision-making more transparent and fair.   
 Yet, Western experience has shown that federal systems are continuously subject 
to the renegotiation of the status-quo.385  As Russia integrates further into the global 
economy, the incentives for regional governments to expand their policy authority and 
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fiscal resources will likely increase, as has been the case in Canadian and European 
federal systems.386  And even if the Putin regime continues to move closer toward a de-
facto unitary state, the necessity of promoting salutary interregional (e.g. fiscal federal) 
competition to promote economic growth may dictate de facto power-sharing 
arrangements with regional governments, as in the case of China.387  
 Thus, whether Russia develops along the lines of either a semi-authoritarian 
model closer to the Chinese one or a western model of federal democracy, it must 
develop a strong national party system that would link the career ambitions of regional 
governors with national politicians.388  The role of vertically integrating mechanisms that 
can bind the interests of politicians at various levels of government is essential to 
structuring bargaining and reciprocity.  As a broad based national party, United Russia 
could theoretically fulfill this role.  It encompasses a much broader number of regions 
than big business, which has much more narrow political and geographical interests.  At 
the same time, Putin’s personal attitude toward a national party system will be of key 
importance in its future development.389  In particular, the danger exists that United 
Russia will either fade away after Putin leaves office (as has occurred when the chief 
patrons of previous “parties of power” have left office), or that it will evolve into a "top-
down" mechanism dominated by federal bureaucrats, especially the statist-minded 
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siloviki – the “law and order” elites that have gradually come to dominate Putin’s 
administration. 390 
 An important finding in regard to democratization is that the “balancing” effect of 
national- level businesses in Russia’s federal system has been a function of the macro-
political context.  During the crisis-ridden 1990s, when the “party of power” was much 
weaker, the expansion of national- level businesses in the periphery acted as a vital 
centripetal mechanism that allowed the federal center to constrain and co-opt would-be 
assertive regional elites, helping to stave off a slide toward de-facto confederative 
relations that could have threatened state breakdown.  Moreover, as Putin consolidated 
power during his first term, regions where national- level business had established a 
strong presence were more compliant with federal legislation to eliminate the bilateral 
power-sharing treaties.  The abrogation of these treaties has helped strengthen a greater 
number of regional executives’ stakes in the federal bargain, since they were viewed as 
being both opaque and unfair, and were a constant source of contention. 391  
 However, in the context of a semi-authoritarian regime that could emerge if the 
Kremlin continues to centralize power – both “horizontally” and “vertically” – during 
Putin’s second term, big businesses could potentially play either of two political roles.  
The first could be a balancing force against the siloviki and defender of liberal interests 
on both federal and regional levels, especially in terms of supporting opposition parties, 
and championing formal institutions and legislation that limit state interventionism and 
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strengthen property rights.392  The second role, however, could be as an appendage of an 
assertive central state, in which case big businesses would contribute to an imbalance 
(e.g.  over-centralization) of the federal system.  Before these scenarios are examined in 
more detail, it is necessary to outline the relationship between the level of political 
centralization and fiscal federal performance in emerging-market countries such as 
Russia.   
Toward “Market-Preserving” Federalism? 
 
As discussed earlier, one of the chief benefits of “market-preserving” federalism 
is efficiency-enhancing competition among federal subjects for labor and capital, which 
motivates regional governments to provide competitive policy environments for 
businesses and, ideally, adequate social services for the labor force.  More specifically, 
the basic tenets of market-preserving federalism are as follows:393 
  
1.  Clear delineation of authority between various levels of government; 
2.  A high degree of regulatory authority of subnational governments in their 
jurisdictions; 
3.  Enforcement of rules by national authorities providing for a common market 
and mobility of goods and other productive factors between jurisdictions; 
4.  Revenue sharing and borrowing is subject to hard budget constraints; and 
5.  The nature of federal relations is institutionalized and not easily changed 
(unilaterally) by either central or regional governments. 
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As suggested by point three, the success of a market-preserving federal system 
hinges in large part on the autonomy of the central state.  It must have the ability to police 
the behavior of both regional governments and business actors in order to prevent 
collusive relationships which undermine market competition and tax collection (e.g.  
regulatory and extractive capacity).394  In the same vein, both regional governments and 
businesses need to have some degree of autonomy (point two), as well as certainty 
regarding the rules of the game in general, and their property rights in particular (point 
five), in order for interregional (e.g. fiscal federal) competition to be efficiency-
enhancing.  In an environment of arbitrary rules, incentives to maximize individual gains, 
which could be taken away by a predatory federal government, are weaker.395  
As the Chinese case has shown, autonomy does not necessarily have to be 
constitutionally guaranteed, though the credibility of the center’s commitment to honor 
intergovernmental agreements is important.396  However, when the state is unable to 
police a common market infrastructure, assertive regionalism can lead instead to “market-
distorting” federalism, which is characterized by market fragmentation and autarky. 397  
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The theory of market preserving federalism stresses the need for a “strong state” in 
addition to the “strong region” of classic fiscal federal theory. 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the relationship between various typologies of 
intergovernmental relations and progress toward “market-preserving” federalism based 
on the Russian case.  This chart is more germane to emerging market federations, where 
market institutions are generally weaker.398  Emerging market federations such as Russia 
are most effective when the politically disruptive effects of regional assertiveness are 
minimized and when the economically salutary effects of interregional competition are 
maximized, which is a point in the middle of the spectrum. 399  To a certain extent, a trade-
off between political and economic performance is inevitable.  The more the center 
increases its political leverage over the regions by encroaching on fiscal resources and 
policy competencies, the less autonomous regional governments become.   
                                                                                                                                                 
decision-making and regions were more subject to arbitrariness of central ministries, forcing them to either 
assert themselves and bargain for better deals or to rely on informal fiscal practices, both of which 
undermined federal tax collection and created distorted economic incentives. 
398 The correlation between a strong state and market efficiency (e.g.  market-preserving federalism) is 
most evident in emerging-market federations, which lack an institutional infrastructure (capital markets, 
bankruptcy procedures, hard-budget constraints, credit institutions, etc.) to discipline regional fiscal and 
economic behavior.  Thus the state has to initially play a much greater role in “market-creation:” 
establishing and uniformly enforcing rules for horizontal competition, before it can retreat to a less active 
role in policing the market as in advanced federations, where the rules are self-enforcing (e.g. ‘non-
efficient’ competition such as irresponsible fiscal policy, protectionism, autarky, economic separatism  etc.  
is instantly punished by the market, and states cannot expect the federal government to bail them out). Li 
and Lan, 1999; Wibbles, 2000. 
399 Wibbles, 2000. 
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What role do state-business relations play in maintaining this balance in Russia? 
During the 1990s, big business played a dual role.  On one hand, in the context of weak 
market and regulatory institutions, national- level businesses exerted a “market 
preserving” tendency to the extent that they integrated regional markets into the national 
economy.  On the other hand, within the context of Russia’s “oligarchic capitalism,” the 
federal state was fragmented and captured by particularistic business interests, preventing 
it from effectively disciplining either regional governments or big business.  While 
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serving as a mechanism of political integration, alliances between regional governments 
and national- level businesses have tended to crowd out competition (especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises) and have often relied on quasi- fiscal arrangements to the 
detriment of federal coffers.  In the 1990s, the cash-strapped federal state was able to do 
little in the way of addressing mounting interregional asymmetry (the gap between the 
wealthy and poorer regions), while national- level businesses squirreled most of their 
capital abroad.  The overall weakness of the federal center and ensuing fragmented 
national policy space led to a “market-distorting,” rather than a market-preserving, 
outcome for Russia's federal system. 400   
With the emergence of Putin, the reassertion of federal power has at first had a 
positive impact, moving Russia closer to the “market-preserving” end of the spectrum.  
As the autonomy of the federal government relative to big business and regional 
governments strengthened under Putin, the Kremlin has increasingly pressured big 
business to pay taxes and contribute more consistently to capital investment and social 
goals around the country.   
In addition to facilitating the developmental goals of the state, corporate social 
responsibility also brings direct benefits for corporations that make them more willing to 
uphold their end of the bargain.  First, the need for foreign investment (e.g. stock market) 
has induced changes in corporate governance and a trend toward greater transparency and 
attention to a corporate image.  Secondly, the personal political ambitions of the 
enterprise or group leaders are an important motivation.  As corporate leaders turn from 
                                                 
400 Slider, 1997. 
219 
their role as "Wild East" capitalists and increasingly eye political offices on both regional 
and national levels, they have striven to publicize their contribution to socioeconomic 
development and counter the image of a Moscow-based oligarchy plundering the 
periphery and siphoning assets abroad.   
The overall effect of the increase in federal state autonomy and the Kremlin’s 
emphasis on corporate social responsibility during Putin’s first term was initially positive 
for Russia’s federal system in terms of its moving Russia closer to the “strong (e.g. 
autonomous) federal state – strong business” balance needed for market-preserving 
federalism.  However, as the federal center has continued to centralize power, the danger 
of political imbalance – this time in the form of an overbearing federal center – has reared 
its ugly head.  The state's systematic attack on YUKOS, formerly Russia's largest 
privately-owned oil company (and # 4 ranked national- level business for the index 
period), from 2003 - 2004 has raised the specter of a “strong state – weak business” 
scenario, where big businesses could effectively become appendages of the state.  The 
following section delves further into this potential danger and its implications for 




                                                 
401 The impris onment and/or forced exile of the company's major shareholders, plus the magnitude of the 
back tax claims brought against the company, have been widely regarded as an attack on former CEO 
Khodorkovsky for his political activities (active support of opposit ion parties, lobbying for private 
pipelines, etc.) and also to prevent a merger with Sibneft, which was to involve a strategic western investor. 
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Prospects for State-business and Federal Relations in Putin’s Second Term 
 
Putin's second term could represent the end of a transition from the patterns of 
governance unique to the Yeltsin regime, including the model of state-business relations 
associated with oligarchic capitalism.  It is clear that President Putin will remain the 
dominant political figure during his second term, and looking ahead the main question is 
the type of new rules of interaction between the state and big business that will be 
developed and enforced by the Kremlin.  Two scenarios are discussed here.   
 The first, more positive, scenario is that lingering competition between national-
level business elites and the statist-minded siloviki  will lead to the partial 
institutionalization of state business relations, as the oligarchy increasingly champions 
formal rules to defend its interests and as Putin –  mindful of the vital contribution that 
the oligarchs can play in assisting the state in developing the periphery –  restrains the 
siloviki from pursuing a potentially costly "winner take all strategy" against the national 
business elites.  A broader campaign to overturn privatization results would likely incite 
massive capital flight, while the precedent would weaken trust in property rights.  This 
scenario could potentially involve a settlement whereby the oligarchy's property rights 
would be ensured through amnesty (enshrined in legislation) from further investigations 
related to the early years of privatization in exchange for acting as exemplary "corporate 
citizens" in the field of corporate social responsibility. 
State-business relations would most likely take the form of state- led corporatism, 
with the political activity of big business curtailed in exchange for competitive favors 
given to “loyal” oligarchs.  The key to this scenario is that the "Yukos affair" is the 
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exception rather than the rule, and that it represented an attempt to reinforce the rules of 
the game at the time when the stakes were the highest, during the federal election season.  
The fact that the state has vigorously pursued its case against the company after the 2003-
2004 federal elections, and has planned the sale of the company’s core asset, 
Yuganskneftgaz, suggests that the redistribution of property might have been a primary 
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 This alternative outcome is that the siloviki gradually become the dominant actor 
within Putin’s entourage, and instrumentally use state capacity to overturn the results of 
earlier privatizations and force the remainder of the Yeltsin-era oligarchy to cash in and 
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flee the country.  This scenario would become likely were Putin to decide that the 
benefits of a wide-ranging redistribut ion of assets were greater than the potential costs to 
the economy. 402  At the same time, the dominance of the siloviki would likely lead to the 
prevalence of informal rules, e.g. loyalty to the state and the dominant elite group as a 
prerequisite for domestic ownership of newly redistributed assets.  This would be a step 
backward for any institutionalization in state-business relations due to the high degree of 
politicization of leadership positions in national- level businesses and, correspondingly, 
the decreased autonomy of economic actors.  In this scenario, the Yukos affair would be 
part of a systematic redistribution of property (e.g. creation of a new “nomenklatura” 
system in industry) that began with the take-over and effective nationalization of media 
assets belonging to Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky in 2001-2003.403 
If the pendulum does swing to this other extreme compared to the 1990s, an 
“assertive federal state – weak business” model of relations could distort the benefits of 
market-preserving federalism to the extent that big businesses become appendages of the 
state and investment and corporate restructuring decisions are increasingly politicized.404  
Moreover, if a redistribution of property results in greater control of Russia’s oil sector 
by state-owned companies, then the Kremlin’s ability to directly influence regional 
economies – as well as sub-federal electoral outcomes – would be strengthened even 
further.  In short, the primary danger of this scenario is that national- level businesses’ 
                                                 
402 Political benefits could include popular support: the oligarchy generally has a negative image among 
most of the population in Russia. 
403 "Purges" of management also took place in many state-owned companies under Putin, such as 
Gazprom.   
404 The fact that the government managed to derail the merger between Yukos and Sibneft, which would 
have created an oil super-major with the participation of a foreign strategic investor, reflects this trend. 
224 
role as political sticks would offset their potential role as economic carrots, to the 
detriment of democratic federalism and economically beneficial interregional 
competition.  
National- level business actors have played an important political role in 
structuring patterns of intergovernmental relations in the Russian Federation.  
Throughout most of Russia’s democratic transition, from the initial period of chaotic 
decentralization under President Yeltsin to President Putin’s initial consolidation of 
power, they have acted as balancing mechanisms, helping to bind the Russian state in the 
face of weak national party penetration in the periphery.  If democratic federalism is to 
deepen in Russia, a strong national party system should ideally play the primary role of 
vertical integration, while state-business relations on all levels of government should 
become institutionalized.  Recent events, however, have suggested the possible 
emergence of another scenario where both big businesses and the “party of power” 
become instruments of more coercive recentralization, with potentially deleterious effects 
for fiscal federal performance.  The hope remains that national- level business actors will 
continue to play a balancing force, for greater pluralism and, even more hopefully, for the 
consolidation of democracy in the years ahead. 
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Appendix A: Regression, Variation 1 (1990-2002) 
                                                     Standardized Coefficient, T-Value 
Construction of IV (See Table 4-3) 1-a 1-b 2-a 2-b 
Macro-structural factors      
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Prior Assertiveness (1990-1994) N/A N/A N/A N/A 










 National-level enterprises     
    1.  National Ratio (Aggregate) -1.044*** 
t= -3.725 
   















                     a.  Oil and Gas only  
 
  -.476*** 
t= -2.792 
                    b.  Machine & Metals  
 
  -.248* 
t= -1.845* 
R Square .834 .873 .779 .805 
Adjusted R Square .763 .812 .683 .710 
*=significant at the p<0.1 level (90% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
**=significant at the p<0.05 (95% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
***=significant at the p<0.01 level (99% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
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Appendix B: Regression, Variation 2 (1995 – 2002) 
 
                                                                     Standardized Coefficient, T-Value 
Construction of IV (See Table 4-3) 1-a 1-b 2-a 2-b 
Macro-structural factors      
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 National-level enterprises     
    1.  National Ratio (Aggregate) -.971*** 
t= -3.468 
   















                     a.  Oil and Gas only  
 
  -.392** 
t= -2.340 
                    b.  Machine & Metals  
 
  -.293* 
t= -1.945 
R Square .791 .803 .746 .754 
Adjusted R Square .700 .709 .636 .635 
*=significant at the p<0.1 level (90% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
**=significant at the p<0.05 (95% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
***=significant at the p<0.01 level (99% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
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Appendix C: Regression, Variation 3 (Unilateral Actions Only) 
 
                                                                          Standardized Coefficient, T-Value 
Construction of IV (See Table 4-3) 1b/ 90-94 2b/ 90-94 1b/ 95-02 2b/ 95-02 
Macro-structural factors      
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Elite Continuity (1990-2001) 
 


















 National-level enterprises     
    1.  National Ratio (Aggregate)     










     2.  Regional Ratio (Aggregate)     






                    b.  Machine & Metals  
 
- .082 
t = -1.825* 
 -.382*** 
t= -3.067 
R Square .732 .747 .793 .808 
Adjusted R Square .628 .649 .681 .704 
*=significant at the p<0.1 level (90% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
**=significant at the p<0.05 (95% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
***=significant at the p<0.01 level (99% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
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Appendix D: Regression, Variation 4 (Bilateral Actions) 
 
                                                                    Standardized Coefficient, T-Value 
Construction of IV (See Table 4-3) 1b/ all 1b/ oblasts 2b/ all 2b/ oblasts 
Macro-structural factors      
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 National-level enterprises     
    1.  National Ratio (Aggregate)     










     2.  Regional Ratio (Aggregate)     












R Square .665 .527 .625 .455 
Adjusted R Square .486 .250 .425 .138 # 
*=significant at the p<0.1 level (90% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
**=significant at the p<0.05 (95% confidence interval, two-tailed) 
***=significant at the p<0.01 level (99% confidence interval, two-tailed) 









A separate series of regressions was run on the oblasts (non-ethnic regions) only.  This 
controls for outlying cases; the wealthiest ethnic republics are clear outliers on the 
assertiveness index.  Secondly, this also controls for heterogeneity.  The salience of 
ethnicity in center-periphery relations was so strong in the early part of the 1990s that the 
strategic behavior of ethnic leaders has most likely reflected this huge asymmetry in 
bargaining power.  The results for the non-ethnic regions mirror those for the entire group 
of wealthy regions.  Most importantly, national- level enterprises retain their significance 
in all the variations. 
 
Two steps were taken to guard against spurious results related to the significance and sign 
of the national- level business variable.  First, the top five “borderline” enterprises listed 
in Table 4-1 – those which are just below the first echelon of enterprises in terms of their 
size – were individually factored in as “national- level” businesses.  Adding each of these 
enterprises slightly reduced the model’s fit, whereas taking out individual enterprises 
already designated as “national- level” also reduced the model’s fit.  This suggests that the 
operationalization of the independent variable is valid and that this is not an arbitrary 
effect.   
 
In addition, a differently constructed version of the main independent variable was also 
tested.  National- level businesses were subtracted from the wider pool of the top 200 big 
businesses, theoretically yielding “regional- level” businesses.  When substituted for the 
national- level variable, the “regional- level” business variable was significant and 
positive, rather than negative, for both machine and metals as well as non-vertically 
integrated oil companies.  The results for the control variables were the same in terms of 
sign and overall statistical significance.  Thus, either subtracting national- level businesses 
from the wider pool of big businesses or including them as a separate variable yields a 
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